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The purpose of this study is to explore the diverse ways that aesthetic 
experience is tested by participatory art. The study will show the part played by 
participatory action in changing the conditions in which aesthetic experience 
arises. It will be confirmed that when the philosophy of action is taken into 
account then explanations of participatory art are enhanced. 
 
There are many descriptions of aesthetic experience and it is generally assumed 
to be a cornerstone in explanations of art. In one of the leading accounts 
aesthetic experience is associated with disinterested perceptions where the 
individual is free of any practical concern for the object of experience. In recent 
explanations of contemporary art there is less emphasis on aesthetic experience 
and there is a tendency to suggest that background knowledge and 
interpretation are equally as significant as perception in the experience of art. 
 
‘Participatory art’ is a category of art that explicitly demonstrates this state of 
affairs. In contemporary criticism participatory art is a term used to describe art 
that favours an audience composed of active contributors rather than detached 
viewers. These are artworks that encourage moments of engagement by an 
audience such as the moving of elements in the work or the movement of the 
participant’s body. It could be said that the observable actions of participants 
mediate between perception and knowledge in participatory art. Such work 
opens up a space where assumptions made about the experience of art can be 
challenged.  
 
The present study explores how aesthetic experience is affected by the 
introduction of human action in participatory art by exploring three exhibitions 
of participatory art at The Tate Modern, The Barbican and Dundee 
Contemporary Arts. In this study it is suggested that participation in such 
artwork may be a consequence of deliberation, spontaneity or may take place 
within a social group. Therefore the aesthetic experiences and actions that are 
identified in these artworks are examined from the standpoint of reason, the 
body and social convention through the respective adoption of analytical, 





From the 28th April to the 6th of June 1971 there was a retrospective of the work 
of American artist Robert Morris at the Tate gallery in London. As part of this 
exhibition Morris presented a number of large and simple objects that the 
audience were invited to physically engage with. Corresponding with the 
Keeper of Exhibitions and Education of the Tate, Morris explained the aim of 
this work. “Time to press up against things, squeeze around, crawl over – not 
so much out of a childish naïveté to return to the playground, but more to 
acknowledge that the world begins to exist at the limits of our skin and what 
goes on at that interface between the physical self and external conditions 
doesn’t detach us like the detached gaze.” (Newman, M. & Bird, J. 1999: 96). 
Morris had some explanatory photographs made that were exhibited alongside 
the objects. These show the gallery staff participating ‘appropriately’ with the 
works as a guide for the public. (Fig. 1a & 1b) 
 
   
Fig. 1a & 1b 
 
The exhibition opened for five days and then was promptly closed by the 
Keeper of Exhibitions and the Director of the Tate, “a number a people, given 
the chance actually to climb on and push around objects in a gallery, went over 
the top – pieces were damaged, members of the public suffered minor injuries.” 
(Potts, A. 2000: 249). The show reopened with the participatory artworks 
removed a short time later. Reviews at the time made unfavourable references 
to playgrounds and assault courses. A more positive review describes the 
energy of the opening: “By the end of the private viewing the place was a 
bedlam in which all rules of decorum had been abandoned as liberated 
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aesthetes leaped and teetered and heaved and clambered and shouted and 
joined hands with total strangers.” (Newman, M. & Bird, J. 1999: 104). 
 
This study concentrates on contemporary presentations of this kind of art. 
During visits to the Tate Modern and The Barbican Gallery in London and 
Dundee Contemporary Arts I came across artworks with a similar spirit to 
Morris’ objects of the early seventies that encouraged physical participation 







The Unilever Series  
 
Carsten Höller 
‘Test Site’ (Fig. 2) 
 











I took part in this work in mid-December 2006. It was a series of chutes that 
extended from the second, third, fourth and fifth floors to the ground floor of 
the Turbine Hall. Participants were invited to slide down a chute on their backs. 
When I visited participants were initially asked to queue for a free ticket. 
Tickets were stamped with a time at half hourly intervals. At the appropriate 
time you were permitted to participate in the work. This involved going to the 
required floor and queuing in order to be fitted with a protective hat, elbow-
pads and knee-pads. An attendant then gave you some brief instructions. You 
sat at the top of the slide in a cotton bag and pushed yourself forward into the 
chute. The drop took five to ten seconds. In my experience it was a wild ride 
that left me trembling slightly. 
 
In an interview Höller describes his work: “A slide is a sculpture you can travel 
inside.” (Honoré, V. 2006). This description highlights how ‘Test Site’ has two 
main aspects. These two aspects are “the visual spectacle of watching people 
sliding and the ‘inner spectacle’ experienced by the sliders themselves.” (Tate 
Modern. 2006). From one perspective it is a sculptural object that can be 
contemplated. Its architectural scale and its use of plastics and metal present the 
observer with numerous opportunities to evaluate its aesthetic properties. From 
this perspective an observer can also witness the crowds who participate in the 
work. Participants gather at the tops of the slides, zoom down the slides and 
gather at the bottom to become spectators themselves. Höller states that 
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individuals may remain as observers if they want, “it would be a mistake to 
think that you have to use the slide to make sense of it.” (Honoré, V. 2006).  
 
From another perspective a participant has an opportunity to travel inside ‘Test 
Site’ at high speed. In this sense the work offers a practical experience that helps 
you to travel efficiently and provides you with a physical and emotional 
experience because you drop at such an unnerving rate. Höller adopts an 
objective point of view on his work and underlines that ‘Test Site’ can be 
explained in practical terms as a transport system or in relation to the 
architecture of the city. He proposes that ‘Test Site’ is an opportunity for 
participants to study their own responses to the work and a chance for an 
audience to assess if ‘Test Site’ could have an architectural function. He 
describes it as “a large-scale experiment” (Honoré, V. 2006). Höller also 
emphasises that ‘Test Site’ offers an intense experience for each participant. He 
is especially interested in the potential of his work to transform the personal 
disposition of each audience member. There is a private aspect to participation 
where sliding induces states “[…] somewhere between delight and alarm.” 









Felix Gonzalez-Torres and Christopher Wool 
‘Untitled, 1993’ (Fig. 3) 
 
7th July 2001- 2nd Sept. 2001 
Gallery 1 and 2 
Dundee Contemporary Arts 
 
I took part in this work as part of the group show ‘Trauma’ in mid-August 2001. 
It consisted of a pile of posters about 30cm high. Each poster was in portrait 
format and was 152cm high and 101cm wide. Participants were invited to take a 
poster away and gallery staff maintained the height of the pile. On my visit to 
the gallery I took away a poster and it had to be rolled up because of its size. 
This was a collaborative work by Gonzalez-Torres and Wool. Gonzalez-Torres 
supplied the participatory format and Wool supplied the text for the poster. 
Gonzalez Torres has produced numerous versions of this format using images 
and plain sheets of paper. Wool had previously produced an untitled painting 
with this text on it in 1990. The text is by Raoul Vaneigem and is quoted from 
Greil Marcus’ book on Punk and Dada ‘Lipstick Traces’ (Marcus, G. 2002).  
 
Gonzalez-Torres’ previous paper and poster works have all encouraged 
audiences to actively take ownership of examples from a stack. These examples 
have been described as “souvenirs of a public exhibition event” (Fuchs, R. 1997: 
89). In this sense ‘Untitled, 1993’ can be described as having a public dimension 
when it is a stack of posters in the gallery and a private dimension when a 
participant takes one away. Fuchs describes these public and private aspects to 
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the work in more detail as “the artist’s deliberate manipulation of the 
mechanics of reception.” (Fuchs, R. 1997: 89). From the outset the work permits 
an active engagement with the stack of posters. Fuchs suggests that the 
underlying participatory character of this work allows Gonzalez-Torres to 
stress how a particular, introspective and private experience of art integrates at 
a fundamental level with a more general social, cultural and public experience 
of art. Consequently Fuchs claims that in Gonzalez-Torres artwork a participant 
“functions as a living interface between the private and public spheres.” (Fuchs, 
R. 1997: 90). The participatory act of taking ownership is a concrete 
embodiment of how the individual experiences art in a social context.  
 
Fuchs also highlights the ephemeral format of Gonzalez-Torres work. He 
describes it as “production with the aim of renewed disintegration.” (Fuchs, R. 
1997: 93). A sense of disintegration inheres in the work yet with each new 
production of the work the disintegration is restored. The break up of the work 
is the work. Fuchs suggests that this approach to art production is part of 
Gonzalez-Torres’ response to the AIDS crisis in the mid-nineties. Gonzalez-
Torres lost many friends and himself died an AIDS related death in 1996. It can 
be suggested that by making dispersal an integral constituent of these works 










(1967) (Fig. 4) 
 
Lygia Clark 
‘Six Sensorial Masks’ 
(1967) (Fig. 5) 
 
16th Feb. 2006 –  
21th May 2006 




Fig. 4 & Fig. 5 
 
I participated in both of these works in April 2006 during the exhibition 
‘Tropicália – A Revolution in Brazilian Culture’. This exhibition focused on the 
diverse Brazilian cultural movement known as ‘Tropicalism’ that a had a 
multidisciplinary approach to art production, an empathy with the 
emancipatory potential of popular culture, an interest in collective participation 
and an engagement with the harsh social and political realities of late 60’s early 
70’s Brazil. The curator described the exhibition as “an attempt to understand 
the logic guiding the work of Oiticica and Lygia Clark and to set their work in 
its proper context.” (Searle, A. 2006)  
 
Oiticica’s ‘Tropicália’ is a sprawling installation that incorporates tent-like 
structures called ‘Penetrables’. These are environments that you enter and move 
through. They are inspired by Oiticica’s experiences in the favelas or 
shantytowns around Rio de Janeiro. There were cordoned-off pits of hay, water 
and sand, tropical foliage in pots, caged cockatoos that constantly called out 
and a maze of cubicles with a television tuned to a current television 
programme at its centre. Participants were expected to take off their footwear 
and wander through the installation. It has been suggested that in this 
installation Oiticica intended to comment on the radical value of ‘tropicality’. 
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“Oiticica called attention to the dangers of a superficial, folkloric consumption 
of an image of tropical Brazil, stressing the existential life-experience that 
escapes this consumption” (Ostoff, S. 1997: 7). 
 
Clark’s ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ is a series of fabric hoods that are piled on a table. 
Participants are invited to try on a hood. Each hood highlights a different 
sensory attribute. One hood has mirrors placed over the eye-holes, presenting 
the user with a disturbing close up reflection of his or her eyes. Another has 
herbs and spices packed into a pocket at the front that produces an olfactory 
sensation and another has maraca like objects positioned over the ears to 
produce an auditory sensation. Clark has stressed that during this period her 
work was not about art objects, her own self-expression or art history but about 
a kind of therapy where the sensory experience takes precedence. She stresses 
the purifying nature of her art. “The instant of the act is the only living reality to 
us” (Clark, L. 1965: 100). There is a sense in which participation is essential to 
this work; you have to be wearing it to experience it. 
 
While this study mainly concentrates on these three contemporary 
presentations of participatory art, references will also be made to other 
participatory artworks that have similar properties. Occasional references will 
additionally be made to a pilot study of a participatory artwork called 
‘Renascent Scission’ that I carried out at Gray’s School of Art in 2007  




This study will therefore primarily concentrate on participatory art from the 
participant’s perspective. The artworks selected as examples for this study 
represent participatory art that openly invites participatory action. The selected 
artworks encourage participants to slide, to take possession, to enter or to wear 
an artwork. When you encounter this art you are active rather than passive 
because it involves “activated spectatorship” (Bishop, C. 2005: 11). Two 
consequences of ‘activated spectatorship’ will be explored in this study. Firstly 
modernist accounts of aesthetic experience will be compared to accounts of the 
experience of participatory action. This will demonstrate how ‘the aesthetic’ is 
tested by participatory art. Secondly explanations of human action will be 
compared participatory art. This will show the diverse ways that participatory 
 21 
action may be captured and therefore the variety of ways that participatory 
action interrogates ‘the aesthetic’. 
Objectives 
 
This study accepts the possibility that aesthetic experience may have a role in 
an experience of participatory art while recognising that this role may be 
defined by the presence of participatory action. Consequently it is 
acknowledged that aesthetic experience may no longer have such a privileged 
position because the ordinary experience of action is influential in participatory 
art. Participatory art is no longer solely linked to special experiences that are 
detached from everyday life but also the experiences that constitute everyday 
life.  
 
The main objective of this study is to reach a fuller explanation of participatory 
art by exploring some of the more influential philosophies associated with 
aesthetic experience and human action. Within this main objective a distinction 
can be made between an explanation of art and an exploration of philosophy. 
Given that this study springs from research that took place in an art school 
rather than the philosophy department of a university the primary concern is to 
generate new knowledge about participatory art rather than to independently 
test the soundness of a series of philosophical arguments. Therefore 
philosophical arguments about aesthetic experience and human action will be 
placed at the service of new knowledge about participatory art. 
 
In this study it is suggested that participation may be a consequence of clear 
deliberation, spontaneous feeling or may be influenced by a set of social 
circumstances. Therefore it is an objective to explore how the aesthetic 
experiences that are identified in participatory art relate to reason, the body and 
social convention. Another objective is to look at the role played by action in 
participatory art. As with aesthetic experience the relationship of action to 
reason, the body and social convention will be considered. Consequently 
analytical, phenomenological and institutional/sociological perspectives will be 
adopted in order to explain aesthetic experience and action. It is also an 
objective to find out if explanations of the changing role of aesthetic experience 
in participatory art can be informed by explanations of participatory action. 
Can arguments about aesthetic experience be supported by arguments about 
action? 
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I would say that this study involves a measure of cross-disciplinary research 
because it incorporates the study of analytical, phenomenological and 
institutional/social approaches to aesthetic experience and action. The study 
contributes to knowledge about participatory art by comparing ideas about 
aesthetic experience with ideas about human action that have not been 
considered until now. It is suggested that an exploration of this relationship 
will help participants to understand some of the experiences that are 
encountered in participatory art. 
 
Theme: Aesthetic Experience 
 
Richard Shusterman suggests that analytical approaches to aesthetics have 
moved from an interest in the “evaluative” and the “phenomenological” to an 
interest in the “descriptively neutral” and the “semantic” (Shusterman, R. 1999: 
32). According to Shusterman this shift reflects a more general transformation 
within culture. As a consequence of the effects of all new media from TV 
onwards, the dominant mode of communication is changing. We are moving 
from a “unified experiential culture” to a “modular, informational one” 
(Shusterman, R. 1999: 37). Contemporary art is influenced by this state of affairs 
and this is described as the “anaesthetic thrust” in contemporary art 
(Shusterman, R. 1999: 29). For Shusterman aesthetic experience appears to have 
been superseded because it has too many associations with an outmoded form 
of art appreciation that valued pleasure and sensation. Interpretation is now the 
favoured term and the tendency in analytical approaches to aesthetics is to 
appraise art in terms of detached definitions and meanings rather than on the 
basis of how it makes you feel. Nonetheless Shusterman does not completely 
disregard aesthetic experience. He suggests that given the possibility of an 
aesthetic experience you are drawn to it and that the point of such experience is 
to emphasise “what is worth seeking in art and elsewhere in life” (Shusterman, 
R. 1999: 37). 
 
Shusterman is arguing that the role of aesthetic experience should not be 
overlooked in favour of analysis and interpretation. In this study I will 
recognise that aesthetic experience is simply one experience among the many 
experiences that an artwork can offer and I will cast doubt on the prominent 
role given to aesthetic experience by modernist theories of art. Following Noël 
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Carroll I will argue that “aesthetic experience is neither the only, the central, 
nor the best kind of appropriate response to an artwork” (Carroll, N. 2001: 61).  
 
When aesthetic experience is considered it is often straightforwardly associated 
with a perceptual experience. Looked at in more detail aesthetic experience can 
be described as a feeling of pleasure that arises from a set of perceptions that 
are caused by an artwork. It is also frequently claimed that this feeling of 
pleasure has a special, intrinsic value. Carroll describes the ‘traditional account’ 
of aesthetic experience, “an aesthetic experience of an artwork involves 
contemplation, valued for it own sake, of the artwork.” (Carroll, N. 2001: 44). 
On the basis of this brief description there are therefore three assumptions 
made about aesthetic experience that can be examined: its origins in perception, 
its association with pleasure and its supposed inherent value. 
 
Perception and pleasure 
 
In his discussion with George Dickie, Monroe Beardsley proposes that aesthetic 
enjoyment is “the kind of enjoyment we obtain by the apprehension of a 
qualitatively diverse segment of the phenomenal field […]” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 
42). For Beardsley the enjoyment produced by aesthetic experience arises from 
the perception of the aesthetic properties of an object or event. An individual 
becomes aware of an artwork’s properties primarily by looking at, listening to, 
smelling, touching or tasting a phenomenon. 
 
On the other hand Dickie suggests that perception is not necessarily the 
primary experience in an encounter with an artwork. For Dickie there are other 
aspects in your encounter that have an important bearing on your response to 
the work. At the very least you have a recognition that you are directing your 
attention to a ‘phenomenal field’ that is in fact an artwork and not an ordinary 
object. You may also be aware of an artistic tradition or technique that is 
embodied in a work. In general you have some knowledge, no matter how 
basic, that goes hand in hand with your perceptions.   
 
For example you may view a painting and see that it is full of flowing 
movement but you may not know that it was painted in 1955. The first part of 
this statement is a description of the “aesthetic object” (Dickie, G. 1974: 149) of 
the painting; the second part of this statement can only be determined by an 
historical analysis of the painting. Dickie accepts that the aesthetic aspects you 
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may come across in an exhibition may be distinct from what appear to be 
‘extrinsic’ historical aspects of the artwork. However he does not accept that 
just because your perception of the work can be separated from your 
knowledge of the work that perception is necessarily the fundamental ground 
for an experience of art. 
 
Dickie proposes that prior to your encounter with the art you must know that 
your perceptions are going to be the primary focus in the upcoming experience. 
You use your knowledge to ‘clear your mind of thoughts’ in order to have the 
proper aesthetic experience based on perception. This seems to suggest that 
your ability to be sensitive to the aesthetic properties of art does not arise 
‘naturally’ but is grounded in cognition. “Beardsley’s distinguishing between 
intentions and aesthetic objects presupposes this background knowledge but 
does not call attention to it” (Dickie, G. 1974: 171).  
 
Carroll is equally concerned with the role that knowledge plays alongside 
perception in aesthetic experience. He suggests that a focus on the perceptual in 
aesthetic experience leads to an increasingly restricted understanding of what 
counts in art. Rather than stress the importance of aesthetic experience he 
favours other ‘non-aesthetic’ factors such as when you look for a meaning an 
artwork, try to discover its underlying formal structures or try to figure out its 
symbolic order in a “gamelike” manner (Carroll, N. 2001: 10). This is described 
as “interpretative play” (Carroll, N. 2001: 11). He points out that placing 
interpretation on equal standing with aesthetic experience can be justified 
because it is so evident in education, in criticism and in artistic practice itself. 
Like Dickie, Carroll accepts that the aesthetic and the interpretative can be 
differentiated but he cannot see how it can be proved that aesthetic experience 
is more fundamental or operates at a deeper level than interpretation. In fact he 
suggests that like aesthetic experience, interpretation can be associated with 
pleasure because you can enjoy deciphering a complex theme or comparing an 
artwork to historical precedents. 
 
On the basis of these claims it can be suggested that the encounter with art is 
cognitive as well as perceptual, that interpretation is as significant as aesthetic 
experience and that interpretation can lead to pleasures that are similar to the 
pleasures of aesthetic experience. Just as Dickie and Carroll have suggested that 
cognition and interpretation often supplant aesthetic experience, in this study I 
aim to show that participatory action similarly displaces aesthetic experience. I 
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will show that the presence of participatory action confirms the significance of 
cognition and investigative interpretation in participatory art and that 




When he considers the intrinsic value of aesthetic experience Carroll traces a 
connection between the aesthetic theory of Kant and the modernism of Adorno. 
He suggests that Kant’s notions of ‘disinterestedness’ and the ‘freeplay of the 
imagination and understanding’ are used by Adorno in an ‘allegorical account’ 
of aesthetic experience. Kant’s terms are made to act as signs for a general 
criticism of the dominant values in society. Where Kant proposed that 
disinterestedness is an experience free of practical or ethical interests; Adorno 
reworks this to mean an experience free from economic or political interest. By 
surrendering to a disinterested aesthetic experience you are making a tacit 
comment on prevailing social values. Where Kant proposed that in aesthetic 
experience there is a freeplay of the understanding and imagination “since no 
definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition” (Kant, I. 1997: 
108); Adorno reworks this to mean an aesthetic experience that is “holding forth 
an alternative kind of reason, whose possibility also indicts instrumental 
rationality.” (Carroll, N. 2001: 55). Therefore aesthetic experience and 
contemporary society are engaged in an adversarial relationship. Aesthetic 
experience functions as a worthy model for the way things ought to be outside 
of use value, rationality or profit.           
 
Grant Kester takes a similar perspective when he comments on modernist 
avant-garde theory. He notes that when art is defined to the extent that it is at 
odds with its societal surroundings it operates as a form of “semantic 
resistance” (Kester, G. 2004: 32). Art is the critical ‘other’ of advertising, 
commodification, popular-culture, kitsch, public relations, mass media and 
political spectacle. The difficulty and interpretative complexity of art stands in 
opposition to the surrounding culture and remains “utterly unpalatable to the 
appropriative powers of consumer culture” (Kester, G. 2004: 32). Peter Burger 
similarly contends that aesthetic experience offers the individual a kind of 
refuge from the ravages of day-to-day experience. It offers “a communicative 
experience which is not subject to the imperatives of means end rationality and 
allows as much scope to the imagination as to the spontaneity of behaviour” 
(Burger, P. 1984: 25). In art reality is not presented in instrumental terms and 
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ideas are not introduced within a rational framework. From these standpoints 
aesthetic experience presents you with a strong feeling of alienation or an 
extraordinary epiphany. In either case your habitual point of view on society 
and culture is disrupted by the shock of aesthetic experience.  
 
For Carroll the credibility of these modernist accounts of aesthetic experience 
rests on an arguable assumption. If aesthetic experience is explicable as freeplay 
and disinterestedness and if freeplay and disinterestedness stand in opposition 
to the prevailing values of instrumental rationality and the market economy 
then it is clear that aesthetic experience cannot be reduced to advertising and 
profit motives. However according to Carroll there is no definitive evidence 
that freeplay and disinterestedness actually are the primary ingredients in an 
account of art. He has argued that ‘interpretative play’ is as important as 
aesthetic experience and this does not arise from the notions of freeplay or 
disinterestedness. Interpretation emerges from the background of knowledge 
you may have about art history and tradition. Interpretation involves many 
‘definite concepts’ and ‘declarations of interest’. In this way he is able to cast 
doubt on the authority of the modernist account of aesthetic experience. Other 
kinds of experience and knowledge deserve as much attention as aesthetic 
experience in accounts of art. “[The allegorical approach] presupposes that 
aesthetic experience is a matter of disinterested freeplay of the imagination, 
untethered by determinate concepts. These features of aesthetic experience 
must obtain if aesthetic experience is to be allegorized as a site of resistance 
against exchange value and instrumental reason” (Carroll, N. 2001: 57)   
 
On the basis of these comments I will assume that the modernist account of 
aesthetic experience that is put forward by Adorno cannot be straightforwardly 
applied to participatory art. Following Carroll I will acknowledge that art does 
not necessarily always stand in opposition to ‘instrumental reality’. Instead I 
propose that aspects of instrumental reality and its everyday concerns are 
integrated into participatory art. I will recognise that you employ background 









It could be suggested that human action is such a pervasive occurrence in 
everyday life that it often passes without remark. For example in the morning I 
may go into my kitchen intending to read the newspaper. I open the window 
shutters. This allows light into the room where the cat is sleeping. The light 
gives the cat a fright and she runs out of the kitchen. This series of events could 
be described as opening the shutters, letting light into the room or frightening 
the cat. I may take one perspective and think that this adequately covers my 
actions or I may take the whole story together explaining it as a result of my 
plan to read the paper. It could be said that situations like this happen to you 
everyday in multiple ways and you rarely pause to examine them. Nonetheless 
you do have a sense that there is an underlying kind of sequence that can be 
used to explain your actions. If my friend complained that when the cat ran out 
of the kitchen she knocked over a vase I would explain the sequence of events 
that led to the accident by pointing to the reason why I opened the shutters. I 
wanted some daylight to read by. 
 
When human actions are discussed reasons like this become very important 
and are often talked about in the same breath as intentions. My immediate 
intention in opening the shutters was to let light in. A more overarching 
intention was to read the paper comfortably. An even more distant intention 
may have been to check the cinema listings in order to make arrangements for 
the rest of the day. Therefore there are guiding intentions that deal with the 
here and now and intentions that organize events at a higher level. In this 
example it is also clear that I had clear reason for opening the shutters. On 
another day I may have opened the shutters because that is what I always do in 
the morning or I may have opened the shutters absentmindedly while talking 
on the telephone. In these cases I was acting out of habit or spontaneously. 
These examples indicate significant kinds of human action that do not involve 
clear reasons. 
 
Human action is a key theme in this study because a distinguishing property of 
participatory art is the way that it invites actions from a participant. 
Participatory art invites you to physically act in relation to the work in some 
way or other. Claire Bishop has one explanation of what these actions may 
mean. In a description of ‘relational aesthetics’ she states, “Such work seems to 
derive from a creative misreading of poststructuralist theory: rather than the 
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interpretations of a work of art being open to continual reassessment, the work 
itself is argued to be in perpetual flux” (Bishop, C. 2004: 52). She is suggesting 
that just as interpretations of artworks are often unstable, the ability to touch, 
move or alter a participatory artwork perceptibly reveals this instability. 
Participatory art literally and tangibly reveals to the audience the interpretative 
process. Interpretation is remodelled into a type of publicly observable 
behaviour. Your actions in relation to an artwork become a concrete 
embodiment of how you experience art. 
 
The aim of this study is not to suggest that participatory art crudely prioritises 
behaviour in explanations of art. However there are some terms associated with 
behaviourism that help to clarify the role that theories of human action can play 
in an explanation of participatory art. From the perspective of behaviourism 
human action can be described as a “molecular concept” or as a “molar 
concept” (Care, N.S. and Landesman, C. 1968: xiv). As a ‘molecular concept’ 
action is described in very specialist terms linked to the stretching and 
movements of your muscles. As a ‘molar concept’ action is described in more 
everyday terms with no reference to physiology or nerves. An action is 
‘walking down the street’ or ‘lifting a box’. Behaviourism also provides the 
terms “peripheral” and “central” behaviour (Care, N.S. and Landesman, C. 
1968: xiv). ‘Peripheral behaviours’ are events that are observable outside the 
body and ‘central behaviours’ are events that occur within the body such as 
feelings, thoughts or moods. From this scheme Care and Landesman are able to 
suggest that ‘Theories of action’ deal with how people actually intervene 
physically in the world. The theory of action deals with “molar peripheral 
behaviour” (Care, N.S. and Landesman, C. 1968: xiv). 
 
In this study action will be explored from an analytical perspective, a 
phenomenological perspective and from a social perspective. From the 
analytical perspective there are a number of interconnected viewpoints 
associated with explanations of action. The viewpoints that have a direct 
bearing on this study question the role of causality by asking: Is action caused 
by a preceding psychological event or mental state? They question the role of 
intention by asking: When you intend to do something is this a private plan or 
part of shared language? They also question the role of the will or volition by 
asking: In what sense are you a free agent if something outside of yourself or 
another person causes you to act? They additionally question the naturalistic 
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view of human action by asking: Is an action best explained in terms of nerve 
signals and physical movement? 
 
Unlike the analytical approach, phenomenology considers action in a way you 
might consider perception. Just as your senses can distort or heighten your 
perception of your surroundings so can your actions, “action does not merely 
take place within the world, but rather contributes to its constitution.” 
(Waldenfels, B. 1997: 11). From a phenomenological perspective action is 
explained in terms of its direct relation to ‘the body’ and how it is associated 
with existence as a “vital infrastructure” (Waldensfels, B. 1997: 11). 
Phenomenology helps to explain spontaneous, impulsive and habitual actions 
that do not have any reasoned basis but play a key role in behaviour. In this 
sense a phenomenology of action recognises that behaviour can fall outside of 
intention and clear goals. Through phenomenology “[…] we also recognise 
purposeless, useless, anti-economic, celebratory gestures in the human being.” 
(Flusser, V. 1985: 168) 
 
From a social perspective action moves out into the wider world where the 
consequences of taking a rational view or a ‘living’ view of action are explored. 
When action is understood in this way then it is suggested that the role of 
‘practical reason’ is being explored. “Practical reason is reasoning which is used 
to guide action, and is contrasted with theoretical reason, which is used to 
guide thinking.” (O’Neill, O. 1998: 613) From one perspective your actions can 
be understood in instrumental terms. This helps you with immediate solutions 
on how to act without giving you an overall guide for why you should act in 
such a way. From another perspective you already know what your goal is but 
this goal doesn’t supply you with the particular method for getting there. From 
another perspective it can be suggested that it is best not to explain practical 
reason in terms of means or goals. Instead the reasons for your actions can be 
explained in terms of ‘norms’. Norms are like a set of basic rules that act as 
“identity-constituting personal projects” (O’Neill, O. 1998: 617). Gender, age 
and ethnicity are examples of norms that could guide your actions. This view 
explains how practical reasoning may follow rules but doesn’t offer any way of 
questioning the rules. Another standpoint on norms suggests that they can be 
too specific and can only be applied to specific individuals and groups. It is 
better to appeal to “the world at large” (O’Neill, O. 1998: 617). The only kind of 
practical reason that ought to be respected is the kind that is acceptable to the 
widest public rather than limited interest groups. This view offers external 
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justification from which to criticise prescribed norms but also risks being overly 
general. When action is examined from a social perspective in this study these 
themes of instrumentalism, means and ends and particular and universal 
norms will inform its underlying structure. 
 
The intention of this study is to demonstrate that when the philosophy of action 
is applied to explanations of participatory art then there is no simple division 
between physical behaviour and psychological meaning. 
 
Theme: Participatory Art 
 
Participatory art has emerged under many aliases and in many forms through 
the 20th century. I would say that Allan Kaprow’s explanations of the 
‘Happening’ are a pertinent historical reference point for this study. In his text 
‘Assemblages, Environments and Happenings’ (1965) Kaprow outlines some of 
the distinguishing features of the period’s performance art. He is critical of 
performances that rely on theatrical conventions where the audience is 
separated from the show, declaring that their separation should be as indistinct 
as possible. He also proposes that the Happening does not necessarily need to 
be explained as ‘art’. Instead he suggests that it could just as easily be described 
in terms outside of art such as sport, biology or engineering. He hopes that 
Happenings will be able to extend spatially, spreading out across venues and 
locales to become a global phenomenon and furthermore he speculates that 
Happenings may question the nature of time. The duration of a Happening 
does not need to be limited to the few hours of theatrical convention. It has the 
potential to last for months, years or even be endless. At his most ambitious he 
imagines a kind of ‘open-ended general world score’ that could be used to 
choreograph the action of everyone and everything including the natural 
environment, animals and the weather. Kaprow’s views are a useful precedent 
in this study because underlying all of his explanations of the Happening is a 
commitment to the inclusion of participants and recognition that ‘ordinary 
action’ can refresh your understanding of art. “By avoiding the artistic modes 
there is a good chance that a new language will develop that has its own 
standards.” (Kaprow, A. 1965: 706).  
 
Claire Bishop develops the term ‘participatory art’ to describe work that 
involves “activated spectatorship” (Bishop, C. 2005: 11) and identifies three 
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main social themes that have become linked to such art since the sixties. These 
are Activation, Authorship and Community. Activation describes the intended 
outcome of participatory artworks where your participation prompts you to 
action in other spheres life. The participatory artwork generates a sense of 
freedom that provides the impetus to make wider social or political changes. 
Authorship describes the way that the creator of a participatory artwork 
surrenders some of the power they may have as the originator of the work. The 
artist becomes less dominant in the generation of meaning for the work. This is 
seen as generating a more equal social model. Community describes the manner 
in which the collective characteristics of the participatory artwork may be 
emphasised by its creator. The cooperation that occurs in the collective is 
contrasted with the isolating effects of dominant forms of individualism. 
Participation acts as “a restoration of the social bond through a collective 
elaboration of meaning” (Bishop, C. 2006: 12). 
 
I would say that the works by Höller, Gonzalez-Torres, Oiticica and Clark that 
are the focus of this study fall under Bishop’s categories and that to a greater or 
lesser degree they explore the notions of activation, authorship and community 
that are proposed as central themes of participatory art. However it is 
problematic to focus on a specific set of gallery-based works and classify them 
as being representative of all participatory art. Therefore I suggest that it is 
worth taking a broader perspective on participatory art where gallery-based 
and community-based participatory art can be compared. 
 
The exhibition spaces that housed the artworks under consideration in this 
study may be looked at from a positive perspective. They could be described as 
sites that encourage a liberal and multicultural outlook on culture. They 
provide spaces for the imagination and offer opportunities for aesthetic 
experience. They generate a sense of community amongst their audiences and 
they support the aesthetic education of their audiences without relying on the 
didactic methods employed in other spheres of life. You may learn something 
without the self-conscious awareness that you are improving yourself. From a 
more critical perspective it could be said that these venues serve the interests of 
dominant commercial and cultural elites. As a consequence they do not 
represent marginal groups but impose a specific form of community on diverse 
audiences. It could be said that these institutions assume that the experience of 
art is intrinsically valuable, isolate aesthetic experience from day-to-day life and 
decontextualise art in order to control it. “It is presumed to be of a higher order 
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possessing universal aesthetic quality that purportedly makes a better person of 
whoever experiences it.” (Hein, H. 1998: 304) 
 
According to Michel Foucault the museum or gallery can be understood as a 
“discursive formation” (Danaher, G. Schirato, T. Webb, J. 2000: 21). This 
discursive formation generates knowledge about art and aesthetics and this 
knowledge is dependent on three main factors: the discipline, the commentary 
and the author. Art is ‘owned’ by numerous disciplines such as art criticism, art 
education, art practice, curatorial practice and the art market. If art ever ends up 
in court then it is critics, educators, artists, curators and dealers who are called 
upon to give their judgement. For Foucault when a critic judges an artwork he 
or she is providing a commentary on art. In providing a commentary on art the 
critic is referring to his or her knowledge and this knowledge is based on what 
the critic has read or seen. In order to maintain your position as a critic you are 
continually assessed within your discipline to make sure you are making the 
appropriate commentaries. You must be tested to make sure you ‘fit in’. For 
Foucault the main way of securing your position is to be comprehensively 
aware of important artists and you must also provide commentaries on 
favoured theorists in your field. This is how the ‘truth of art’ is established. 
 
As is evident in this brief description of Foucault’s theory of discursive 
formation, the ‘truth of art’ is the result of the actual situations where it is being 
discussed. There is no disinterested essence of art that transcends the discipline, 
the commentary or the author. The ‘truth’ of the situation arises in a complex of 
argument, strategy, expertise, influence and power. The ‘truth’ is not pure but a 
consequence of “chance encounters, institutional politics and practices of 
patronage and favouritism” (Danaher, G. Schirato, T. Webb, J. 2000: 38). 
However for Foucault an important reward for any discourse that manages to 
achieve a degree of dominance in this process is the opportunity for its 
supporters to claim that their discourse is essential and universal. This is 
typically accomplished by demonstrating that a discourse is grounded in 
authoritative historical precedents. The further back in history you can trace the 
genealogy of your discourse the more legitimacy it has as a ‘truth’. Therefore 
from Foucault’s viewpoint the current ‘truth’ of the gallery as a special site for 
the contemplation of contemporary art is a result of the successful imposition of 
the values of a dominant cultural group. This dominance is guaranteed because 
they have effectively connected the current role of the gallery with precedents 
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that have taken place during the historical development of the art market and 
the gallery.  
 
The participatory art that is the focus of this study is gallery-based. It is 
therefore suggested that these works are dependent on the gallery to an extent. 
They do not radically challenge the gallery’s dominance as a discursive 
formation in the manner of community-based artworks. On the contrary it 
could be said that they accept the historical role of the gallery. Nonetheless 
these works are not exhibited in a straightforward manner. They redirect the 
resources of the gallery and reappraise the conventions of the gallery. In this 
way I suggest that they provide participants with opportunities to readdress 
the gallery’s role in presenting art. 
 
Discussions about community-based art can lead to polarisation. The museum 
and gallery tend to be cast in a negative light while environments outside of 
these contexts are viewed affirmatively. Art in a museum has been 
compromised while art in the community retains its integrity. I would disagree 
with this view and am inclined to say that both contexts share similar 
challenges. As mentioned above it could be suggested that the museum can be 
criticised for representing a dominant cultural elite. However community-based 
artworks can be criticised in much the same way. It is often assumed that 
community art projects represent the values of a community and that the 
community has either determined the content of a project or has actually been 
instrumental in the production of a project. Ideally an artist becomes integrated 
with the community and in turn the community becomes enfranchised through 
creative artistic labour and establishes a degree of artistic authority through the 
project. Nonetheless it can be suggested that such projects do not always 
represent a community. Under the guise of being community-based, art projects 
can be imposed on communities or artists can assume that they have the right 
to speak for a community. Community-based art projects can equally serve the 
interests of a cultural elite and treat a community as an undifferentiated group 
who need to be ‘educated’. Following Grant Kester I would suggest that it is 
more reasonable to take a pluralist view and acknowledge that there are 
difficulties and benefits to be found in both contexts. “Rather than posit a 
hierarchy between museum-based art and projects developed in non-art 
environments, it is more appropriate to think of these as two equally productive 
sites, each with its own appropriate strategies and potential compromises.” 
(Kester, G. 2004: 189). 
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Miwon Kwon’s discussion of the term ‘community’ will shed some more light 
on the current definition of participatory art. For Kwon the term community is 
frequently associated with a particularly narrow meaning. She explains how 
community arose in different forms in a city wide community-based art project 
in Chicago called “Culture in Action: New Public Art in Chicago” in the early 
nineties (Kwon, M. 2004: 104-134). She points to four main forms of community, 
the first of which is the ‘community of mythic unity’. In this formation 
community becomes an “overgeneralised and abstract projection of 
commonality” (Kwon, M. 2004: 120). An artist may bring together a previously 
disparate group and name it as a community. She then describes the notion of a 
‘sited community’. In this instance a group exists prior to the artist’s 
involvement and this identity is employed in the project. There are also 
‘invented communities (temporary)’ and ‘invented communities (ongoing)’. In 
the temporary invented community Kwon suggests that a group is organised 
around the creative objectives of a project only for its duration and disbands at 
its end. In the ongoing invented community, a group forms in similar manner 
around the objectives of an art project, but the group’s life extends beyond the 
period of the project and achieves some independence and success in its own 
terms.  
 
These definitions of community show the diverse ways that community-based 
art projects can approach the issue. The participatory artworks that are the 
focus of this study do not address the general issue of community, however it 
could be said that these works fall under either the ‘community of mythic unity’ 
or the ‘invented community (temporary)’ category. The works of Höller, 
Gonzalez-Torres, Oiticica and Clark could be negatively described as forming a 
sense of ‘mythic unity’ because by being exhibited within the art institution the 
community is reduced to crowds of ‘gallery goers’ or ‘art lovers’. For example 
tourists, students and local residents are combined into a ‘community of 
participants’. More positively these works could be described as presenting a 
temporary and invented community. Admittedly they only involve a short 
period of participation so they are not community-based art projects in the strict 
sense but they do bring groups together for the duration of the work. 
 
Another way to come to a clearer definition of participatory art is to consider 
some explanations of what is actually achieved when participation is given a 
central role in an artwork. What is so significant about participation? Miwon 
 35 
Kwon looks at how participation may surface as ‘artistic labour’, Grant Kester 
explores the possibility that participation emerges as ‘dialogue’ and Vilém 
Flusser considers participation in terms of communication theory. 
 
For Kwon a community-based art project must represent the community and 
this process of representation is guaranteed in two main ways, either “[…] 
when the idea or subject of the artwork is determined by the community, or 
better yet if it is the community itself in some way” (Kwon, M. 2004: 96). One 
approach to transforming the community actually into the subject of the 
artwork is to generate a situation where community members become part of 
an artistic collective along with the artist and engage in the production of the 
artwork. So community members may discuss plans for a project, carry out the 
construction of an installation, have an exhibition or produce video-art. Kwon 
claims that this kind of participatory creativity makes some political 
assumptions about the role of ‘artistic labour’. “A culturally fortified subject, 
rendered whole and unalienated through an encounter or involvement with an 
artwork, is imagined to be a politically empowered social subject with 
opportunity (afforded by the art project) and capacity (understood as innate) 
for artistic self-representation (= political self-determination).” (Kwon, M. 2004: 
97). 
 
Kwon questions the assumption that participatory action is automatically a 
liberating experience. Community members may collectively engage in the 
production of a work but it is arguable whether they inevitably achieve creative 
self-awareness. She questions whether ‘artistic labour’ can only be understood 
as a trouble-free episode of positive creativity. Kwon’s doubts about the 
meaning of ‘artistic labour’ firstly show how the participatory actions in the 
work of Höller, Gonzalez-Torres, Oiticica and Clark are not ‘artistic labour’. The 
participatory actions that are the focus of this study: the sliding, the taking 
possession, the entering and the wearing are far more ordinary and everyday. 
By contrast, for example, if you were involved in a community collective that 
was making a video you would have many more opportunities to be creative. 
An aim of this study is to find out how such ordinary and relatively uncreative 
actions may influence your experience of the artwork. Secondly Kwon shows 
that it is important to evaluate participatory action. It should not always be 
assumed to be a positive artistic experience. I would say that from one 
standpoint the participatory actions encouraged by the works in this study 
provide opportunities to critically appraise your role as a participant. Are your 
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participatory actions in any way creative? Do you feel any camaraderie with the 
artist or other participants? Are you being manipulated?  
 
Kester uses the term “dialogic art” when he refers to community-based art 
(Kester, G. 2004: 1). For Kester the aim of a project is to cultivate a series of 
dialogues. This perspective shifts the focus from the art object to a focus on the 
communicative possibilities that the art object may spark off. A project cannot 
be explained solely in terms of its form or interpreted with reference to its 
position within an artistic tradition but in terms of how it may generate 
discourse. The encounter with art extends beyond the artefact into “[…] the 
very process of communication that the artwork catalyses.” (Kester, G. 2004: 
900). In a sense Kester is suggesting that communication itself becomes an 
artistic ‘material’ for the dialogic artist. By becoming more involved in the 
process of communication it could be said that dialogic art begins to include a 
more heterogeneous set of media and methods. Dialogic art can no longer be 
evaluated in visual terms because its main outcome may be to generate a 
discussion, a social formation or a new set of links within a community. Kester 
proposes that dialogic art employs similar “transdisciplinary deviations” to 
those employed in classic avant-garde art such as Fluxus, Happenings or 
Situationism (Kester, G. 2004: 51). It is an art form that is not necessarily 
associated with a particular discipline but goes beyond the notion of a 
disciplinary field or is found across different disciplinary fields. “[…] the 
meaning of a given dialogical work is not centred in the physical condition of a 
single object or in the imaginative capacity of an individual viewer. Instead the 
work is constituted as an ensemble of effects, operating at numerous points of 
discursive interaction.” (Kester, G. 2004: 189). 
 
Kester loosens the ties that participatory action may have with a particular 
artistic method or medium and focuses instead on the way that participatory 
action becomes a dialogue. The dialogic artwork rests on a “process of 
communicative exchange rather than a physical object” (Kester, G. 2004: 90). I 
would suggest that there are similarities between the way that Kester explores 
dialogic art and the way that participatory art will be investigated in this study. 
He draws attention away from the object towards the process of 
communication and suggests that this process is transdisciplinary. In a 
corresponding way this study will concentrate on the way that participatory 
action cuts across disciplines. 
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Just as Grant Kester emphasises the discussion and communication that can be 
generated by new forms of ‘dialogic art’, Flusser’s communication theory is 
relevant in an explanation of participatory art because he similarly stresses the 
dialogue that can be generated by photography, television and digital 
technology. This notion of dialogue introduces a new participatory ratio 
between the producers and recipients of culture. Flusser also looks forward to a 
role for art that is comparable to Kester’s interest in the communicative 
potential of art. He imagines a future where “Art would no longer work at 
things (‘oeuvres’), but would propose models.” (Flusser, V. 1973: 34). 
 
According to Flusser the image was the earliest form of communication and its 
dominance was maintained up to and beyond the invention of writing. The 
image has a synchronic nature. “An image is a surface whose meaning is 
suspended in the moment: It ‘synchronizes’ the situations that it represents as a 
scene.” (Flusser, V. 1978: 37). For Flusser the image presents a mythical world-
view and communicates with immediacy. The onset of writing introduces a 
new form of communication. With text comes a logical way of thinking and 
“linear historical consciousness” (Flusser, V. 1973: 22). Writing establishes a 
diachronic world-view that fundamentally leads to science and the analytical 
method. Flusser argues that in the current situation, with the advent of 
photography, television and digital technology, the image is being re-
established as the dominant mode of communication. However this does not 
mean that communication is returning to the myths of the past, rather new 
media present communication in the form of a “techno-image” (Flusser, V. 
1978: 40). Techno-images may be images but they do not represent actuality in 
the way that early images do. They are assembled from programmes or have 
linear forms of thought incorporated into their structure. For Flusser the ‘techno 
image’ heralds an approaching dominant model of communication. 
 
“First, I mean that it will no longer be the centralized senders but everyone 
sitting in front of an image-producing terminal who will be able to dictate his 
own programs to the apparatus. Second, I mean that all of these ‘own 
programs’ will be compatible, feeding and correcting each other. That in this 
manner a continuous dialogic programming of all apparatuses will be 
generated by all participants.” (Flusser, V. 1985: 169). 
 
With this statement Flusser accurately predicts current models of online 
communication and it could be argued that these are a dominant form of 
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communication. For Flusser communication is no longer historical or based on 
linear texts, communication is now “posthistorical” (Flusser, V. 1973: 34). You 
no longer stand outside the image or the text and reflect on the message; you 
are now able to modify images that are constructed out of texts. You adopt a 
new position in relation to history because you are able to develop other 
combinations of history. Communication is no longer solely a “discourse” 
where a message is simply transmitted by a sender to a receiver (Flusser, V. 
1986-87: 18); communication can also be a dialogue where exchanges and 
interaction accrue between participants to form new messages. 
 
I would suggest that Flusser’s views on ‘posthistorical’ communication and 
networked dialogue have a bearing on explanations of participatory art because 
his suggestions capture the new model of communication that is intimated by 
participatory art. The works of Höller, Gonzalez-Torres, Oiticica and Clark seek 
dialogue in the form of active, bodily participation so it could be said that they 
establish a new relation to history for their participants. They do not present 
their art as a discourse or a fixed historical consciousness but present it as a 
dialogue that encourages contributions to their work’s history. In this sense 
they present a ‘posthistorical’ model of communication in their work.   
 
This study therefore recognises from the outset that there are particular 
problems associated with the museum or gallery space and the site-specific 
community art space. The main case studies for this thesis were exhibited at the 
Tate Modern, The Barbican and Dundee Contemporary Arts therefore this 
thesis will concentrate on the problems associated with participatory art 
exhibited in museum and gallery spaces. 
 
This study could be criticised because it overlooks key terms that are associated 
with participatory art such as ‘the community’ and ‘the site’ and I should 
instead consider artworks where all the key terms linked to participatory art are 
in play. In this way the importance of ‘the community’ can be weighed up 
against ‘aesthetic experience’ and the role of ‘the site’ can be evaluated 
alongside ‘action’. I agree that this approach could be profitable. Participatory 
art is such an overarching term and includes such a multitude of methods that a 
more eclectic set of case studies could have been employed. However I feel that 
by taking such a broad view the study would not have properly grasped the 
full meaning of the all the key terms. It is suggested that by concentrating on 
gallery based works and the association they may have with ‘aesthetic 
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experience’ and ‘action’ I have been able to bring out the full meaning and these 
terms. It is suggested that this approach does not artificially narrow the scope of 
the study but offers a more fully concentrated set of intentions. 
 
When the term ‘participatory action’ is used in this study Kwon, Kester and 
Flusser’s explanations of what participation can achieve will be used as a guide. 
Therefore participatory action will not be considered as ‘artistic labour’ but 
thought of as ordinary action in the day-to-day world. It will also be recognised 
that this ordinary action has the potential to be ‘transdisciplinary’ because it 
brings diverse disciplines and practices together. It will additionally be 
acknowledged that participatory action proposes a dialogic and ‘posthistorical’ 
rather than a discursive and historical model of communication. It will be 
shown that participatory art opens up a space for testing the boundary between 
aesthetic experience and ordinary experience, that it is a practice that employs a 
variety of different methods and that these methods traverse the discipline of 
aesthetics and communication theory. 
 
It could be argued that by presenting everyday action in a ‘transdisciplinary’ 
and ‘posthistorical’ context that participatory art questions some of the values 
of modernism. For Jurgen Habermas the dominant version of modernism 
involved a critical reflection on the specifics of the three main disciplines of 
science, morality and art. The overarching aim of this specialisation was the 
general benefit of society, however according to Habermas the findings of these 
disciplines were not distributed as expected. “The differentiation of science, 
morality and art has come to mean the autonomy of the segments treated by the 
specialist and their separation from the hermeneutics of everyday 
communication.” (Habermas, G. 1983: 463). Habermas traces a familiar 
trajectory for modern art where it becomes increasingly autonomous and 
begins to lose relevance in the face of ‘everyday communication’. Nonetheless 
he remains committed to modernism because in ‘everyday communication’ all 
the three fields of the enlightenment project are co-ordinated around one 
another. Science, morality and art are integrated into life because day-to-day 
life involves logic, practical choices that have ethical consequences and 
expressions of imagination. For Habermas modernism should aim to bring 
these areas together, not treat them autonomously. In this sense the high 
modernism of the twentieth century failed because it was narrowly specialist. 
This casts doubt on modernist practice as described by Clement Greenberg. 
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“The essence of modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods 
of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself – not in order to subvert it, but to 
entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.” (Greenberg, C. 1960: 754). 
 
Instead modernism should be viewed as a process where fields of knowledge 
become more integrated.  
 
“A reified everyday praxis can be cured only by creating unconstrained 
interaction of the cognitive with the moral-practical and the aesthetic-




Aesthetic experience and participatory action are themes that inform the 
structure of this study from the outset. It is assumed that participatory action is 
a human action and it supposed that because this human action takes place in 
an art context that it is associated in some way with some kind of aesthetic 
experience. It is additionally recognised that aesthetic experience and human 
action have been explained from many philosophical perspectives. On these 
grounds it is proposed that if some central philosophical perspectives on 
aesthetic experience and human action are identified and these perspectives are 
then compared to the properties of some participatory artworks then some key 
properties of participatory art in general will be revealed. 
 
Chapters one to three are devoted to aesthetic experience and participatory art. 
Chapter one offers an analytical explanation of aesthetic experience in 
participatory art. The aim of this chapter is to establish the position that is held 
by aesthetic experience in participatory art. Does aesthetic experience fit in 
alongside the practical and social experience of participatory action? Chapter 
two offers a phenomenological explanation of aesthetic experience in 
participatory art. The aim of this chapter is to learn if the ‘feel’ of aesthetic 
experience changes in participatory art. Do the new practical and social 
experiences introduced by participatory action change aesthetic experience? 
Chapter three offers an institutional explanation of aesthetic experience in 
participatory art. The aim of this chapter is to discover how the conventions of 
participatory art respond to the conventions of the art institution. How do the 
rules of participatory art relate to the rules of the art institution? 
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Chapters four to six are then allocated to action and participatory art. Chapter 
four provides an analytical explanation of participatory action. The aim of this 
chapter is to find out if participatory action can be rationally explained. Do you 
clearly plan or have a reason for participatory action? Chapter five provides a 
phenomenological explanation on participatory action. The aim of this chapter 
is to reveal what participatory action may ‘feel’ like. What role do the body and 
the temperament play in participatory action? Chapter six provides a social 
explanation of participatory action. The aim of this chapter is to explore what 
social values may influence participatory action. How does participatory action 
come to light in the context of the wider social world? 
 
The participatory artworks that are selected as the primary examples for this 
study took place in three exhibitions that I personally attended. Numerous 
secondary artworks by other artists also appear throughout the study to 
support or illustrate aspects of the discourse, as do references to the ‘Renascent 
Scission’ pilot study (Appendix I). Chapters one to three (On aesthetic 
experience) each take a different exhibition as their main case study. Chapter 
one considers Carsten Höller’s ‘Test Site’. Chapter two considers Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres and Christopher Wool’s collaborative work  ‘Untitled, 1993’ 
and chapter three considers Lygia Clark’s work ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ and Hélio 
Oiticica’s ‘Tropicália’. Chapters four to six (On action) then the same works in a 
different order. Chapter four considers Felix Gonzalez-Torres and Christopher 
Wool’s collaborative work. Chapter five considers Lygia Clark and Hélio 
Oiticica’s works and chapter six considers Carsten Höller’s work.  
 
Throughout each chapter the relevant philosophical perspective is explored and 
at key points in the discussion the findings are compared to the properties of 
the selected case study. A set of proposals is then reached for each chapter. The 
proposals on aesthetic experience and action are then evaluated to identify their 
similarities and differences. An overall set of proposals is then put forward. 
These draw on the way that claims made about aesthetic experience and action 







Actual and Reasonable 
 
This study is composed of six chapters that arrive at a series of proposals on 
aesthetic experience and action in participatory art. The study brings analytical, 
phenomenological and institutional perspectives on aesthetic experience 
together with analytical, phenomenological and social perspectives on human 
action. Each of these perspectives is compared to my own experience of specific 
participatory artworks with the aim of contributing some knowledge about key 
properties of participatory art in general. 
 
It is suggested that participatory art arises in the context of numerous 
uncontrollable variables and heterogeneous situations. The temperament, social 
background, gender, age and education of one participant can diverge 
dramatically from another as well as the participant’s perceptiveness, mood, 
experience and knowledge of art. The situations in which artworks are shown 
and the social groups that view the artwork additionally influence this 
variability. This leads to many competing perspectives and ambiguities about 
what is true about participatory art. As a result a qualitative research approach 
will be adopted for this study. I have to ask if my responses and the responses 
of others are true and plausible given that the responses of participants cannot 
be interpreted with certainty and it cannot be assumed that my own responses 
to a participatory artwork can be upheld as definitive. 
  
A truth condition can be used to offset the overt influence of any beliefs I may 
personally have about participatory art. From this standpoint I can ask: Is 
aesthetic experience actually embodied in participatory art in this way? And: Is 
participatory action actually like this? Following Williams, “By virtue of the 
truth condition on knowledge, in ascribing knowledge to someone we are 
doing more than characterize his subjective state: we are implying something 
about the world around him.” (Williams, M. 2001: 19).   
 
Nevertheless I would say that there is no categorical certainty about the truth 
conditions of participatory art in this study. Consequently the plausibility of a 
proposal about participatory art will also be taken into account and not simply 
whether it is true or false. Truth will be closely linked to belief and the 
proposals in this study will be gauged in terms of their credibility. From this 
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point of view it will be asked: In the context of participatory art is this a 
convincing claim? Given this link between truth and belief, knowledge about 
participatory art becomes “a highly prized state of belief” (Klein, P.D. 1998: 
269).  
 
It is recognised that a measure of objectivity can be introduced into knowledge 
about participatory art to counterbalance personal belief but that this 
knowledge will not have any clear certainty. Given this it is suggested that the 
aim of this study is not to establish truth and falsehood but to explain and 
support the reasonableness of its proposals. Following Chisholm: “Thus we 
might say that one belief is more reasonable than another, or more exactly, that 
one belief is more reasonable for a given person at a given time than is another 




It could be said that this description of what may be known about participatory 
art does not clear up any ambiguity. Asking what is actually true and whether a 
belief is reasonable are quite vague ways of testing a proposal. What will tie 
these two terms together are the justifications that are given for saying that a 
proposal is actual or reasonable. Following Roderick Chisholm it is suggested 
that a way to justify what you know is to locate “a kind of stopping place” 
(Chisholm, R. 1977: 2).  
 
A proposal must be subjected to questioning until you come to a point where 
you seem to have a more basic type of evidence for your knowledge. So you 
may ask: ‘How do you justify saying that participatory art involves 
participation?’ And I could answer: ‘I witnessed groups of people taking part in 
an artwork in a gallery’. You could ask further: ‘How is this evidence justified? 
You could be making it up’. And I could answer: ‘I am a reliable witness’ or 
‘Other participants will support my claims’. According to Chisholm what is 
known can be justified by tracing back what is proposed to a more basic 
evidence that he terms the “directly evident” (Chisholm, R. 1977: 2) and this 
tends to be perception of a situation in ‘ideal’ conditions. Williams suggests a 
similar approach although he includes evidence other than perception. He talks 
about a “reliable source” (Williams, M. 2001: 25) and this can include the 
testimony of a dependable witness or a recognised and authoritative text.  
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Alongside the notion that what is known about participatory art can be traced 
back to a more basic foundation there is also the notion that what is known is 
dependent on the way that sources of evidence jointly back one another up. 
“They are ‘mutually supporting’ just as the poles of a tepee are mutually 
supporting” (Klein, P.D. 1998: 269). Chisholm similarly suggests that even a 
perception in ‘ideal’ conditions is not a basic enough ‘stopping place’. You also 
have to acknowledge “the importance of the mutual support that is provided in 
part by the logical relations that certain propositions bear to each other.” 
(Chisholm, R. 1977: 85). 
 
A series of ‘stopping places’ and the notion of ‘mutual support’ will be used to 
substantiate the proposals made about participatory art in this study. One 
‘stopping place’ is my personal experience of the participatory artworks that are 
the focus of this study. In these artworks I directly participated in actions that 
involved descending down a chute, taking possession of a poster, entering an 
installation and wearing experimental garments. Another ‘stopping place’ are 
the photographs and discursive accounts of these participatory artworks made 
by the artists or by critics and journalists who have witnessed the works. These 
show what the works look like and highlight the artistic intentions and 
interpretative perspectives to be taken into consideration. One other ‘stopping 
place’ is the document of the pilot study ‘Renascent Scission’ (Appendix I). The 
intention of this document is to offer an accessible and less formal account of 
some of the issues associated with participatory art and to demonstrate the 
interest that art students have in these issues. These sources of evidence are all 
compared to the theoretical discourse of the thesis and this is where the ‘mutual 
support’ for the proposals that are made about participatory art builds up. In 
this sense my own explanations of the properties of specific participatory 
artwork may be a ‘stopping place’ but they also require the ‘mutual support’ of 




Going further it is suggested that there are two ways to justify what may be 
known about participatory art. Michael Williams suggests that from one 
perspective justification relies on “adequate grounding” and from the other 
perspective it relies on “personal justification” (Williams, M. 2001: 22).  
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When the ‘adequate grounds’ are taken into consideration then the evidence 
that is used to support a proposal is looked at with some objectivity. This 
means that when an example of participatory artwork is used as evidence in 
this study then the ‘facts’ of the work are taken into account. What are the 
‘facts’ of an artwork? According to Chisholm: “First, that there are states of 
affairs, some of which occur or obtain and some of which do not occur or 
obtain; and second that there are attributes or properties, some of which are 
exemplified or instantiated and some of which are not exemplified or 
instantiated.” (Chisholm, R. 1997: 87). From this perspective it is recognised that 
there are facts about artworks that can be more or less reported neutrally such 
as scale, medium, duration, date and location.  
 
However a contradiction emerges when an overtly objective explanation of a 
participatory artwork is favoured. If I assert that an individual’s participation 
can be verified in the same way that physical properties of a simple object such 
as a block of wood can be verified then this makes participation external to a 
human explanation. In this case I neutrally register participation and the 
relationship between an artwork and human explanation is abandoned. The 
fundamental necessity of interpretation is overlooked. It is suggested that the 
most reasonable way to resolve this problem is to accept that an artwork’s 
properties are not absolutely objective and that your experience of them is not 
absolutely personal. In this study my personal perspective and the perspective 
of others are compared to one another and considered in the light of the 
properties of a number of participatory artworks. I personally witness and 
interpret participatory action and support my claims with the claims of others 
who have views on aesthetic experience and action. Accordingly the adequate 
grounds that are used to justify proposals about participatory art are not strictly 
based on impartial evidence. It must also be considered in terms of the 
reliability of the witness and the dependability of the interpretation. The 
theories and properties that are ascribed to participatory art are supported to a 
large extent by personal justification. In this way ‘adequate grounds’ must 




‘Personal justification’ assures the soundness of a theory about participatory art 
by making sure that the theory emerges from a representative overview of the 
field of inquiry. For example does this theory take into account the main 
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problems associated with an analytical approach to aesthetic experience? Does 
this theory bear in mind the main arguments about the social nature of action? 
The soundness of a theory in this study accumulates through a comprehensive 
comparison of arguments associated with aesthetic experience and action. The 
reliability of this approach is additionally supported by the careful employment 
of reasoned argument. Following Robert B. Burns it is suggested that the notion 
of triangulation is used to ensure the reliability of the discourse on theories 
linked to participatory art. (Burns, R.B. 2000: 419).   
 
How can I ‘personally justify’ using my own experience to make claims about 
participatory art? Following Chisholm it could be said that my explanations 
arise from “properly accredited sources of knowledge” (Chisholm, R. 1977: 
122). I perceive the work, I call on a store of past experiences to compare it to, I 
reflect inwardly about the work and I can use reason to explain aspects of the 
work. However each of these sources of knowledge can in turn be influenced by 
the mood I was in when I encountered the work, by the response of other 
individuals in the gallery, by a willingness to show approval towards the work 
given my research interests and by my social and educational background. All 
of these factors make my explanation highly conditional. It is suggested that the 
notion of the case study can justify the support that participatory artworks give 




Triangulation informed this study from the beginning. The earliest sources of 
information about aesthetic experience and action came from three key 
encyclopaedias in Glasgow University Library. These are: 
 
CRAIG, E. Gen. Ed. 1998.  
Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London, Routledge. 
DRUMMOND, J. Gen. Ed. 1997.  
Encyclopaedia of Phenomenology. London, Kluwer. 
KELLY, M. Chief Ed. 1998.  
Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
As key words emerged during my reading I constantly checked to see if they 
appeared in these three encyclopaedias and began to cross-reference between 
the entries in each encyclopaedia. The entry in an encyclopaedia is 
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accompanied by an initial explanation and after this the most important texts 
associated with the entry are listed. Key terms such as action and aesthetic 
experience began to emerge in the research. A clearer picture of participatory 
art began to form in parallel with this exploration of key words. Given that it is 
relatively contemporary phenomenon the main initial sources of information 
about participatory art came from a series of databases. These were: 
 
http://www.jstor.org: A cross discipline journal archive 
http://www.theses.com: An index of theses published in the UK and Ireland 
http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com: An arts abstracts database 
 
In this way I was able to establish a series of correspondences and was able to 
refine the scope of the literature review as my reading progressed. The tripartite 
structure of the project’s discourse surfaced from this method. It was 
recognised that an explanation of how aesthetic experience and action are 
embodied in participatory art could be achieved by taking a rational, bodily 
and social perspective. 
 
Robert B. Burns suggests that triangulation justifies qualitative research in two 
ways. It does this by: “checking out the consistency of findings generated by 
different data-collection methods [and by] checking out the consistency of 
different data sources within the same method.” (Burns, R.B. 2000: 419). With 
reference to the first way of using triangulation: one ‘data-collection method’ in 
this project is an extended philosophical discourse that takes in numerous 
perspectives on aesthetic experience and action, another ‘data-collection 
method’ is a reflection on my own experiences and experiences of others while 
taking part in participatory art. Throughout this project these two methods are 
constantly weighed up against one another in order to achieve a credible 
explanation of how aesthetic experience and action are embodied in 
participatory art. With reference to the second way of using triangulation: 
‘different data-sources’ using the same method are compared to one another. A 
tripartite approach is used where aesthetic experience and action are 
considered from an analytical, a phenomenological and an institutional/social 
standpoint. Correspondences between these standpoints are then used to 







The examples of participatory art used in this project took place in exhibitions 
that I personally experienced and this is the main reason why they are used. I 
am able to remember the event and consider my own participation and the 
participation of others. These observations can then be weighed up against 
other critical interpretations of the work and also against the main 
philosophical discourse of the project. It is suggested that a useful way to 
present my experience of these artworks in the context of this project is as a 
series of case studies. The case studies in this project are based on models used 
in social science but they do not strictly follow the practices recommended for 
an empirical study in social science. Rather the case study is an approach that 
provides some justification for the use of my own experience as evidence in this 
project given that my observations can be influenced by factors like personal 
temperament, social background etc. 
 
The chosen participatory artworks in this project can be presented as a set of 
case studies because each artwork forms a “bounded system” (Burns, R.B. 2000: 
460). Each work was shown for a limited period in a specific location. In order 
to be explained as a case study Burns also suggests that you should know what 
it is you are explaining. He describes this as “the unit of analysis” (Burns, R.B. 
2000: 460). For this project the ‘unit’ is aesthetic experience and action in 
participatory art. This is understood through my own experience and the 
observed behaviour of others in a group of participatory artworks. An 
important purpose of the case study is that an explanation of the particular case 
can represent the general class that the case belongs to. The case studies in this 
project represent participatory art that openly invites participatory action. 
 
It is suggested that it is appropriate to describe these case studies as 
“observational case studies” (Burns, R.B. 2000: 462). According to Burns for an 
observational case study in social science the researcher identifies a specific 
location, social group or activity that is going to be observed and then tries to be 
sensitive to the influence that they may have on what they are observing. In this 
project it is a particular activity that is the focus of each case study rather than a 
specific location or social group. Each case study is considered in terms of the 
aesthetic experience and the action of the participant. For this project I was both 
a participant and an observer in these case studies. I took part in the artworks 
and watched others take part. As I observed and participated in these artworks 
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I behaved in the way I would usually behave when visiting a gallery or 
museum. I did not have any special plans or procedures to follow. I did not 
notify the galleries that I was visiting. I arrived in mid-morning or mid-
afternoon. I spent one or two hours in the exhibition space taking in the work 
alongside other exhibits that may have been there. I did not identify myself as a 
special type of participant or observer by interviewing other participants but 
was part of the general audience for these artworks. In this sense I was able to 
remain unobtrusive and get a sense of a ‘typical’ day in the life if these works. 
Within each chapter in this project theories about aesthetic experience or action 
are developed and these are compared to my findings in the artwork case 
studies. The main outcome of these comparisons is the emergence of a 
discussion. Given that this project springs from research in art rather than 
philosophy these discussions will be valued on the basis of the new knowledge 
they yield about participatory art. Therefore these discussions place philosophy 
at the service of new knowledge about art. During these discussions the theory 
and findings are mutually reconsidered because the philosophical discourse is 
supported or questioned by the findings in the artwork case studies. It is a 
process of interpretation that develops when my interpretation is compared to 
the views of others. If it is recognised that artworks tend to generate multiple 
and conflicting interpretations then it must be recognised that it is in the 
process of discussion that my own personal experience begins to gain some 
credibility as it is confirmed and opposed by the views of others. 1. In this way a 
set of proposals about participatory art is generated. Burns describes this as 
“explanation building” (Burns, R.B. 2000: 473).  
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The features of ‘Test Site’ (Fig. 1) that made the strongest impression on me 
were its sculptural appearance, the sense of being part of a large crowd of 
people who all had the same goal, the staggering force of the high-speed 
descent inside the chute and the unsteadiness I felt as I stood up after sliding. 
As I surveyed the work’s appearance I was distracted by other activities like 
queuing, talking and reading. When I felt that I was part of a social group this 
was reinforced by the conventions of queuing, talking and reading. As I 
plunged down inside the chute I was dimly aware that the intensity of the 
experience was threatening to overwhelm me and when I felt a bit shaky in the 
aftermath of the experience I also felt slightly elated.    
 
Problem 
When I participated in ‘Test Site’ I would say that I enjoyed the experience 
despite its more harrowing characteristics. After an experience of ‘Test Site’ you 
could say that ‘you had to be there’ or ‘you have to experience it first hand’. I 
was also struck by how many experiences the work seemed to offer. During my 
participation I looked, talked, anticipated, waited, descended and recollected. I 
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could not say that the experience rested on my direct participation because 
during my participation I had opportunities to observe the whole experience as 
a detached spectator. I also could not say that the experience was solely 
aesthetic because I also had to think practically and socially while I took part in 
the work. It is suggested that there is a need to explain how aesthetic experience 
relates to social and practical experience because social and practical 
experiences are so predominant in a work like ‘Test Site’. It is proposed that this 
will help artists and participants to understand the role played by aesthetic 
experience in participatory art. 
 
Resolution 
It is put forward that an analytical perspective can help to explain how aesthetic 
experience is embodied in participatory art. From this point of view it is 
recognised that aesthetic experience is either regulated by a psychological 
attitude or controlled by the objective conventions of the artwork. Aesthetic 
experience surfaces from an internal experience or an external set of practices. 
These ideas are relevant because it could be said that through the introduction 
of observable action participatory art casts doubt on the idea that there is a 
schism between inner and outer experience. From this viewpoint it is suggested 




This chapter will look at some basic issues in aesthetic experience and aesthetic 
attitude theory. The argument can be summarised: Is aesthetic experience 
introspective? Is it governed by a special psychological viewpoint? It can also 
be asked: Does the object of experience determine aesthetic experience? 
Phenomenological and objective descriptions of aesthetic experience will be 
introduced and views on the reality of subjective and objective perspectives on 
aesthetic experience will also be investigated. George Dickie’s examination of 
the conventions of aesthetic experience will be considered in detail. His 
thoughts on the art institution, aesthetic distance and aesthetic 
disinterestedness will be appraised. Monroe Beardsley’s examination of the 
phenomenon of aesthetic experience will also be considered in detail. His views 
on the aesthetic viewpoint, aesthetic enjoyment and the intrinsic value of art 
will be considered. The debate between Dickie and Beardsley will also be 
discussed. These accounts will provide an analytical perspective on 
participatory art and throughout the chapter they will be compared to aspects 
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of ‘Test Site’ by Carsten Höller. These comparisons will provide an analytical 
explanation of how aesthetic experience is embodied in participatory art. In 
these comparisons the various philosophical discourses on aesthetic experience 
will be used as a means to reach a fuller understanding of participatory art 
rather than a means to discuss aesthetic experience per se. Therefore these 
comparisons will place accounts of aesthetic experience at the service of 
explanations of ‘Test Site’. This will help to answer the main question of this 
chapter: What position does aesthetic experience hold in participatory art? 
 
1.2 Aesthetic experience 
1.2.1 Basic Issues 
 
In ‘Test Site’ I participated by queuing, receiving instructions and sliding down 
a chute. These activities could all be described as everyday actions. I have done 
similar things in other more usual circumstances. However because they took 
place in the context of an artwork there was also a sense that I should have a 
special awareness of my participation. There was the possibility of aesthetic 
experience. In ‘Test Site’ how did an everyday awareness of my activity relate 
to the special awareness intimated by the artwork?    
 
One approach to aesthetic experience tries to resolve two competing arguments 
in an ongoing debate. The gist of the first argument is that aesthetic experience 
is governed by a special psychological viewpoint. This aesthetic viewpoint is 
distinct from social, practical or historical viewpoints. The second argument 
claims that aesthetic experience is determined by the objective attributes of the 
object of the experience. This object may be a thing or an event. There is of 
course a conciliatory position that combines elements from both arguments. At 
both poles of the argument Collinson suggests that there are “logically 
necessary conditions” (Collinson, D. 1992: 157) that provide a viewer with a 
means to have an aesthetic experience. In the first argument the condition is 
that you acquire the correct psychological attitude. This attitude makes 
aesthetic experience possible.1. When looking at a painting you may be asked to 
surrender to your perceptions and empty your mind of any biographical 
knowledge you have of the artist. Work by Frank Stella (Fig. 2) may cause you 
to concentrate on your experience of the colour, line and shape of the painting 
without any regard for its subject matter. In the second argument the conditions 
are the formal conventions that make up the object. These conventions may be 
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things like rules that control how the elements of an object relate to one another. 
In this respect Frank Stella plays with a central convention of painting: namely 





Monroe Beardsley looked at the reasons why someone has an aesthetic 
experience rather than a non-aesthetic experience. He claims that in order to 
have an aesthetic experience you have to adopt the correct aesthetic attitude in 
order to perceive ‘aesthetic qualities’. This can be illustrated if the situation is 
considered where one person sees a patch of blue colour as ‘refreshing’ while 
another person just sees a neutral patch of blue. The former sees aesthetic 
qualities and the latter does not. There appears to be an additional feeling 
attached to the perception that brings out the aesthetic qualities of the colour. 
Beardsley describes this as “a special achievement in the employment of the 
familiar faculties” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 97). Ordinary perception is being used 
but in an exceptional way. What makes it so special? He proposes that in such 
situations you more readily yield to what is given in a perception. You are at 
ease with a less focused perception and take in a more general set of 
relationships. He talks about the “unfettered power of seeing as seeing is freed 
from subservience to a practical end” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 100). 
 
George Dickie took a more objective stance to aesthetic attitude theory. He 
proposed that the aesthetic attitude is only a way of directing your attention. 
You can just as easily pay attention to the social, biographical or economic 
aspects of an object. Aesthetic experience is not an ambiguous psychological 
phenomenon that occurs in an individual. To distinguish aesthetic attention 
from other kinds of attention you focus on the objective properties of the object 
and the knowledge of artistic conventions you bring to the object. It is an 
outcome of the objective properties of the works themselves and the objective 
practices for viewing works. By emphasising the aesthetic properties and 
conventions used in the production of an artwork Dickie reconnects aesthetic 
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experience to the object of experience. Collinson agrees that Dickie provides 
good reasons to question the psychological aspects of the aesthetic attitude. If 
you spend too much time looking inward then the object of experience stops 
being important. Nevertheless she points out that this proposition can just as 
easily be reversed. You can just as easily say that if you spend too much time 
looking outward then the awareness that you may have an experience as an 
individual begins to recede. Collinson suggests that Dickie’s notion of aesthetic 
attention “does not carry with it the rich phenomenological possibilities that are 
traditionally associated with aesthetic perception” (Collinson, D. 1992: 164). 
 
An objective of this project is to show how participatory art questions the role 
of ‘aesthetic perception’ in your encounter with art (§ Theme: Aesthetic 
Experience). This issue is outlined in a different way in Michael Fried’s essay 
‘Art and Objecthood’ where he defends a position similar to Collinson. (Fried, 
M. 1967). In this essay he argues that there is a need to distinguish between 
‘modernist art’ and ‘the theatrical’. For Fried “Art degenerates as it approaches the 
condition of theatre” (Fried, M. 1967: 831). In this statement Fried is not rejecting 
drama as an art form. He is not saying that plays are not art and actors are not 
artists. He is proposing that art should be experienced in a specific way. He 
favours clear divisions between painting and sculpture stating “What lies 
between the arts is theatre” (Fried, M. 1967: 831). At the time of these 
declarations Fried was responding to minimalism and particularly Robert 
Morris’ work. He was critical of the way that Morris’ work became “an object in 
a situation – one that, virtually by definition, includes the beholder.” (Fried, M. 
1967: 825). 
 
Fried’s distinction between the “authentic” (Kester, G. 2004: 49) modernist work 
and the theatrical minimalist work has its basis in his understanding of how 
you perceive time in an encounter these works. He proposes that there is 
“Presentness” (Fried, M. 1967: 832) in your experience with the authentic 
modernist work. Your encounter has a marked sense of totality and directness 
that differs from more ordinary encounters. You are led to disregard your 
surroundings and your perceptions are forcefully sharpened. An experience of 
the theatrical minimalist work on the other hand has “duration” (Fried, M. 1967: 
832). Your encounter with the work accumulates through time. You notice the 
context of the work and your presence in that context and begin to assemble 
meanings in much the same way that you build up an understanding of a plot 
when you read a novel. The authentic work therefore has a transcendent 
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element to it because its aim is to suspend your usual modes of thinking. The 
theatrical work is impure because it calls attention to your usual use of the 
symbolic order and modes of thinking. 
 
Fried supports the role of ‘authentic’ modernist aesthetic experience when he 
differentiates it from ordinary experience. He demonstrates the potential of 
aesthetic experience to ‘short circuit’ your habitual viewpoint. However the 
current thesis is not examining the role of aesthetic experience in modernist 
painting or sculpture but its role in participatory art. Consequently the part 
aesthetic experience plays cannot be outlined in straightforward terms. 
Additionally history has shown that since Fried formulated his position on 
minimalism, numerous ‘theatrical’ art forms have emerged to become a 
legitimate part of art history such as land-art, conceptual art, performance art, 
installation art, site-specific art as well as participatory art. 
 
Rosalind Krauss’ offers a more positive outlook on minimalism. For Krauss, 
minimalist art does not act as a “transparent pane – a window through which 
the psychological spaces of the viewer and creator open onto each other” 
(Krauss, R. 1977: 70). According to Krauss minimalism questioned whether 
artworks must have a clearly distinguishable surface beneath which a complex 
meaning can be discerned. Minimalist artists were exploring prevailing notions 
of how meaning is understood i.e. that ideas and feelings ‘well up’ from a 
private inner space to be inspected in a public exterior space. For Krauss this is 
especially evident in the way that minimalist works employed ordinary 
materials that had not been overtly manipulated by the artist such as plywood, 
sheet metal, felt, bricks and fluorescent lights. Rather than assuming that the 
artist must imprint their ideas or feelings onto a material, they place significant 
conceptual emphasis on the forms that the materials have prior to their 
involvement. They were seen as being ordinary materials-in-the-world. 
Minimalists accepted that the meanings of their materials had already been 
established by the world-in-general before they were used in their art. For 
Krauss this way of using materials indicates a way of understanding how 
meaning is formed. Just as the meaning of a house brick is determined by its 
common use as a building material, minimalism proposes that ideas and 
feelings may also be conditioned as part of a public experience. These 
unadorned and basic materials were not differentiated from other objects in the 
world and they were not seen as harbouring or bearing some special 
psychological insight. In this sense minimalist art did not offer a transcendental 
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moment of ‘presentness’ to the viewer, but showed that an encounter with art 
might be a publicly negotiable experience. Your experience of art could be 
something that can be discussed and is something that stands in relation to 
other kinds of experience. Rather than being isolated as an exceptional 
‘immediate’ experience minimalist practices “share in the extended flow of 
duration” (Krauss, R. 1977. my italics: 198).   
 
These perspectives show that the idea of aesthetic experience is clearly 
problematic. It must be acknowledged that the modernist attitude of 
‘presentness’ creates difficulties given that the focus of this project is 
participatory art and that artistic development since the sixties has shown the 
significance of  ‘duration’ in the encounter with art. Krauss acknowledges that 
minimalist practice offers a valuable perspective on how meaning may be 
shared in an encounter with art. If a conclusion is to be drawn from all of this it 
must be that it is important to explain your experience in participatory art as 
‘durational’. Your experience is not only perceptual but as is pointed in the 
introduction, it is also cognitive and interpretative (§ Theme: Aesthetic 
Experience). In participatory art aesthetic experience shares space with 
numerous other experiences and these other kinds of experience frequently 
cause you to question the status of ‘the aesthetic’.  
1.2.2 Feelings or thoughts 
 
When I first witnessed the architectural scale and throng of participants around 
‘Test Site’ I began to more fully appreciate the work. However I was 
unprepared for the actual experience itself. I was taken aback by the impact that 
sliding down a chute made on me. I had an initial grasp of what ‘Test Site’ 
involved but how did this relate to what I underwent during my participation?      
 
It could be said that a phenomenological account of aesthetic experience deals 
with the role of inner experience in art and an epistemic account of aesthetic 
experience deals with the role of objective conventions in art, (Iseminger, G. 
2003). A phenomenological account concentrates on what it feels like to have an 
aesthetic experience and stresses the inner, psychological aspect of aesthetic 
experience. When you undergo an aesthetic experience a phenomenological 
account asks: What kind of impression does it leave you with? An epistemic 
account focuses on how this experience brings about these aesthetic feelings or 
thoughts. From a more objective perspective it asks: What perceptions are you 
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using and how do they cause aesthetic feelings or thoughts? In epistemic 
accounts it is the objective conditions in your encounters with artworks that 
shape aesthetic experience. Your aesthetic experiences arise from artistic 
conventions that are used in a premeditated way by an artist. 2.  
 
Gary Iseminger looks at the difficulties presented by phenomenological 
accounts of aesthetic experience when he discusses the related notion of 
aesthetic attitude. According to aesthetic attitude theories, in order to have an 
aesthetic experience of an artwork you have to quell any other mental states 
that may interfere with your aesthetic attitude. You must inhabit a particular 
mental state. You have to contain any knowledge or contextual interests you 
may have in an artwork to allow for the aesthetic attitude to surface. The 
situation is portrayed as “different states of mind competing for mental space” 
(Iseminger, G. 2003: 106). Iseminger points out that this portrayal tends to imply 
that the aesthetic attitude is embattled and must be sheltered, “there is a strong 
temptation to make the mind safe for aesthetic experience” (Iseminger, G. 2003: 
106). As a consequence aesthetic attitude theories are liable to impose numerous 
limitations on what is an acceptable state of mind for aesthetic experience. The 
attitudes that suit aesthetic experience become increasingly restricted. In this 
way aesthetic experience becomes associated with a remote sensibility purged 
of unsavoury associations. Taken to their logical conclusion aesthetic attitude 
theories tend to sideline other attitudes that pay attention to the biographical 
detail, social context, history and politics of an artwork.  
 
Iseminger’s approach supports the side of the argument that highlights the 
known aspects of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience is placed in the 
context of knowledge and it is recognised that aesthetic experience may occur 
in conjunction with other kinds of experience that may offer different 
perspectives on the situation. Practical, social and historical experiences all have 
a part to play in an epistemic account of aesthetic experience. This is 
particularly reinforced by the conditions of ‘Test Site’ where practical or social 
experience may be called upon as much if not more than aesthetic experience. 
In my experience of sliding in ‘Test Site’ practical considerations where at the 
forefront of my mind as I sped through the chute. As a consequence aesthetic 
attitude theories that tend to disconnect the aesthetic from the practical or the 
social are questioned by participatory art like ‘Test Site’. In stressing the need to 
protect the aesthetic attitude from contamination by other states of mind I 
would say that valuable relationships with other kinds of experience that may 
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well inform and enhance aesthetic experience are being overlooked. This view 
can be supported if the position that is adopted in the introduction to this 
project is taken into consideration  (§ Theme: Aesthetic Experience). From this 
perspective, cognition and interpretation are as important as perception. What 
you may know about an artwork and what you think it may mean have as 
much influence as your perception of the work.  
 
In order to advance an explanation of aesthetic experience in the participatory 
artwork I suggest that an explanation settles on the threshold between felt 
experience and the known experience. Aesthetic experience in participatory art 
is not just about what you feel because you have to call upon your social and 
practical knowledge in your encounter with the work. Höller confirms this by 
emphasising the experiential aspects of the work as a unique encounter and 
also the pragmatic aspects of ‘Test Site’ as a “transport system” (Honoré, V. 
2006). In order to get a feel for the aesthetic experience there is a sense in which 
you have to experience the artwork for yourself and slide down a chute ‘in 
person’. However in ‘Test Site’ there is also a sense in which known objective 
conventions are used in a planned way to produce aesthetic experiences for 
participants. There is a sense in which the artist has calculated numerous 
perceptual factors. Höller indicates that ‘Test Site’ was a “large-scale 
experiment” (Honoré, V. 2006) that required architectural planning. For 
example he no doubt had to work with engineers to calculate the speed of 
participants as they slid down the chutes and the physical impact that would be 




A distinctive feature of ‘Test Site’ is that it involves the combination of 
subjective psychological experiences and objective physical experiences. ‘Test 
Site’ generated a special awareness in me even though I took part in fairly 
ordinary actions. It had a powerful effect on me and I did not anticipate this 
even although I had an informed understanding of the work. Two explanations 
have been put forward for this. Aesthetic attitude theories support the 
recognition of a special psychological viewpoint to regulate experience. The 
other position supports the recognition of the influence of the objective 
attributes of an artwork such as artistic conventions and properties. This 
explanation was also articulated in another way. Phenomenological accounts 
stress the private and ‘felt’ aspects of the experience and epistemic accounts 
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stress the public and ‘known’ aspects of the experience. Each view rivals the 
other and there seems to be a fairly even distribution of evidence to support the 
adoption of either claim. One position asserts a subjective reality; the other 
asserts an objective reality. In order to clearly capture the nature of this 
combination it seems pertinent to explore the actuality of each perspective. 
How real are subjective and objective perspectives on aesthetic experience? 
 
When thinking about aesthetic experience a realist would say that you are 
responding to a thing that actually has aesthetic properties. A non-realist would 
say that it is your state of mind that allows you to experience that thing as 
aesthetic. 3. For example you may say that you had an aesthetic experience of 
‘vibrant collective activity’ when you took part in ‘Test Site’. (Fig. 3) A realist 
may state that ‘Test Site’ had this vibrancy because vibrancy was a real property 
of the situation. A non-realist cannot assert that the situation is vibrant. The 
experience of vibrancy is a property that a person may exhibit or undergo; it is 
not a property of the situation. Therefore the experience of vibrancy can only 
exist as an affective response. In a sense you can only imagine ‘Test Site’ as 





Zangwill differentiates between aesthetic realism and non-realism by looking at 
how they impact on your ability to make aesthetic judgements. For a realist an 
aesthetic judgement rests on aesthetic experience. If this experience has a 
content that represents an aesthetic situation then the judgement must reflect 
the situation in order from the judgement to be accurate. For a non-realist an 
aesthetic judgement also rests on aesthetic experience, however the content of 
the experience is not conceived as being representative of an actual aesthetic 
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situation. For the non-realist the world does not actually have any aesthetic 
properties. You can only adopt an aesthetic attitude towards the ordinary 
properties of the world and this makes aesthetic experience available to you. As 
a realist you are able to compare your judgement to the reality of the aesthetic 
properties. As a non-realist there are no actual properties that your judgement 
can be compared to. For the non-realist it therefore becomes difficult to justify 
favouring one aesthetic attitude over another. Therefore Zangwill is able to 
conclude: “[…] when it comes to explaining the normativity of aesthetic 
judgements, the realist is ahead” (Zangwill, N. 2003: 78). 
 
Nevertheless Bender argues that there is no reason to suppose that a belief in 
the properties of an object is any more real than a feeling that is a response to an 
object. It may be conceded that feelings that are a response to an object may be 
more difficult to demonstrate and justify than a rational argument that 
establishes a belief about an artwork’s aesthetic properties. Nevertheless it is 
also reasonable to say that the feelings produced in response to artworks do 
seem to exist. If it is acknowledged that states of belief and states of feeling are 
real then it can be said that affective states should not be excluded from an 
account of aesthetic realism. Internal aesthetic experiences as well as external 
aesthetic facts are acceptable as starting points in a realistic aesthetic judgement. 
Internal experiences can form: “realistic truth-conditions” (Bender, J. 2003: 87). 
  
Looking in more detail at the implications of aesthetic realism Bender points 
out that realism is generally applied to physical phenomenon. For example it 
tends to be accepted that the physical properties of an object such as its weight 
remain true regardless of how that object is perceived. Its properties can be 
verified objectively. However when you discuss the aesthetic properties of an 
object you are partly considering your subjective reaction to these properties. In 
this sense he suggests that aesthetic properties mainly have “a relational 
character” (Bender, J. 2003: 83). He stresses that a contradiction emerges when 
aesthetic realism is discussed. If you assert that aesthetic properties are real in 
the same way that physical properties are real then this suggests that aesthetic 
properties can be verified in an objective manner. Aesthetic properties become 
external to human responses. If this is the case then you are turning your back 
on the relational character of aesthetic properties. The most reasonable way to 
resolve this problem is to accept that aesthetic properties are not absolutely 
objective or that your experience of them is not absolutely subjective. Aesthetic 
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experience is a response to the physical world so the experience must relate 
object and subject in some way. 
 
It seems that realism is the least complicated approach to aesthetic experience. 
If it is accepted that aesthetic properties really do exist in the world then an 
accurate aesthetic judgement about an object should reflect the aesthetic 
properties of that object. Nevertheless Bender points out that if realism is 
applied too rigorously then it implies that the really existing aesthetic features 
of an object can exist independently of human aesthetic experience. As though 
you can imagine the aesthetic features of an object simply waiting to be 
confirmed by an accurate aesthetic judgement. 
 
Similarly there are difficulties if aesthetic non-realism is strictly applied. In 
accepting this position an aesthetic experience becomes your felt response to the 
artwork during an affective mental state. However if ‘Test Site’ is considered 
from this perspective there is the possibility that as a participant you may be 
harbouring an attitude or mood that strongly influences your felt response to 
the artwork. You may not be in the mood to participate at all; you may hold a 
general scepticism about the aims of participatory artworks in general or you 
may be in a buoyant mood that causes you to freely sing the artwork’s praises 
and enthusiastically take part. Bender indicates that if this non-realist 
explanation is adopted it can still act as basis for a type of aesthetic realism. I 
would propose that in spite of their ability to dominate an aesthetic experience 
and regardless of their ability to complicate any account of aesthetic experience, 
feelings still form a real foundation for aesthetic experience. Affective states 
may offer a less dispassionate perspective on an artwork but there is no reason 
to deny that they are not real. Although they can lead to a positive and negative 
bias towards an artwork, emotional states make a real contribution to aesthetic 
experience.  
  
I would therefore accept that the aesthetic features of an object and the 
experience of those features are interdependent. In this way the ’relational’ 
characteristics of ‘Test Site’ become its main aesthetic features. There are 
measurable objective properties occurring in this work. It has sculptural 
properties. It is made of metal and plastic structures. The heart rates or brain 
activity of individuals could also be measured as they participated in the work, 
but it could be said that these are not the artwork’s main aesthetic properties. It 
could be said that the main features are those given in descriptions of the ride 
 63 
as stimulating or alarming, descriptions of the experience of anticipation or 
achievement at having taken part as well as descriptions of the sense of being 
part of a large group of participants. These cannot exist independently of your 
direct experience of the work. I would therefore say that aesthetic experience in 
‘Test Site’ is embodied in the relation between the objective properties of the 
work and the experiences of participants.  
 
1.3 The conventions of aesthetic experience 
 
Various explanations of how aesthetic experience may be embodied in the 
participatory artwork have been explored. It was initially established in the 
introduction that your experience of art involves cognition and interpretation as 
well as perception. It was then shown that it is appropriate to consider the 
durational aspects of this experience rather than its presentness. This led to the 
recognition that aesthetic experience must share space with social and practical 
experiences in participatory art, that aesthetic experience rests on the threshold 
between the felt and the known and that it offers a relational realism that links 
the work as an object to the participant’s experiences. 
 
All of these explanations of the experience of art demonstrate how participatory 
art reveals that there is no clear gulf between ‘the aesthetic’ and other kinds of 
experience. These explanations highlight how participatory art via its emphasis 
on the durational, its recognition of other modes of experience and its focus on 
the threshold and the relational, brings various practices and disciplines 
together. It could be said that like minimalism, conceptual art, performance art 
or installation art, participatory art interrogates modernist aesthetic practice. As 
has been mentioned in the introduction it introduces “transdisciplinary 
deviations” that cut across and go beyond the notion of the discipline of 
aesthetics. (Kester, G. 2004: 51. § Theme: Participatory Art).  
 
It is suggested that in order to trace the path of participatory art as it cuts across 
the discipline of modernist aesthetics that an examination of some of the key 
assumptions of modernist aesthetics will be valuable. The aim of this 
exploration is not only to show the extent to which participatory art does in fact 
diverge from modernist aesthetics but also to show that there may be aspects of 
modernism that can help to throw some features of participatory art into 
sharper focus. It is proposed that the influential discussion by Monroe 
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Beardsley and George Dickie will help to introduce some of these central issues. 
Their arguments about the art institution, distance, disinterestedness, the 
aesthetic viewpoint, aesthetic enjoyment and the intrinsic value of art will help 




In works like ‘Test Site’ you often learn how to behave because there are textual 
or aural instructions available. You also understand the rules not simply by 
looking at the work or by reading about what to do but by other means such as 
watching or listening to others. In ‘Test Site’ it seems appropriate to consider 
the extent to which these kinds of public conventions influence your aesthetic 
experience and if they provide a sympathetic context for aesthetic experience. 
 
George Dickie argues that the main shared characteristic of artworks may be 
found in their “non-exhibited” rather than their “exhibited” aspects (Dickie, G. 
1974: 23). The exhibited aspects of an artwork are the visibly evident features of 
a work: its size, composition, colours etc. The non-exhibited aspects of an 
artwork are the history and theory that inform your experience of the artwork. 
Since the ‘readymade’ and the ‘objet trouvé’ contemporary artworks have often 
exhibited properties that are identical to the exhibited properties of an ordinary 
object. The objects of art are frequently the same as objects that can be bought in 
shops or found on the street. However by being presented with such objects 
audiences are required to consider the conditions within which art objects are 
exhibited. Such objects point to non-exhibited properties such as: Who says 
such an ordinary object can be art? Dan Flavin used off-the-shelf fluorescent 
light fittings and tubes for his works (Fig. 4). These works not only have a 






If it is accepted that non-art cannot be distinguished from art on the basis of its 
exhibited properties because artists have long been exhibiting non-art objects as 
art. If it is also accepted that an artwork’s non-exhibited properties must be 
relied on such as the knowledge that informs an experience of the artwork; then 
it could be suggested that art is embracing a more conceptual state of affairs. 
Dickie suggests that this leads to a consideration of how these concepts are 
organised. Is this knowledge arranged systematically into something that can 
be understood as an art system? He proposes that when art is described as 
being embedded in such systems of knowledge then “the institutional nature of 
art” is being considered (Dickie, G. 1974: 29). The art institution is like a custom 
or tradition that has been developed in order to identify art from non-art in the 
same way that the more formal legal institution allows you to identify what is 
legal and illegal.  
 
Taking ‘Test Site’ as an example, there are aspects of this work that could be 
described as having non-exhibited properties. There is the general background 
knowledge that allows you to differentiate the nature of this participatory 
artwork from similar participatory situations that are not artworks such as 
when you may be involved in market research. You also know that it is 
different to a fairground ride not simply because it looks different but because 
it takes place within an art institution. These conclusions may be based on your 
knowledge of theories associated with participatory artworks or knowledge 
about this specific artwork picked up prior to your encounter with the work. 
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There are also non-exhibited properties that surface because to an extent there 
are instructions that can be referred to. There are texts and gallery attendants to 
advise you so there is a sense that additional information is necessary in an 
experience of artwork. By the same token it is also the case that many of the 
artwork’s non-exhibited properties were not essential in an experience of the 
work. Many participants such as children did not need instruction and were 
focused on the fun of the event or for others without any prior knowledge of 
participatory artworks, observing the behaviour of other participants prompted 
their participation. I would argue that these were exhibited properties of ‘Test 
Site’ and as such these properties informed behaviour. However whether the 
exhibited or non-exhibited properties of the work influenced behaviour, in each 
case I would suggest that ‘Test Site’ involved the experience of ‘duration’ rather 




In ‘Test Site’ you could stand back and survey the work as a whole or as a 
participant you could become involved in all sorts of other behaviour. As a 
viewer your role seemed relatively simple but as a participant you actually 
entered the work and took part in other practical and social experiences that 
tended to make it more difficult to explain your experience as a whole. 
 
The idea of distance is used to explain what is special about aesthetic 
experience. It is an attitude that a viewer may choose to adopt while 
scrutinising any kind of object or event. You introduce a distance between 
yourself and the focus of your scrutiny. This distancing allows a viewer to 
disregard any practical issues that may be associated with the object or event, 
giving the viewer the freedom to consider the object or event within a new 
frame of reference. It deters any distractions from interfering with your 
aesthetic experience. Edward Bullough uses the example of fog at sea 
(Bullough, E. 1996: 248). As a passenger on a ship you may distance yourself 
from the practical properties of danger that the fog presents in order to 
appreciate its aesthetic properties. For Dickie the main purpose of the idea of 
distance is to make sure that you do not mix up your ordinary affairs in the 
‘real world’ with the extraordinariness of the aesthetic experience. An 
additional feature of the idea of distance is that it may increase and decrease. A 
viewer may become more or less distant from an object or event. While taking 
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part in ‘Test Site’ a substantial sense of fear may cancel out any possibility you 
may have for aesthetic experience. There is no distance for appreciation (Fig. 
5a). While participating in ‘Test Site’ you may also become more interested in 
the structural engineering of the work and not pay full attention to the 
experience as a whole. (Fig. 5b) 
 
  
Fig. 5a & Fig. 5b 
 
In this sense it can be said that distance helps to explain the different 
experiences of each viewer. It regulates between your aesthetic experience and 
your practical affairs. Dickie describes it as “a special psychological force that 
blocks the ordinary impulses” (Dickie, G. 1974: 93). 
 
Dickie challenges the theory of psychological distance by considering a 
theatrical example. A jealous husband is watching a play. The play’s narrative 
closely resembles practical events that are occurring in the jealous husband’s 
life. According to the distance theory the practical properties represented in the 
drama undo any aesthetic properties that may be experienced. The drama’s 
resemblance to actuality causes a reduction in the necessary distance. Following 
this reasoning Dickie points out that if the husband is relying on distance to 
appreciate the drama and if the distance is reduced to the point where he is 
unable to appreciate the drama aesthetically then it follows that if distance 
totally collapses and the husband identifies completely with events on the stage 
then this may cause him to jump on the stage to tackle his ‘rival’. According to 
Dickie the distance theory implies that this kind of situation is possible. 
Distance is used to block out your regular responses to situations, so if a jealous 
husband does jump on the stage to tackle a rival he is acting normally because 
he has no distance between himself and the represented events. 
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Dickie supports this claim by looking at the example of pantomime. Within 
many pantomimes there are strong participatory elements. Audiences are 
repeatedly asked to respond to events on stage. Audiences are able to consider 
the practical properties that are involved in responding to a request from the 
stage but equally are able to resume considering the aesthetic properties of the 
drama immediately after their participation. For Dickie the distance theory 
spends too much time concentrating on the psychological states of audience 
members. Distance theorists have “mistaken the functioning of an institutional 
convention against spectators participating in some works of art for the 
functioning of a psychological force” (Dickie, G. 1974: 104). 
 
For Dickie it is institutional conventions that determine how you behave when 
experiencing artworks. You do not jump on the stage to confront a villain in a 
theatre because you comply with the conventions of theatrical performance. He 
highlights theatrical conventions such as the arrangement of seats in one 
direction, a raised stage, the dimming of the house lights, the curtain going up 
and coming down again. Such conventions seem hardly worth remarking upon. 
They are applied so unreflectively that their significance goes undetected. 
However these examples show that there is a body of knowledge that is already 
understood prior to an experience of the work. It is not an inner psychological 
distancing but an awareness of the knowledge about how to behave when 
experiencing a work that influences whether you should pay attention to the 
practical properties or the aesthetic properties of a work. 
 
Take the following example. Two people may enter a shop selling reproduction 
Bauhaus furniture. One person may be aware of the conventions that exist in 
museums where a viewer wouldn’t dream of sitting on the chairs. The other 
just treats the furniture as you normally would in a furniture shop and sits 
down. It is the latter individual who has followed the correct convention in this 
case. In the context of a furniture shop, practical as well as aesthetic properties 
may be considered. Again, in a gallery one may come across a monitor 
displaying a video art piece. Beneath the monitor there may be set of 
headphones. The convention in such a situation is that viewers are invited to 
experience the soundtrack to the work by wearing the headphones. One viewer 
may be aware of this convention and confidently wear the headphones. Other 
viewers without prior experience of this convention may be more inhibited.  
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Using Dickie’s position on convention it can now be said that as a participant in 
a participatory artwork if you are informed of the facts of a situation then you 
understand the relevant conventions. It is these conventions that determine 
your behaviour towards the artwork and lead you to attend to the aesthetic, 
practical, historical or participatory properties of the artwork. For Dickie there 
is no ‘psychical distance’: “no special kind of act or state of mind exists to 
suspend action or anxieties” (Dickie, G. 1974: 112). In ‘Test Site’ numerous 
conventions prompt you to queue, receive instruction and take part. The 
examples of the shop and gallery also demonstrate that there is not such a clear 
division between your experiences of the practical properties and aesthetic 
properties embodied in an artwork. One may move between contemplation and 
action or engage in each simultaneously. I would say that a consequence of 
recognising the proximity between the practical and aesthetic properties of an 
artwork leads to an understanding that aesthetic experience is more involved in 
the real affairs of the world and as such it is a state of attention that is in general 
quite robust. Accordingly aesthetic experience does not need to be safeguarded 
from practical knowledge by the insertion of some distance between the two. In 
‘Test Site’ moments of contemplation and activity coincide and follow from one 
another throughout the artwork. I would therefore say that the conventions that 
are considered appropriate in ‘Test Site’ have some parallels with the 
conventions of the shop rather than the gallery.  
 
If ‘Test Site’ is considered from the perspective of a theory of psychological 
distance then it could be said that there is an aspect of this work were distance 
becomes an issue. In ‘Test Site’ there is the distinct possibility that participants 
may lack the distance required in order to have an aesthetic experience. A 
significant feature of this work is that you surrender a degree of control when 
sliding down a chute and this is an aspect to the work that is not determined by 
convention. The rules of the work are left behind once you abandon yourself to 
the pull of gravity in a chute so in this sense the work encourages a very direct 
and uncontrollable response. During this kind of activity you may experience 
anxiety but this state arises as a response a practical concern for your own well-
being. It is a practical anxiety that can come about in many other more ordinary 
states of affairs. It could therefore be said that in order to appreciate the action 
of sliding down the chute from an aesthetic perspective you would have to 





During my participation in ‘Test Site’ a number of factors combined to make it 
difficult to have an objective view of the work. I was influenced by the 
behaviour and attitudes of fellow participants. They lacked the reserve and 
inscrutability that gallery goers usually have. It was also extremely difficult to 
take a neutral view of the actual action of sliding because it was so intense. 
 
‘Disinterested awareness’ is described by Dickie as “the alleged individual 
power which when exercised makes accessible the aesthetic features of objects” 
(Dickie, G. 1974: 115). It is a situation where a viewer disconnects any external 
associations an artwork may have in order to properly experience the aesthetic 
properties of the work. 4. 
 
From Dickie’s perspective there is no need to adopt a special psychological 
outlook that excludes other kinds of experience in order to have an aesthetic 
experience. Instead he suggests that you either pay attention or you do not pay 
attention to an artwork and when you do pay attention you may have different 
reasons for paying attention. For example, a journalist, a student and a tourist 
may be looking at the same painting. The journalist is considering the article 
she is going to write about the exhibition. The student is considering how the 
painter’s work relates to his own work and the tourist has turned away from 
the painting and is remembering how he used to live in the place depicted in 
the painting. In the first two cases the viewers are attending to the work but 
their attention has different motives, in the last case the viewer is inattentive to 
the work. 
 
Dickie asks how you should address artworks that include moral content. A 
war correspondent may capture an image that conveys moral outrage. If the 
disinterested awareness theory is followed then the moral must be isolated 
from the aesthetic, yet the intention of the work was to address a moral issue. 
Surely by ignoring the impetus to create an artwork in the first place you are 
ignoring a main constituent that contributes towards a full appreciation of the 
artwork? If you always detach your awareness from a work’s historical context, 
its emergence from a social context, the artist’s biography and the artist’s state 
of mind in producing the artwork, then you may be dispensing with a crucial 
enhancement to your appreciation of that artwork. Dickie argues that a theory 
of disinterested awareness sharply divorces other kinds of knowledge from 
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aesthetic experience and fails to account for art forms like documentary where 
interested awareness is the primary constituent of the experience. “In short, how 
can the theory which seeks to explain the phenomenon of the experience of art 
try to explain away what is obviously such an important aspect of some art and 
an important reason for experiencing that art” (Dickie, G. 1974: 134). 
 
Considered in the light of the participatory artwork, disinterestedness seems a 
remote concept. In participating with an artwork you may be calling on 
practical or social experience so immediately your experiences of the artwork 
are being associated with experiences external to the artwork itself. I would say 
that Dickie’s concept of attention offers a provisional framework for the 
diversity of experiences that may be called on in a participatory artwork. A 
child may be drawn to the potential fun in ‘Test Site’, an adult may be 
genuinely keen to participate, some may feel obliged to take part and others 
may prefer to remain disinterested. Each may attend to the work with different 
motives in mind.  
 
Nevertheless ‘Test Site’ could be considered in a disinterested way if its 
sculptural properties were being appreciated. From this perspective you would 
be adopting the role of a spectator who was not practically participating in the 
work but who was evaluating the work in formal terms with reference to its 
shape, colour, structure, materials and composition. Höller himself accepts that 
detachment is an appropriate approach to his work, “it would be a mistake to 
think that you have to use the slide to make sense of it.” (Honoré, V. 2006). 
 
It could be argued that this kind of disinterested art appreciation may enhance 
your encounter with ‘Test Site’.  Such an appreciation may produce different 
qualities of experience therefore plainly saying that you attend or do not attend 
to ‘Test Site’ leads to an impoverished understanding of the phenomenon of 
aesthetic experience. However this view becomes difficult when the 
‘transdisciplinary’ nature of participatory art is taken into account. From this 
standpoint ‘Test Site’ questions the assumption that your experience of art is 
purely perceptual, traversing the discipline of aesthetics to reveal that there is 
no schism between your ordinary experience and aesthetic experience. I would 
suggest that ‘Test Site’ opens up a space that changes the emphasis in your 
experience from perceptual to cognitive experience.  
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1.4 The phenomenon of aesthetic experience 
1.4.1 Aesthetic viewpoint 
 
There were two main ways of experiencing ‘Test Site’. You could be a spectator 
or a participant in the work. As a spectator you remained outside the work and 
kept participation to a minimum and as a participant you accepted the 
invitation of the work and became engaged with its procedures. As a spectator 
you could appreciate the features of the work as a whole but as a participant 
you became involved in all sorts of other behaviour. In this way participation 
seemed to complicate the issue of how to adopt an aesthetic viewpoint on ‘Test 
Site’.  
 
Monroe Beardsley initially characterises aesthetics as being caught up with all 
sorts of other concerns. He proposes that confusion may be reduced if you 
discriminate between the perspectives that may be taken on the objects of your 
attention. Beardsley points out that when you appreciate a building you 
consider practical, engineering and aesthetic viewpoints simultaneously yet 
they deal respectively with how well it functions, if it is structurally sound and 
if it is aesthetically inventive. What you ought to do is control your focus. This 
allows you to determine if the building succeeds in the area you are focusing 
on. In terms of practicality its occupants can be asked if it is a comfortable place 
to live. When looking at it in terms of engineering physical laws are referred to 
and when focusing on it from an aesthetic viewpoint you compare it to past and 
current architecture in order to identify its aesthetic accomplishments. The main 
point Beardsley makes is that each viewpoint requires a different group of 
values to determine the success of a building. 
 
“To adopt an aesthetic point of view with regard to X is to take an interest in 
whatever aesthetic value X may possess or that is obtainable by means of X” 
(Beardsley, M. 1982: 21)  
 
Beardsley moves on to ask: What exactly is an aesthetic value? His main aim is 
to demonstrate that aesthetic value can be clearly differentiated from other 
values. He states that the aesthetic value of an object is “the value it possesses in 
virtue of its capacity to provide aesthetic gratification” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 21). 
So you may take pleasure; find inspiration, be fascinated or be entranced by an 
object. Each of these states may be classified as gratifying, but what is it about 
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the object that allows you to attain these states? Beardsley proposes: “[…] 
formal unity and/or the regional qualities of a complex whole” (Beardsley, M. 
1982: 22). If an artwork is extensively unified, incorporates forceful regional 
qualities and a degree of complexity then it can be given aesthetic values. These 
kinds of gratification are unique to aesthetics and form the main constituent of 
aesthetic value. As evidence for this theory Beardsley points to art history 
where there is general agreement that there are many iconic artworks that offer 
this kind of gratification. 
 
Beardsley’s method of discriminating between the numerous perspectives that 
can taken on an artwork seems useful but can an aesthetic point of view be 
adopted on a participatory artwork? Can practical and social viewpoints be 
separated from the aesthetic in such works? Is it possible to say that aesthetic 
experience is caused by the formal unity, regional qualities or the complex 
whole of a participatory artwork? The formal unity of ‘Test Site’ as a sculptural 
or architectural object can certainly be grasped. It could also be suggested that 
the work has regional qualities because there are various sites where your 
attention settles in order to appreciate any aesthetic values. Alongside the 
regional qualities of ‘Test Site’ as a sculpture there are regional qualities in the 
sight of watching participants drop through the chutes of ‘Test Site’, in viewing 
participants as they suddenly emerge at the base of a chute and there are also 
regional qualities in the image of large groups of spectators clustered around 
the base of the chutes. The complex whole of ‘Test Site’ could even be described 
as the way that all its disparate elements come together to present a discernable 






Therefore it can be said that the aesthetic values of ‘Test Site’ can be considered 
in isolation from its practical values just as they are in architecture. However it 
is noticeable that Beardsley assumes that the values of formal unity, regional 
quality and the complexity of the whole that produce the aesthetic viewpoint 
are encountered from the perspective of a detached viewer. Each of these terms 
may be embodied in ‘Test Site’ but it should be acknowledged that a significant 
and over arching intention behind a work like ‘Test Site’ is that you do not 
simply view the work as a detached viewer but that you also participate in it. I 
would propose that as a detached viewer you have opportunities to reflect on 
the aesthetic values of ‘Test Site’ but because it encourages participation rather 
than detachment it brings sets of values together to create an overall encounter 
with the work. In this sense when you are a detached viewer, your experience 
of ‘Test Site’ may rest on a particular range of values such as formal unity, 
regional qualities and complexity but when you participate, which is the main 
aim of this work, your experience broadens in scope. As a participant aesthetic 
values begin to more closely associate with social and practical values. 
 
1.4.2 Aesthetic enjoyment 
 
When I took part in ‘Test Site’ it was clear that many people were enjoying 
themselves however this seemed to be different kind of enjoyment to that 
which is customarily associated with the experience of art. It seemed less 
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serious and more inclusive. ‘Test Site seemed to question the role of the 
particular kind of enjoyment associated with aesthetic experience.  
 
Beardsley explains how aesthetic enjoyment can be differentiated from other 
forms of enjoyment. You may enjoy the virtuosity of an artist or reminisce 
about the historical period that he or she was active in but this kind of 
enjoyment is not aesthetic. The former is an appreciation of his skill and the 
latter is an appreciation of social history. Beardsley thinks that the aesthetic 
may be separable and looks for further evidence. This can be found if you look 
at drama. A play may have a tragic ending. A Hollywood producer may come 
along and add a happy ending in an adaptation for cinema. This may appeal to 
your ethical side but for Beardsley this does not lead to an increase in aesthetic 
pleasure. Happy endings do not directly increase aesthetic enjoyment. Ethical 
appreciation and aesthetic appreciation may influence one another but they are 
based on different values. They are independent forms of appreciation that 
“[…] cannot be weighed on the same scale” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 38). A 
consequence of this conclusion is that many other kinds of enjoyment are then 
excluded in order to determine a place for aesthetic enjoyment. Moral, personal 
and intellectual enjoyment is ruled out as are emotional and physiological 
enjoyment. Beardsley confines aesthetic enjoyment to a very specific starting 
place resulting in this definition: 
 
“1. Aesthetic enjoyment is (by definition) the kind of enjoyment we obtain by the 
apprehension of a qualitatively diverse segment of the phenomenal field, 
insofar as the discriminable parts are unified into something of a whole that has 
a character (that is, regional qualities) of its own. 
2. Aesthetic value is (by definition) the capacity to provide, under suitable 
conditions, aesthetic enjoyment. 
3. Positive critical criteria are (by definition) properties that are grounds for 
aesthetic value. 
From propositions 2 and 3 it follows that: 
4. Positive critical criteria are (analytically) properties that help or enable an 
object to provide aesthetic enjoyment.” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 42). 
 
What are these ‘positive critical criteria’? The main criteria are “unity, 
complexity and intensity” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 42). Whenever there is an effort 
to establish the degree of aesthetic enjoyment that an artwork is capable of 
producing then these criteria may be used as a rough guide. In a work like John 
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Chamberlain’s below (Fig. 7) all of these criteria can be evaluated. You can 
concentrate on how Chamberlain creates a unified composition. In looking at its 
complexity you can take note of how the crushed car parts have been integrated 
into its unity and in judging its intensity you can study the twists and 





Beardsley pays particular attention to the criterion of ‘unity’ asking: “Why does 
unity function as a guide [?]”(Beardsley, M. 1982: 44). He justifies this criterion 
in two ways. It is suggested that it is what people often generally say when they 
are talking about artworks. If a cross section of viewers is asked about a 
painting for example, the likelihood is that a majority would say something like 
it is harmonious, well arranged or balanced. He also refers to Aristotle’s Poetics 
where Aristotle parallels plots in drama with natural phenomenon: “they 
should be based on a single action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a 
beginning, middle and an end, so as to enable the work to produce its own 
proper pleasure with all the organic unity of a living creature.” (Aristotle. 
1984b: 2335). For Beardsley ‘unity’ is not only a commonly used criterion but 
also one that has a long philosophical history. 
 
How do Beardsley’s positive critical criteria inform an explanation of the 
participatory artwork? If it is assumed that aesthetic enjoyment can be 
absolutely differentiated from other kinds of enjoyment then the criteria of 
unity, complexity and intensity seem broadly suitable. However in the context 
of the participatory artwork this approach to discriminating what produces 
aesthetic enjoyment is problematic. It has been suggested that participatory art 
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cannot be easily explained in aesthetic terms but tends to traverse the discipline 
of aesthetics. In this sense ‘Test Site’ is unlike the Chamberlain sculpture that 
has been used as an example. As a participant in ‘Test Site’ you are no longer 
detached from the work. Your experience is more closely associated with many 
other kinds of enjoyment during participation and as a consequence the criteria 
for evaluating ‘Test Site’ become less specific. All the kinds of enjoyment that 
Beardsley seeks to exclude from his account of aesthetic enjoyment such as 
social, personal, intellectual, moral, practical and physiological enjoyment may 
potentially be encountered when you participate in ‘Test Site’. I would say that 
in participatory art a broad scope of types of enjoyment should be considered 
alongside the specificity of aesthetic enjoyment. 
 
Nonetheless it is suggested that Beardsley’s notion of the centrality of unity in 
promoting aesthetic enjoyment helps to explain an important aspect of a work 
like ‘Test Site’. As a participant you experience the work as having a beginning; 
prior to sliding you wait in a queue and when your turn arrives you wait in 
anticipation at the mouth of a chute. At its middle there is the actual act of 
sliding down a chute. It also has an end when you are shot from the exit of a 
chute onto a crash mat and can then join others who are observing the event. As 
an individual each participant experiences the unity of the work but there is 
also an overarching sense of unity that assembles each person’s participation 




Fig. 8a & Fig. 8b 
1.4.3 Art for its own sake 
 
After taking part in ‘Test Site’ I certainly felt as though I had been through an 
extraordinary event. ‘Test Site’ offers an intense and forceful participatory 
experience. It could be said that the experience of sliding down one of the 
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chutes in ‘Test Site’ was the central experience of the work that was worth 
trying ‘for its own sake’.  
 
When something is valued ‘for its own sake’ it has intrinsic value. The usual 
value of an event or object is dependent on factors external to the event or 
object. It may be used for a purpose for example. You value a coat because it 
keeps you warm or because you like the way it makes you look. Therefore to 
test for intrinsic value this “other regarding value” is removed and the object is 
imagined on its own. (Beardsley, M. 1982: 46). Does it still have value? There 
are parallels to this approach in art. Does the central experience of sliding in 
‘Test Site’ continue to have aesthetic value after all the ‘external factors’ have 
been removed? What remains if Höller’s biography, his intentions in making 
the artwork, the art historical context that it may be placed within and the social 
context from which it emerges is disregarded? If a value does remain then in 
this sense Beardsley is able to suggest that the experience provided by ‘Test 
Site’ may be something that has intrinsic value. 5. 
 
Beardsley recognises that aesthetic values are often described as intrinsically 
valuable. Art sometimes does not need any excuses. It is often pursued without 
justification. Nevertheless he concedes that this explanation may not be 
adequate and this leads him to look in more detail at the relationship between 
aesthetic experience and aesthetic value. His position can be characterised by 
the following series of questions: What good is that artwork? It can be replied: It 
has aesthetic value. In answer to the question: What good is aesthetic value? It 
can be replied: It has intrinsic value. Beardsley considers other replies that may 
be given if it is not accepted that aesthetic value is intrinsically valuable. It 
could be asked: “Why should we cultivate aesthetic experience?” (Beardsley, M. 
1982: 69). To artists and people who value aesthetic experience the answer to 
this is self-evident but Beardsley asks this question from the perspective of a 
layperson. He wants to develop a sound defence for aesthetic experience. He 
does this by showing the correspondences that can be drawn between the 
rewards of art and the rewards that are achievable in other areas. In this sense 
he wants to “[…] connect aesthetic evaluation with other and already 
acknowledged forms of value” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 69). 
   
Beardsley justifies aesthetic experience by summarising a broad spectrum of 
potential explanations. He describes how a contemporary interpretation of 
‘catharsis’ may validate aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience may produce 
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“short term adjustments within the psyche” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 71). He also 
considers how aesthetic experience may help to improve the feelings, the 
imagination or the perceptions and concludes that aesthetic experience may 
fundamentally enhance “the whole personality structure” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 
72). Beardsley suggests that aesthetic experience may contribute towards a 
growth in sensitivity through an enhancement of your ability to interpret and 
understand the emotions, imagination and perceptions of the self and of others. 
Quoting John Dewey, Beardsley proposes that aesthetic experience “[…] forms 
a habit for all other experiences” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 75). Aesthetic experience 
may generally offer a ‘type’ on which all other experiences can be based on. 
 
How does this discussion inform an explanation of participatory art? Can the 
participations that are invited by ‘Test Site’ be justified along similar lines? 
Beardsley proposes that aesthetic experience may contribute towards 
improvements in the personality. The aesthetic value of ‘Test Site’ can be 
justified in these terms if it is suggested that ‘Test Site’ has a cathartic element. 
Höller mentions that he is interested in this aspect of the 
experience,“[participants are] affected and to some degree ‘changed’” (Honoré, 
V. 2006). If catharsis is understood as an experience of purification that is 
induced by an intense experience then ‘Test Site’ can be explained in this way. 
In participating in this work you literally ‘take the plunge’ and give up your 
self-control for the period of the slide. As a participant you undergo a cleansing 
experience because you overcome your customary caution and reserve. In this 
way participation in a work like ‘Test Site’ can result in something like a sense 
of renewal.  
 
1.5 The debate about aesthetic experience: Conventions and phenomenon  
 
When the debate between Beardsley and Dickie is applied to an artwork like 
‘Test Site’ it can be outlined like this: From Beardsley’s point of view when you 
have an aesthetic experience in ‘Test Site’ it arises from a special attitude that 
you adopt. This attitude rests on a set of values that are particular to aesthetic 
experience. They produce a specific kind of enjoyment and they are worth 
cultivating because they provide an exemplary and rewarding experience. 
From Dickie’s point of view aesthetic experience in ‘Test Site’ is simply a kind 
of attention that has to compete with other kinds of attention such as your 
practical engagement with the work and the social exchanges you may take 
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part in. Aesthetic experiences only arise in ‘Test Site’ because it takes place as 
part of the art institution and uses artistic conventions. Beardsley defends the 
special-ness of aesthetic experience by claiming that it gives you feelings of 
unity that you don’t come across in any other experience. Dickie argues that 
this is a simplification of what happens when we experience art. 
 
The point of contention between Beardsley and Dickie is Beardsley’s claim that 
an artwork that has the objective property of ‘unity’ can cause an aesthetic 
experience that has the subjective property of ‘unity’. Dickie doubts that 
‘perceived unity’ translates into “a special unity of experience” (Dickie, G. 1974: 
188). For Dickie when a direct correspondence is made between objective and 
subjective unity an unwelcome sense of vagueness enters into descriptions of 
aesthetic experience. For Beardsley a unified melody produces a unified feeling. 
These are “the affects evoked by the work” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 83). Dickie 
agrees that there may certainly be a unified melody. This is “the work of art as 
perceived” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 83). However for Dickie a perception of 
objective unity does not directly equate to a subjective feeling of unity. 
 
Dickie is also critical of Beardsley’s notion of the ‘feel of unity’ because he is too 
eager to associate ‘affects’ with aesthetic experience. Beardsley specifies that art 
must generate feelings in a viewer. However there are situations where the 
intention of the artist is not necessarily to induce an emotional state in a viewer. 
There are artworks where no emotional response is involved. Some art may 
only require perception or a thought. Dickie proposes that you should be more 
inclusive when considering what makes up an aesthetic experience: “the 
complete range of aesthetic experiences has to be examined before a general 
conclusion can be drawn” (Dickie, G. 1974: 192). In some of the key works of 
conceptual art this is precisely what is demonstrated. In a work like Joseph 
Kosuth’s ‘One and three hammers’ (Fig. 9) the artwork stimulates thoughts 






Beardsley counters Dickie’s arguments against the unity of aesthetic experience 
by considering the concept of unity in more detail. One way he thinks of unity 
is in terms of ‘coherence’. He gives a definition of coherence: “one thing leads to 
another, continuity of development, without gaps or dead spaces, a sense of 
overall providential pattern of guidance, an orderly cumulation of energy 
toward a climax, are present to an unusual degree.” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 84). 
Beardsley argues that this description not only describes the objective 
properties of an experience of coherence but also describes the way that feelings 
build on one another. For Beardsley feelings can combine in the same way that 
the objectively perceived world does. Feelings can act “[…] as though they 
belong with each other and to each other” (Beardsley, M. 1982: 85). On this 
point Dickie finally concedes that ‘coherence’ does seem to describe the way 
that feelings may be said to unify in the experience of an artwork. He states that 
Beardsley is “[…] probably right in thinking that it is possible for feelings to 
cohere” (Dickie, G. 1974: 195). 
 
‘Test Site’ is a work that has many constituents. It involves the brief experience 
of sliding down a chute that can be easily grasped in one example but there are 
other experiences that surround this central experience. There is the experience 
of anticipation and the experience of all the events that immediately precede 
and follow the actual sliding such as when you receive a ticket, wait in a queue, 
witness crowds of other people spectating or participating and receive 
instruction. After sliding you are checked to make sure you are okay and you 
then begin to have a memory of the total experience. It is suggested that all of 
these features play a role in forming the full experience of ‘Test Site’.  
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According to Beardsley the distinctiveness of aesthetic experience rests on its 
capacity to give you a feeling of unity. When ‘Test Site’ is considered in this 
light it could be suggested that it has objective properties that could be 
described as unified. From this perspective it could be said that after 
participating in the work all the experiences that you may have had at each 
stage cohere. Even although the queuing, receiving instruction, spectating and 
participating induce a diverse group of thoughts and feelings it is proposed that 
at any point during your participation in ‘Test Site’ you can stand back and 
reflect on the total experience and see that it forms a whole. It could also be said 
that you have a personal experience of completeness after having participated 
in ‘Test Site’. As soon as your own participation is over this changes your 
experience of the artwork. Your completed participation casts a shadow over 
the total work. It changes your feeling of expectation to recollection. Originally 
you only saw the work from the outside as an observer now you are able to see 
the full work as a participant.  
 
From another perspective it could be suggested that during the various stages 
of actual participation you are presented with feelings that pull away from one 
another. You are concerned with the immediate practical problems that ‘Test 
Site’ presents. You have to deal with queues and safety precautions. You are 
also directly concerned with the social exchanges that are necessary part of the 
work such as communication with attendants and other participants. 
Furthermore it should be recognised that too much stress is often put on the 
affective aspects of aesthetic experience. When ‘Test Site is considered from this 
perspective it could be said that it involves aesthetic experiences that generate a 
heightened feeling of stimulation but it can also be said to be as much about a 
direct physiological experience of movement and can also be said to involve an 
intellectual challenge to your knowledge of the conventions of art appreciation. 
For a participant an experience of ‘Test Site’ may involve aesthetic feelings, 
physical sensations and thoughts about the nature of art that do not come 
together into a sense of overall unity. It could be said that during actual 
participation you do not have the required detached attitude. 
 
In this project it has been established that participatory art tends to go beyond 
the discipline of aesthetics. It encourages a cognitive and interpretative 
approach to art that stresses ‘duration’ rather than ‘presentness’. I would 
suggest that Beardsley’s insistence on the feeling of unity generated by aesthetic 
experience tends to run counter to these explanations of how you may respond 
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to participatory art. It should be acknowledged that as a participant in ‘Test 
Site’ a significant part of your experience is not strictly aesthetic experience. 
Therefore the importance that Beardsley attaches to the feeling of unity 




This chapter took an analytical perspective on aesthetic experience. The 
objective was to find out what position aesthetic experience holds in 
participatory art. Given that participatory art involves social and practical 
experience from the outset it is suggested that aesthetic experience must be 
appropriately articulated in relation to these other kinds of experience and 
explained with these other concerns in mind. In participatory art aesthetic 
experience can no longer be considered in isolation from other experiences.  
 
I would say that participatory art demonstrates that there is no clear break 
between private aesthetic experience and more public social and practical 
experiences. Participatory art does not remain focused on the discipline of 
aesthetics or stay within its “area of competence” (Greenberg, C. 1960: 755). It 
cuts across aesthetics to broaden the scope of what may be included in art. 
Participatory art shows that your experience of art has ‘duration’ rather than 
‘presentness’. It shows that your background knowledge about a work and 
your search for its meaning count as much as any immediate feelings or 
perceptions you may have of the work. Participatory art via its recognition of 
other modes of experience and its focus on the ‘threshold’ and the ‘relational’ 
brings various practices and disciplines together.  
 
Aesthetic experience in participation has been explained as an artistic 
convention. The main terms in this account were distance, disinterest and 
attention. I would say that it is difficult to justify distancing special aesthetic 
experiences from other experiences that are integral to participation. Social and 
practical experiences introduce aspects of the ordinary world into an experience 
of the work so that the proximity of aesthetic experience to other experiences 
has to be recognised. I would also say that disinterestedness is problematic 
because social, practical and aesthetic experiences form attachments in 
participation and make the participant ‘interested’ in experiences other than the 
purely aesthetic. I would say that describing aesthetic experience as a type of 
attention is useful because it provides a suitable measure of flexibility that 
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corresponds to how you may move between different kinds of experience in 
participatory art: You may pay attention to a practical issue and then pay 
attention to an aesthetic state of affairs.  
 
It has been suggested that in participatory art you may fully participate, 
spectate-and-participate and fully spectate. I would say that a property of 
participation is that it allows you to bring aesthetic, social and practical 
experiences together and a property of spectatorship is that it allows you to 
individuate aesthetic experience from social and practical experience. 
 
On this basis it is possible to say that as a spectator or during moments of 
standing-by while you participate you are able to separate your aesthetic 
viewpoint from other social or practical viewpoints. As a spectator you may 
appreciate the architectural grandeur and the sense of community that ‘Test 
Site’ generates. You may view the sculptural properties of ‘Test Site’ or be a 
witness to the collective atmosphere of the work. As a participant you may also 
experience a private feeling of catharsis. These kinds of experience can be 
compelling and personal. Nonetheless it should be acknowledged that a key 
aim of participatory art is participation rather than spectatorship. This 
introduces a complex of experiences into the encounter with art that causes you 
to question the role of the modernist aesthetic and the value of focusing on the 
discipline of aesthetics. 
 
I would argue that ‘Test Site’ does not promote a set of feelings, values and 
enjoyments that are specifically associated aesthetic experience. It involves 
cognitive, practical, social and communicative experiences that broaden the 
scope of the kind of values and enjoyments that can be associated with art. 
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When I encountered ‘Untitled’, 1993 (Fig. 1), I initially surveyed it from a 
distance but as I approached the stack I became less interested in its appearance 
and more aware of my potential role as a participant in the artwork. I quickly 
read the text of a poster, decided to take one, rolled it up and walked away. The 
lasting effect of this work is the memory of this action and not its appearance or 
where it was situated in the gallery. It is also revealing that this episode stands 
out as the most memorable aspect of the group show that this work appeared 
in. I remember feeling that I wanted to own a poster. This was definitely an 
incentive but I did not feel that possession of a single example really gave me 
the full concept. I also remember believing that by taking a poster I was 
contributing to something and my actions made me think of other people who 
had also taken a poster. My participation in this work was also an occasion 
were I made a connection with the gallery staff because I was uncertain about 
whether I could take a poster and after I had taken one I realised that attendants 
were handing out elastic bands to stop rolled posters from unfurling. 
 
Problem 
It seems that my experience of ‘Untitled’, 1993 was comprised of an aesthetic 
experience of looking at the work and a series of practical and social 
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experiences that made up the participation. On the other hand it could be 
suggested that there is not such a clear distinction between aesthetic, practical 
and social experience. It could be said that these experiences intersect and have 
an influence on each other. The part that participatory art plays in combining 
different kinds of experience together will be considered in this chapter. 
Participatory art invites participation that is both physical and contemplative 
and introduces observable actions alongside private responses. It is proposed 
that an explanation of how aesthetic experience integrates with social and 
practical experience will help artists and participants to understand how 
aesthetic experience is changed in participatory art. 
  
Resolution 
It is suggested that a perspective that deals with aesthetic experience as a 
phenomenon can explain how aesthetic experience is changed in participatory 
art. This perspective tends to question the kind of dualism that emerges when 
the ‘bodily’ senses and the ‘cognitive’ senses are clearly divided. This is an 
important view to consider because participatory art similarly interrogates the 
separation between the ‘bodily’ and the ‘cognitive’. This perspective also tends 
to challenge approaches to aesthetics that stress a definite separation between 
the subjective world of the viewer and the objective world of the artwork. This 
is an important issue because in participatory art observable actions are 
introduced alongside private responses. From this point of view it is suggested 
that some explanations of how aesthetic experience is changed in participatory 
art will be demonstrated. 
 
Summary 
This chapter will concentrate on some aspects of the aesthetic theories of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and Hans George Gadamer. Nietzsche 
stresses the bodily aspect of aesthetic experience. His aesthetic theories are 
useful in this account of how aesthetic experience is embodied in the 
participatory artwork because he is the originator of some key ideas that 
diverge from the analytical approach to aesthetics. He gives a 
phenomenological account of the experience of art by concentrating on what 
you feel when you experience art rather than trying to reason how these 
experiences come about. For Nietzsche the experience of art is founded on non-
cognitive states. He claims that states of dreaming and intoxication are the 
impetus behind the desire to experience art. Furthermore he suggests that these 
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non-cognitive states are achieved through the body as a whole and not just 
through the ‘cognitive’ senses like sight or hearing. 
 
Heidegger’s aesthetic theories are valuable in this account of how aesthetic 
experience is embodied in the participatory artwork because he advances the 
phenomenological perspective on aesthetic experience. Like Nietzsche he 
claims that the impetus to have aesthetic experiences is not based on cognition. 
Instead he claims that an elementary state of being termed Dasein offers a 
practical familiarity with the environment. You have an interpretative approach 
to the world that is revealed in your fundamental practical engagements with 
your surroundings and this lies beneath cognitive approaches to situations. 
Like Nietzsche Heidegger concentrates on the feel of aesthetic experience rather 
than trying to reason how these experiences come about.  
 
The philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger provides a phenomenological 
description of the encounter with art through references to ‘the body’ and 
‘man’. The usefulness of these kinds of generalisations in the discussion about 
participatory art will also be assessed in this chapter. Michel Foucault’s 
explanations of the modern subject will be called upon in order to provide a 
commentary on appeals made to the authenticity of corporeal experience and 
the notion that there may be an essential human nature that can be described as 
‘man’.    
 
Gadamer’s aesthetic theories are valuable in this account of how aesthetic 
experience is embodied in the participatory artwork because he develops the 
interpretative aspect of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein. Following Heidegger he 
builds on the idea that an understanding of the world has its basis in an 
elemental state of being. Gadamer claims that this state of being is essentially 
interpretative. This leads him to stress the importance of interpretation and 
conclude that the most appropriate approach to philosophy is interpretative or 
hermeneutic.1. For Gadamer hermeneutics extends universally. Hermeneutics is 
considered to be an essential constituent of being and can be applied to every 
aspect of life not just written texts. 
 
These accounts will provide a perspective that explains participatory art as a 
phenomenon and throughout the chapter these findings will be compared to 
aspects of ‘Untitled’, 1993 by Felix Gonzalez-Torres and Christopher Wool. 
These comparisons will provide an explanation of how aesthetic experience is 
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embodied as a phenomenon in the participatory artwork. Again it is 
emphasised that in these comparisons various philosophical positions will be 
used as a means to reach a fuller understanding of participatory art rather than 
a means to discuss aesthetic experience as such. Therefore these comparisons 
will place accounts of aesthetic experience at the service of explanations of 
‘Untitled’, 1993. This will contribute to the main question of this chapter: Does 
the ‘feel’ of aesthetic experience change in participatory art? 
 
2.2 The bodily and the cognitive senses 
 
When I took part in ‘Untitled’, 1993, I felt a measure of confusion about my 
participation. Was the decision to lift, roll up and take away a poster an 
important part of my experience of the work? Or, on the other hand was the act 
of taking a poster incidental to my appreciation of the work; once I got it home 
and put it on my wall then I could really appreciate it.  
 
Carolyn Korsmeyer’s work on the sense of taste is relevant to this problem. She 
wants to find out why some senses are considered to be more important than 
others. She proposes that the dualism of the cognitive and the bodily senses 
cannot be uncritically accepted and questions the assumptions that these terms 
rest on. For Korsmeyer they are supported by an arrangement of apparently 
self-evident and eternal pairs: “mind over body; of reason over sense; of man 
over beast and culture over nature. […] the elevation of male over female” 
(Korsmeyer, C. 1999: 30). These assumptions have to be examined because such 
simple binary pairs are rarely seen together without some kind of emphasis that 
places one above the other. For Korsmeyer this kind of weighted binary 
structure leads to the abandonment of one term for the other. The bodily senses 
are traditionally neglected because they are associated with concerns that are 
uncritically considered to be inferior i.e. the sensual, the natural and the 
feminine. This results in “the comparative theoretical neglect of everything that 
is categorized with the inferior terms” (Korsmeyer, C. 1999: 30). In this way she 
claims that the bodily sense of taste can offer a new perspective on some old 
philosophical problems.  
 
Just as Korsmeyer claims that the bodily sense of taste can offer a new 
perspective on some old philosophical problems it is claimed that a bodily 
participation rather than a cognitive engagement with an artwork can offer a 
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new perspective on aesthetic experience. Korsmeyer argues that Plato and 
Aristotle established attitudes to the cognitive and the bodily senses and that 
these attitudes continue to be accepted. Her intention is to point out that the 
current attitude to the senses has its roots in a set of archaic beliefs that have 
since been disproved by science: “Greek analysis of the senses where revised 
long ago; the value structure they employed has been naggingly persistent” 
(Korsmeyer, C. 1999: 33). The current attitude to the senses accepts that the 
visual and the aural are the best candidates to be linked to aesthetic experience. 
These senses operate over distances, promote “[…] stillness, or stasis […]” and 
are linked to states of contemplation (Collinson, D. 1995: 119). There is no 
criticism of those who have a tendency to seek out these kinds of experience 
because it is believed they lead to more elevated states. On the other hand those 
who seek out taste and touch are criticised because it is believed that these 
senses do not lead to more elevated states. These senses depend on physical 
contact, require movement towards the object of attention and tend to 
concentrate on immediate desires. Gonzalez-Torres produced many works that 
directly address the issue of taste and touch called ‘candy spills’. They are 
similar to his stacks of posters but literally involve the appetite (Fig. 2). A 
‘candy spill’ consists of wrapped confectionary piled in a corner. The viewer is 





Korsmeyer looks at the reasoning Plato and Aristotle applied to their 
explanations of the ‘hierarchy of the senses’. She locates the primary division in 
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this hierarchy between the ‘cognitive’ senses and the ‘bodily’ senses. The 
cognitive senses are sight and hearing; the bodily senses are taste, smell and 
touch. A division occurs between these two groups of senses because of the 
distances that are required for each to function. Sight and hearing can function 
at extended distances while you have to be close to an object to experience its 
taste, touch and arguably its smell. The cognitive senses are considered to be 
superior to the bodily senses because of this ability to function at a distance. 
Distance allows an individual to give an overall appraisal of an object or 
situation. Korsmeyer also suggests that when you look or listen your attention 
is not diverted to the body. The visual and the aural “[…] draw attention away 
from the body of the perceiving subject to the object of perception external to 
the body” (Korsmeyer, C. 1999: 21). The bodily senses on the other hand 
depend on contact with phenomena. As a result smell, taste and touch tend to 
force you to take the body into account during perception. The immediate 
circumstances of the body are drawn into the frame and you encounter the 
perception “”in” the body” (Korsmeyer, C. 1999: 25).  
 
The ability to function at a distance makes sight and hearing ‘cognitive’ because 
the introduction of distance between the eye and the object or the ear and the 
sound tends to suggest that these senses can offer a degree of objectivity. You 
may be deceived by what you see or hear but there is also a sense that what you 
see or hear has some independence because it is at a distance. Korsmeyer claims 
“This distance fosters the impression of the separation of mind from body and 
the potential freedom of mind to explore worlds of intellect […]”(Korsmeyer, C. 
1999: 17). Sight and hearing correspond to the kind of detachment required 
when you are engaged in abstract thought. They give a sense of the possibility 
of a world beyond the body and allow you to conceive of generalities. On the 
other hand the bodily senses fail to achieve this elevated state. They keep you 
anchored to the body and its appetites. Causing you to reflect on what is most 
pressing and specific to your needs. Ernesto Neto’s sculpture ‘Humanoids’ (Fig. 
3) makes a direct appeal to the bodily senses by inviting participants to become 
enveloped within the soft material of the work. It could be said that Neto is 
exploring the assumed hierarchy that splits the ‘bodily’ senses from the 






Korsmeyer examines how Plato and Aristotle treat the role of appetite in 
relation to the senses and points out that there was a general conception of the 
body and soul that was shared by Plato and Aristotle. The rational part of the 
soul was understood to be at the top of the body in the head or heart. The 
passionate part of the soul was thought to be between the heart and the 
stomach and the appetite was thought to be in the stomach and below. The 
rational soul was protected from the influence of the appetites by the passions.  
 
For Plato the dominance of the appetite was considered to be a danger. It was a 
potent force that had to be “[…] kept chained like a wild animal” (Korsmeyer, 
C. 1999: 16). Plato was generally distrustful of all the senses because they only 
give access to the world as it appears. Aristotle tends to be more tolerant of the 
bodily senses but the hierarchy between the cognitive and the bodily senses 
remains. He supports the idea that sight and hearing are higher senses because 
although they give pleasure you do not say that you over-indulge in them in 
the way you may criticize those who over-indulge in taste and touch. The visual 
and the aural promote a contemplative attitude. Korsmeyer quotes from 
Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, “[…] if one sees a beautiful statue, or horse or 
human being or hears singing, without any accompanying wish for eating, 
drinking or sexual indulgence, but only with the wish to see the beautiful and 
to hear the singers, he would not be thought profligate any more than those 
who where charmed by the sirens.” (Aristotle. 1984a: 1949). When you take 
pleasure in the cognitive senses you are not drawn by your appetites to the 
object of your attention. The object of your attention is considered in a 
disinterested and thoughtful way. However Aristotle does not absolutely 
exclude taste and touch from contemplation. An excessive appetite for these 
experiences is met with disapproved but the appetite becomes acceptable when 
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it is employed with restraint; knowledge may be achieved from senses like taste 
and touch but only if they are closely monitored. They offer potent pleasures 
and can be over-indulged so they should be regulated. 
 
I would say that participatory action asks you to consider if putting a poster on 
your wall and standing back and looking at it is the main experience of 
‘Untitled’, 1993. This work invites you to lift, roll up and take a poster and it is 
suggested that these actions cause you to question the association of the visual 
with objectivity and that this leads to a reconsideration of the role of practical 
engagement. In ‘Untitled’, 1993 the body is called upon and this suggests that 
such work requires a reassessment of the straightforward dualism that 
underpins the division between the bodily and the cognitive senses. I would 
say that participatory art instigates a more lenient hierarchy between the bodily 
and the cognitive senses. This leads you to review the structure of categories 
that the senses are ordered within. Participatory action in ‘Untitled’, 1993 asks 
you to reacquaint the self with the way that the body is drawn back into the 
frame by the bodily senses. In Torres ‘candy spills’ the role of the appetite is 
literally presented to participants when they decide to take a piece of 
confectionary and in ‘Untitled’, 1993 by taking a poster you demonstrate an 
interest in ownership of an example of the work. Such participatory action 
associates the work with the idea of the desire for possession and it could be 
suggested that this leads you to query the conventions that surround the 
appetite to own and touch art. 
 
2.3 Nietzsche 
2.3.1 The metaphysics of flux 
 
An appealing aspect of ‘Untitled’, 1993 was the way that you could take a 
poster but the work ostensibly remained the same. I was aware that many 
people had participated in the work but it continued to appear as a minimalist 
pile of neatly stacked posters. The work was undergoing an incessant physical 
change yet appeared continuous. 
 
Nietzsche explores this sense of change that underlies the appearance of 
stability in his discourse on the metaphysics of impermanence. Consistent with 
this idea is a sense that the ultimate grounds of reality can be described as being 
in ‘flux’ or ‘becoming’ (Young, J. 1992). An overwhelming volatility is at the 
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root of being and this stipulates that all things that are created are inevitably 
destroyed. For Nietzsche if this state of affairs is acknowledged then it suggests 
that history should be looked at in a different way. If the underlying nature of 
history is ‘becoming’ then the idea that history is a progression or may have a 
purpose is an illusion. If history is grounded on ‘becoming’ then to say that it 
started at one point and is advancing to another point is a contradiction. 
Human beings may feel as though they can impose purposefulness on history 
but ultimately history is the ceaseless reappearance of the same fundamental 
relationship. This relationship dictates that all order ends in disorder, that this 
disorder then produces order ad infinitum; consequently history is not a linear 
but a cyclic process. 2. Robert Morris demonstrates this kind of ongoing process 
in the work ‘Continuous Project Altered Daily’ (Fig. 4a & Fig. 4b) where he 





Fig. 4a & Fig. 4b 
 
When he discusses the ‘Open Work’ Umberto Eco makes similar observations 
about the underlying properties of reality. He suggests that in the twentieth 
century it was accepted that a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity was integral 
to many scientific theories. Modern science revealed that indeterminacy is a 
primary aspect of reality. Eco proposes that art acts like an “epistemological 
metaphor” (Eco, U. 1989: 90) and that the properties of the ‘Open Work’ present 
the indeterminacy of reality. Just as modern science highlights the uncertainty 
at the basis of many definitive scientific principles the ‘Open Work’ highlights 
the way that art can be ‘in progress’. While modern science proposes that there 
may be no all-encompassing set of principles to explain reality, the ‘Open 
 94 
Work’ questions the underlying stability of an artwork’s properties by 
presenting art that has yet to be completed by the participant. “The 
discontinuity of phenomena has called into question the possibility of a unified, 
definitive image of our universe; art suggests a way for us to see the world in 
which we live, and, by seeing it, to accept it and integrate it into our sensibility. 
The open work assumes the task of giving us an image of discontinuity. It does 
not narrate it; it is it.” (Eco, U. 1989: 90). It could be said that for Eco the 
constant renewal and incompleteness of a work like ‘Untitled’, 1993 is a 
presentation of the underlying unsettledness of reality. 
 
For Nietzsche art can allow you to experience this indifferent, chaotic, 
‘becoming’ of the world. When you have an experience of art you inhabit non-
cognitive states like dreaming or intoxication and in these states you are able to 
achieve primary insights into life. In a state of dreaming or intoxication you 
achieve a metaphysical awareness of the flux at the heart of life.  
 
How does this discourse contribute to an explanation of how aesthetic 
experience as a phenomenon is embodied in the participatory artwork? If it is 
accepted that a feature of the participatory artwork is its openness to 
participatory action then there is sense in which the artwork could be said to 
actually be in a state of flux. It is constantly being altered, transformed and is 
always ‘in progress’. This is the case in ‘Untitled’, 1993 where the stack of 
posters is continually being depleted and renewed and is never finally static, 
complete or whole. If it is accepted that such work is in an actual state of flux 
then there is a possibility of drawing an analogy between the metaphysical flux 
that Nietzsche claims lies at the heart of life and the actual state of flux that is 
presented in the participatory artwork. Just as an experience of an artwork may 
allow you to come to an awareness of metaphysical flux, a participatory action 
embodied in an artwork allows you to play a part in the actual flux of the 
artwork. It could therefore be said that the actual conditions of flux of the 
participatory artwork are an acknowledgement of the metaphysical flux at the 
heart of life.  
 
2.3.2 The ‘loss of self’ and the body 
 
When I took away a poster from ‘Untitled’, 1993 there was no crowd or queue. 
Only a gallery attendant witnessed my participation however I did have a sense 
that I was part of an absent collective of previous participants. 
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When Nietzsche describes how you may experience art he generally favours a 
Dionysian as opposed to an Apollonian attitude.3. The Dionysian attitude gives 
an insight into the fundamental unity and flux of being whereas the Apollonian 
attitude enhances and regulates the ordinary world as it appears to us. In his 
discussion on how you may be said to ‘lose yourself’ in the Dionysian art of 
dance and song Richard Schacht quotes from ‘The Birth of Tragedy’. “The 
essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of 
symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called into play, not the mere 
symbolism of the lips, face and speech but the whole pantomime of dancing, 
forcing every member into rhythmic movement” (Schacht, R. 1995: 491). 
Nietzsche is enthusiastic about the possibility that through your involvement in 
the event of the Dionysian artwork you may become part of a collective 
liberation. Schacht points out how Nietzsche refers to situations where a ‘loss of 
self’ is achieved in the experience of rituals or celebration through “the 
destruction of the principium individuationis” (Schacht, R. 1995: 491). He suggests 
that as part of a dancing or singing crowd you may become depersonalised. 
Through this process you are then able to briefly identify a deeper unity at the 
heart of reality and in a sense become part of this unity as part of a communal 
group.  
 
How does Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for the possibility of ‘collective release’ 
enhance an explanation of how aesthetic experience as a phenomenon is 
embodied in the participatory artwork? He favours Dionysian arts like dance 
and song and there is a sense that through participation in these activities a 
certain ‘loss of self’ is achieved. Although it would be misleading to suggest 
that the aim of every participatory artwork is to generate a similar ‘loss of self’ 
there is a sense that as a participant in a participatory artwork you surrender a 
certain amount of personal autonomy. You briefly forgo your own willingness 
to act freely in the world for the benefit of an engagement with the participatory 
artwork. A participatory artwork like ‘Untitled’, 1993 may not always engender 
a ‘collective release’ but it can definitely be said that a collective event may 
occur among its participants. You contribute to the collective action of 
acquisition that occurred during the work’s exhibition.   
 
In ‘Untitled’, 1993 I definitely had a sense that while I participated I was in 
some sense puncturing the normal atmosphere of the gallery. My participation 
displaced my usual seriousness and my regard for the norms of ‘gallery 
behaviour’. 
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Related to this is Terry Eagleton’s suggestion that Nietzsche’s understanding of 
aesthetic experience is determined to a large extent by the role of the body in 
general human affairs. His approach suggests that you “[…] return to the body 
and attempt to think everything through again in terms of it, grasping history, 
art and reason as the unstable products of its need and drives.” (Eagleton, T. 
1990: 234). Eagleton stresses Nietzsche’s materialist sympathies in his 
description of his philosophy. For Eagleton Nietzsche uses the body as the basis 
for an explanation of all reality. Reality surfaces from a material and bodily 
involvement with your surroundings. Reality becomes an effect of bodily 
needs. Nietzsche’s aim is to reveal the unstable material energies of the human 
body that underlie more rational motivations. The human body therefore acts 
in order to encourage “the ruin of disinterested speculation”, (Eagleton, T. 1990: 
234).  
 
How do Nietzsche’s ideas about the body and aesthetic experience contribute to 
an explanation of how aesthetic experience as a phenomenon is embodied in 
the participatory artwork? ‘Untitled’, 1993 invites participants to act on the 
work therefore by considering a participant’s action of lifting, rolling and 
taking, the movements and gestures of a body as a whole are being considered. 
It could therefore be said that Nietzsche’s recognition of the unstable energies 
of the body that lie beneath rationality illuminates how action tests the 
divisions that are placed between the body and cognition. Bodily participation 
rather than a cognitive engagement in a work like ‘Untitled’, 1993 offers a new 
perspective on aesthetic experience because it causes you to consider why 
thought that arises from simply looking is so highly regarded and why 
awareness that is an outcome of bodily contact meets with disapproval. 
Nietzsche re-establishes bodily drives at the heart of philosophy in an effort to 
disturb the impassiveness of rationality. It could be said that participatory 
action is a reminder of the bodily foundation of aesthetic experience. It opens 
up a space where the ordered break between the body and cognition can be 
interrogated.   
 
2.3.3 ‘Metaphysical comfort’ 
 
I would say that an important property of my participation in ‘Untitled’, 1993 
was its ordinariness. My simple participatory actions were surprising because 
they were so mundane and appeared curious in the context of a gallery. The 
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day-to-day flavour of my participation confounded my expectations of what 
may constitute an encounter with art. 
 
At one stage in his development Nietzsche claims that art does not deal with 
ordinary appearance but that its aim is to expose the ‘reality’ that lies behind 
the everyday world. He suggests that the underlying reality is an unstable state 
of ‘becoming’ and human reality is a consequence of the erratic energy of the 
material body. Nevertheless an organised social world for human beings 
continues to exist. People continue to commit all their efforts to ensuring that 
common values like reason endure as an impetus for human action. How does 
Nietzsche explain this? How can confidence in the progress of human affairs be 
maintained after having been presented with the essence of being in an 
experience of Dionysian art? Young quotes from ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, “[…] 
knowledge kills action; action requires the veil of illusion” (Young, J. 1992: 42). 
Having gained insight into the ‘becoming’ of being there is a sense that this 
causes a certain amount of anxiety. In order to be released from this anxious 
state it therefore makes sense to stop believing that you may alter your 
circumstances. Your knowledge of ‘becoming’ kills your action and you drift 
into passivity. The only way to overcome this docility is to assert yourself while 
acknowledging that your assertion has its basis in an illusion. It is better to have 
experienced the underlying reality of being and then face the illusion of 
ordinary life with knowledge of this experience rather than without it. Young 
quotes from ‘The Birth of Tragedy’. Nietzsche describes this kind of return to 
the ordinary affairs of life after such insights as a “metaphysical comfort” 
(Young, J. 1992: 45). You return to life quietened by new awareness, with a 
restored sense of your place and a more benign attitude to others. Without this 
kind of experience you collude with the unexamined illusion and custom of 
progress. You are unable to address the reality of being and therefore unable to 
place the illusions of ordinary states of affairs in their proper perspective. 
 
In another stage of his development Nietzsche changes his perspective on this 
sense of overarching ‘metaphysical comfort’. Art may offer you the consolation 
that there are truths hidden beneath the appearance of order and reason. Art 
may calm you during times of disenchantment with the dominant social order 
but it also relieves you of the impetus to actively change that dominant social 
order. By looking to art to present and comment on the reality of your 
circumstances any need to actually change the current reality is forestalled. For 
Nietzsche at this stage art alleviates any dissatisfaction that may be felt about 
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social conditions by distracting you from these feelings of dissatisfaction and 
dulling any dissenting energy you may have. Young quotes from ‘Human all to 
Human’. Nietzsche claims that the points of view offered by art “[…] hinder 
men from working for a real improvement in their conditions by suspending 
and discharging in a palliative way the very passion which impels the 
discontented to action.” (Young, J. 1992: 64) 
 
Young points out Nietzsche’s solution to this paradox in ‘Human, All to 
Human’. Nietzsche looks at what artists do and suggests that they spend too 
much time concentrating on developing their art at the expense of developing 
their lives so he proposes that this should be reversed. Art is no longer a narrow 
practice focused on a restrictive set of artistic values associated with particular 
kinds of artwork. For Nietzsche it can now be all behaviour. If you are to 
change your surroundings then you have to go directly to your surroundings 
and employ your creative abilities within life not art. Nietzsche is sceptical 
about the kind of culture that emanates from galleries, describing it as: “the art 
of works of art” (Young, J. 1992: 82). Therefore while not entirely abandoning 
the context of art for the context of life, Nietzsche does suggest that art can have 
a place among the ordinary artefacts and affairs of life. He remains convinced of 
the value of art but also recognises the need to attach art to a humble origin. 
Salim Kemal highlights Nietzsche’s proposal that artist and non-artist have the 
same starting point: “Every activity of man is amazingly complicated, not only 
that of genius, but none is a miracle” (Kemal, S. 1998: 270). Andrea Zittel 
produces work that tests this relationship between art and day-to-day life (Fig. 
5). She produces artworks that are in a sense experiments in design and in 
another sense experiments in installation art. Her work imitates utility furniture 
and social housing. This encourages participants to use her environments like 
any other living space. These environments also act like space saving devices. 
They are domestic capsules that can be folded away and transported elsewhere 






Nietzsche suggests that artists should look directly at the context of life rather 
than the context of art in order to bring about a direct transformation of their 
surroundings. He recognises that art becomes an ineffective consolation in the 
face of an unsatisfactory social order and suggests that art should be 
incorporated into efforts to change the social order. How does this discourse 
contribute to an explanation of how aesthetic experience as a phenomenon is 
embodied in the participatory artwork? It could be suggested that Nietzsche is 
readdressing the balance between art and life in his aesthetic theory. He 
provides a compensatory viewpoint for the way that art is generally venerated 
for offering a degree of consolation in the face of a harsh reality. He does this by 
emphasising the value of the ordinary and the everyday. This kind of situation 
brings to mind the manner in which commonplace actions become an 
important element in a participatory artwork like ‘Untitled’, 1993. The 
unsophisticated ordinariness of taking a poster away highlights the possibility 
that there may be no clear division between aesthetic experience and ordinary 
experience. Participatory action reveals a space where the encounter with art 
extends beyond the discipline of aesthetics and connects with other orders of 
cognition. 
 
2.3.4 An activist approach 
 
It could be said that when I took ownership of a poster in ‘Untitled’, 1993 that I 
was spurred on by the work to act. My participatory act was observable 
evidence that some kind of feeling or idea had been transferred from the artists 
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through the work to me. As though my act was an externalization of an internal 
interpretation. 
 
Young looks at a later stage in the development of Nietzsche’s thought where 
he proposes that descriptions of aesthetic experience should be strictly centred 
on the mental state of the artist. Young quotes from ‘The Will to Power’. 
According to Nietzsche “[…] the effect of works of art is to excite the state that 
creates art” (Young, J. 1992: 120). I would agree that action is very much part of 
the initial stages of the creative process. As an artist you have to do something 
to make a work. Write down a note or do a sketch at the very least. If the point 
of art is to replicate the creative state and if an artist is involved in ‘willed’ 
states when he or she is being creative, then according to Nietzsche the viewer 
should also be in a ‘willed’ state of creativity. Young refers to “Nietzsche’s 
activist vocabulary for talking about artists” (Young, J. 1992: 121). Nietzsche’s 
theory therefore runs counter to theories that argue that the encounter with art 
is defined as being ‘will-less’ or ‘disinterested’. 
 
His account of the need to stimulate the energy of creativity within the viewer 
seems at first glance to be extremely suitable in an explanation of how aesthetic 
experience as a phenomenon is embodied in the participatory artwork. The 
participatory artwork invites participants to act on the work, just as the artist 
was originally engaged in actions to create the work. Is a work that invites an 
active response simply making the creative process more accessible? Is the 
work a vehicle that transfers the values of creative activity literally ‘into the 
hands’ of the participant? I would suggest that this explanation is too 
straightforward. It supports the view that creativity emerges through the 
feelings and emotions rather than arising from thought and the intellect. It also 
suggests that through artistic skill this feeling becomes embodied in the 
artwork. The viewer then experiences the artwork and the creative feeling is 
transferred to the viewer. This model assumes that the participation is one-way. 
It places all the emphasis on the artist’s feelings and intentions. On the other 
hand I would suggest that it is more appropriate to take in a fuller account of 
role of the participant. The artist may have intentions and feelings for their 
work but the participant is in a position to interpret these intentions and 
feelings for him or herself. Similarly the artist may grant participation but the 
participant is in a position to accept or decline the offer to participate. I would 
suggest that a more reciprocal model is necessary in an explanation of 
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participatory art. The ‘energy’ of participation flows in two directions. The 





Although in galleries it is normal that viewers are not permitted to come into 
direct contact with an artwork, in other situations this kind of behaviour is not 
so unusual. Is the attitude that you ordinarily inhabit where you are generally 
inquisitive about the world present in a work like ‘Untitled’, 1993? Does this 
work encourage a more everyday and direct experience?   
 
Martin Heidegger stresses the non-cognitive basis of the encounter with art and 
suggests that in this encounter there is something that happens prior to your 
knowledge about the situation. For Heidegger a state of being is the elementary 
state and you build on this elementary state when you attempt to understand 
the surrounding world or the self. Before the conception of an object and a 
subject you have a bond with the world and he describes this as Dasein: “For 
Dasein, before arriving at any such cognition, finds itself always already in 
commerce with other things in ways which presuppose a certain primordial 
access to them, a practical orientation or familiarity which is already a kind of 
understanding before the event, and which lays the ontological foundation of 
all more formal knowing.” (Eagleton, T. 1990: 290). Heidegger suggests that 
your experience of the world has at its core a state of being that is primarily 
about a proximity and directness to your surroundings. Dasein presents a kind 
of reactive situation. Eagleton has described this state of being as “a domain of 
‘openness’” (Eagleton, T. 1990: 291).  
 
How does the prominent role that Heidegger gives to a non-cognitive 
experience of art contribute to an explanation of how aesthetic experience as a 
phenomenon is embodied in the participatory artwork? Some valuable 
correspondences may be drawn between Heidegger’s sense of a primitive state 
of being and the state that a participant may encounter during participation. It 
could be suggested that the state of ‘openness’ presented in Dasein has parallels 
with the condition of ‘openness’ that is present in the participatory artwork. 
Rather than present itself as an object to be scrutinised in a detached manner, a 
participatory artwork like ‘Untitled’, 1993 is presented as an invitation to 
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directly participate. It is presented as being fundamentally modifiable and 
responsive to direct action. A practical engagement with ‘Untitled’, 1993 
becomes comparable to the practical state of being that is the primary link you 
have with your environment suggested by Heidegger’s explanation of Dasein. 
Just as Dasein has a basic practical encounter with the world prior to cognition, 
practical participation becomes the basic connection that a participant has with 
‘Untitled’, 1993. Practical participatory action becomes a central experience in 
participatory art. 
 
2.4.2 Practical orientation 
 
When I took a poster from the stack in ‘Untitled’, 1993, I concentrated on being 
careful as I rolled up a poster. I was focused on a distinct set of practical 
concerns that eclipsed my appreciation of the work as an art object.  
 
Heidegger describes the fundamental encounter that an individual may have 
with the world as having a ‘practical orientation’. You engage with the world as 
a practical rather than as a theoretical being. This derives from the priority he 
gives to the “work-world” (Moran, D. 2000: 233). Forms of labour or craft and 
the rudimentary uses of materials fascinate him. Heidegger extends this 
description of the ‘work-world’ by dividing his definition into two categories. 
The first category is “Zuhandenheit (readiness-to-hand)”, (Moran, D. 2000: 233) 
and the second category is “Vorhandenheit (presence-at-hand)” (Moran, D. 
2000: 233). Both of these categories direct you towards a basic approach to the 
environment that is governed by an impulse to touch, manipulate and use your 
surroundings, as opposed to an approach which is determined by a 
disinterested, theoretical gaze. Zuhandenheit may be described as a situation 
where a participant is engaged and fully interacting with his surroundings. For 
example a stone-mason while working with his chisel and hammer on the 
stone, is engaged in an ongoing practice where his tools “withdraw” (Ihde, D. 
1997: 690). They become extensions to his body and to an extent they become 
transparent in his action. His work cannot be separated easily into constituent 
components or qualities of experience. It is ‘to hand’, and occurring. His tools 
and medium are: “[...] there in the light of an action oriented toward an end” 
(Goldmann, L. 1977: 36). Vorhandenheit is a condition intimately associated 
with Zuhandenheit but occurring with different objectives in mind. It is a 
situation where tools or materials are perceived from a more theoretical 
perspective. Heidegger describes this as occurring in situations where a tool 
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fails to function efficiently. He sees it as a disruption to the process. The 
‘wholeness’ of the act comes under scrutiny and is appraised. It can also be 
viewed as a scientific approach to your surroundings. It is described as “[...] 
things standing on their own, available for inspection” (Moran, D. 2000: 233). It 
is a moment where your clear theoretical interest in the world is severed from 
your impetus to manipulate your surroundings. Marijn van der Poll integrates 
a practical experience directly into her participatory chair design ‘Do Hit’ (Fig. 
6). When customers buy a chair they are given a sledge-hammer and a sheet 
steel cube. They then have to pound the cube into the shape of a chair. I would 
suggest that in participating in this work you inhabit a ‘work-world’ similar to 
that described by Heidegger. Your relationship to the hammer and cube would 





For Heidegger the world is not at a distance and it is interpreted in terms of the 
practicalities of the situation and in terms of the tangible variables that these 
practicalities may present you with. You may become part of a ‘whole’ practical 
engagement with your surroundings where you are unable to isolate each facet 
of the experience or you may ‘inspect’ your practical engagement with your 
surroundings to evaluate the experience. The ‘work world’ gives you a sense of 
being able to move through a range of attitudes. In your practical involvement 
with your surroundings you can move from being completely occupied to 
being more remote. This highlights the variable reciprocity that occurs when an 
individual becomes more or less absorbed in their practical activity. 
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How does Heidegger’s description of the ‘work-world’ contribute to an 
explanation of how aesthetic experience as a phenomenon is embodied in the 
participatory artwork? His account has value because it describes a practical 
engagement with the world as a basic aspect of your interpretation of your 
surroundings. In a similar way it could be said that a practical engagement with 
the world is a basic aspect of an explanation of the participatory artwork. From 
this perspective the central experience of practical participation presented by an 
artwork like ‘Untitled’, 1993 can be described on a shifting scale that gradates 
from captivation through distractedness to complete detachment. Participatory 
action could be explained as moving through degrees of attentiveness. Taking a 
poster could be an action that you are very aware of doing or that you do 
without thought. 
 
Although Heidegger is talking about the relationship between a craftsperson 
and his or her tools, it is suggested that the basic idea of the ‘work world’ could 
be extended into the world of the participatory artwork. Nonetheless it is also 
recognised that it is arguable that the idea of work should be regarded as the 
best way to structure an understanding of practicality. Bernhard Waldenfels 
refers to Aron Gurwitsch’s descriptions of how children play with ordinary 
objects, “[…] the pluriformity and polyvalence of things gets lost when the 
status of things is derived from the normal expediency of tools.” (Waldenfels, B. 
1997: 14) 
 
2.4.3 ‘The body’ and ‘man’ 
 
It could be said that Nietzsche and Heidegger make a number of assumptions 
about human nature that reinforce a particular view of the participating subject. 
It could be said that their views on ‘the body’ and ‘man’ create a very general 
and modernist conception of the audience for participatory art. For Nietzsche 
‘the body’ acts to guarantee the authenticity of an experience. Nietzsche uses 
the materiality of the human body’s needs and motivations to show that there is 
division between human nature and human rationality. An essential and ‘lived’ 
sense of agency is opposed to a more straightforward and rational agency. For 
Heidegger Dasein is used to describe a pre-cognitive state of being. From his 
perspective you inhabit a universal state before you reflect and think about 
your specific circumstances. Heidegger proposes that everyone has access to 
this undifferentiated openness to experience. 
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Each of these conceptions of the subject posit a universal human being who has 
a ‘natural’ feeling for life. However from another perspective it could be 
suggested that this ‘natural’ agent does not fully represent the subject. It could 
be said that these features do not exist prior to a discussion about the subject 
and are not commonly applicable to all subjects; rather these features are a 
consequence of taking a particular view on the meaning of individuality. “[…] 
Once spoken for and declared, the rights of “Man” - no matter how parochially 
interpreted to suit the needs of just certain “men” - will take on the dubious 
ideological status of a timeless and universal truth.” (Ingram, D. 2003: 249). 
 
Michel Foucault presents another view of the subject that cannot be described 
as arising naturally. For Foucault your sense of self is to a great extent 
conditioned by your situation and the complex of social forces that affect your 
situation. “Foucault shows that the subject is not natural but takes different 
forms in different historical periods. In other words, rather than being the free 
and active organisers of society, we are products of discourses and power 
relations, and take on different characteristics according to the range of subject 
positions that are possible in our socio-historical context.” (Danaher, G. 
Schirato, T. Webb, J. 2000: 118). 
 
Foucault tests the idea that ‘human nature’ is hard-wired into the subject from 
the beginning and queries whether “[…] there is something biologically given, 
unchangeable, a foundation for whatever it is we do with our mental 
capacities” (Rabinow, P. 1984: 3). For Foucault this biological perspective is just 
one discourse that is seeking a position of power among many other competing 
discourses. He questions the possibility that there is a fixed kind of human 
nature that should be privileged. “His main tactic is to historicize such 
supposedly universal categories as human nature each time he encounters 
them” (Rabinow, P. 1984: 4). 
 
For Foucault social forces impose norms on the notion of the subject. From this 
perspective your identity is wholly influenced by the disciplinary structures of 
numerous public institutions. “[The] constituted subject can be seen as a victim 
caught in the processes of objectification and constraint […]” (Rabinow, P. 1984: 
10). According to Foucault dominant versions of the human subject have arisen 
from sets of conflicting discursive formations. From Foucault’s standpoint the 
regulative norm of the heterosexual, financially secure, law abiding, married, 
male, young, white, sane and healthy individual is historically determined and 
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as such must be historicized rather than held up as a norm. Foucault’s approach 
is “a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, 
discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a 
subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in 
its empty sameness throughout the course of history.” (Foucault, M. 1980: 59).  
 
Following Foucault the notions of ‘the body’ and ‘man’ put forward by 
Nietzsche and Heidegger cannot smoothly represent the truth of the subject. 
The idea of subjectivity cannot stand outside an argument and act like a kind of 
gauge to compare the success and failure of the argument’s conclusions. It has 
to be accepted that whatever position is taken on the subject, it is a particular 
position and as such it does not guarantee the truth of an argument but only 
supports one position in relation to another position. “Where relative systems 
could still cohabit in the single world of modernity, postmodernity involves the 
recognition that, to a large extent one’s relative systems construct the world” 
(Ermarth, E.D. 1998: 589). However, Foucault implies you are not simply free to 
construct your version of human nature on a level playing field with everyone 
else. The prevailing version of human nature that is held up to be ‘true’ arises 
from the most powerful discourse. For Foucault the truth of human nature is 
connected to the most powerful discourses in medicine, law, technology, 
education etc. Doctors, psychiatrists and teachers do not discover the truth of 
human nature. For Foucault these discourses do not have a disinterested access 
to an objective perspective that allows them to say what is true. They are 
engaged in a strategic struggle in support of their version of truth. For example 
teachers produce truth about human nature through their integration with the 
values of the teaching institution, through their familiarity with the procedures 
of teaching and through their expertise with the mechanisms of power that 
these institutions employ. For Foucault the truth of human nature does not 
hover above the disputes about how people learn or who should be excluded 
from learning. “Truth is a thing of this world […]. Each society has its regime of 
truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true.” (Foucault, M. 1980: 72). 
 
On the basis of this discussion I would say that the account of ‘the body’ and 
‘man’ proposed by Nietzsche and Heidegger do not represent the truth about 
subjectivity. Following Foucault our conception of subjectivity has changed 
throughout history and now numerous institutional discourses have objectified 
human nature. For Foucault the truth of human nature is an effect; it is the 
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outcome of a social and historical context. Ideas associated with the subject are 
the upshot of the conflict between competing discourses and as such are 
connected to the authority of the discourse that emerges as the most powerful 
in these conflicts.  
 
From this perspective it could be said that the notions of ‘the body’ and ‘man’ 
used by Nietzsche and Heidegger are an effect of discourses that focus on 
‘authentic’ and ‘natural’ corporeality. It could be said that this experience 
addresses an ideal and context free view of bodily experience that is without 
gender, ethnicity, social status or history. Nevertheless I would also suggest 
that if human nature is constantly placed under harsh scrutiny then the 
coherence of identity becomes extremely uncertain. If the critique of human 
nature becomes so thorough that the idea of agency is absolutely dispersed then 
it could be suggested that this gives too much power to institutional controls. 
With this in mind I suggest that it is problematic to hold up ‘the body’ and 
‘man’ as being entirely representative of ‘people in general’. Instead human 
nature can also be explained as being constituted by sets of power relations and 





Korsmeyer, Nietzsche and Heidegger have shown how participatory action 
may influence aesthetic experience in participatory art. Korsmeyer has shown 
how participatory action allows the bodily senses to be considered alongside 
the cognitive senses. Nietzsche has shown how participatory actions can act as 
a reminder of how your experience of art is ordinary and corporeal. Heidegger 
has demonstrated how participatory actions can place practicality into the 
centre of your experience of art. 
 
During this exploration it has been assumed that in ‘Untitled’, 1993, my 
participatory action appeared alongside my aesthetic experience and that this 
aesthetic experience was influenced by my participatory action. Participatory 
action changed the conditions in which aesthetic experience arose. The 
corporeal and practical nature of participatory action in ‘Untitled’, 1993 
somehow unsettled and changed my understanding of aesthetic experience. I 
suggest that Hans George Gadamer can help to explain how aesthetic 
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experience may be understood under the new conditions of participatory 
action. 
 
Gadamer examines the idea of experience in an effort to displace aesthetic 
theories that tend to emphasise the subjective experience of art over the object 
of art. 4. Experience is considered to be something like a basic ‘unit’ of 
information in the human sciences. For Gadamer the mistake that is made when 
experience and knowledge are connected in the human sciences is to say that 
experience can be reduced to sensations. If you were to ask someone about their 
experiences of a memorable event for example, they would describe it as a 
series of experiences that stuck in the memory. Some of these experiences may 
have a degree of unity and some of them may be composed of smaller elements 
like sensations. Nevertheless in a description of an event you would generally 
hesitate to start your descriptions from the ground up with the basic sensations 
that compose each experience. In this way Gadamer is able to claim that if 
experience is looked at like this “we find a concept of life that restricts the 
mechanistic model” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 53). Sensations may be the building 
blocks for a strict analysis of the data of experience but lived experience, when 
it is being reported or described refers to “unities of meaning” (Gadamer, H.G. 
1975: 56). For example if you were to describe your experience of a work like 
one of Gonzalez-Torres ‘candy spills’ (Fig. 7) you could focus on the specific 
sensation of tasting the confectionary or you could describe your overall 
encounter with the work. One description concentrates on the important 
sensation of the work, the other concentrates on the overall experience of the 
work. I suggest that a description of the overall encounter does a better job of 





Gadamer also explains the concept of experience in terms of the untranslated 
German word Erlebnis. Erlebnis could be described as experience you have ‘in 
person’ throughout everyday life. Gadamer describes it as a state of affairs that 
means “to be still alive when something happens” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 53). 
You have direct experience of the evidence of situations rather supposing, 
imagining or gathering information from others about the situation. Gadamer 
points out that experience understood in terms of Erlebnis is closely associated 
with a life as it is lived. You may make every effort to detail every aspect of an 
experience to another but only you can comprehend the experience itself unless 
that other has a similar experience. A significant aspect of experience does not 
survive when it is described. He proposes that there is “a contrast between life 
and mere concept” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 58). In this sense Georgia Warnke is 
able to say “Erlebnis is supposed to signify the wholeness and intensity of 
human experiences against scientific abstraction” (Warnke, G. 1987: 28). For 
example I attended a major retrospective of the sculpture of Auguste Rodin at 
the Royal Academy in the winter of 2006. I had seen a number of smaller Rodin 
studies over the years and knew his major works from art monographs but it 
was not until I had an actual experience of the major work in the rooms of the 
Royal Academy that I began to comprehend his achievement, particularly the 
surface qualities of his works (Fig. 8). I had seen representations of this but only 






Gadamer further examines the consequences of applying this interpretation of 
experience to aesthetic theory. For Gadamer Erlebnis is a direct experience that 
you can only have ‘in person’ and it is distinct from the ordinary course of life. 
Gadamer suggests that if the reasoning of Erlebnis is followed then it tends to 
unravel the unity of your experience of art. It isolates all the people who may be 
having an aesthetic experience from one another and it separates aesthetic 
experience from ordinary life. “Basing aesthetics on experience leads to an 
absolute series of points, which annihilates the unity of the work of art, the 
identity of the artist with himself and the identity of the person understanding 
or enjoying the work of art” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 82). If your experience takes 
precedence in your appreciation of the artwork then if an artwork has multiple 
viewers then it follows that the artwork offers a multiplicity of experiences. 
Additionally, according to this interpretation of Erlebnis these experiences 
cannot be fully captured in a description or concept so there is a sense in which 
they will only ever remain as subjective phenomenon. Viewers may reach a 
consensus through discussion but fundamentally the numerous experiences of 
the artwork do not integrate. I can show you photographs of works I saw at the 
Rodin exhibition and we can discuss my experience but fundamentally you will 
only appreciate Rodin by directly witnessing the work ‘in person’. 
 
Gadamer also asks if your experience of the artwork is considered to be 
separate from the usual course of your life yet is able to influence your ordinary 
life he wants to know how these distinct areas relate to one another. It could be 
said that aesthetic experience understood as Erlebnis may disclose a momentary 
breakdown in the connectedness of ordinary experience and this explains why 
aesthetic experience can sometimes be so extraordinary. Experience understood 
in terms of Erlebnis is also described as “a new mode of being one” (Gadamer, 
H.G. 1975: 58). In this way the unity of an experience can be differentiated from 
more general inchoate experience. There are memorable and forgettable 
experiences. This sense of the distinct nature of certain kinds of experience can 
be described as having the qualities of an “adventure” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 
60). I have had aesthetic experiences when I have been climbing in the 
mountains where the ordinary world seems to fall away leaving me with an 
impression of nature that is very difficult to communicate. On a cloudy day 
there can suddenly be a break in the cloud and your altitude and the 
surrounding mountains are briefly revealed to you. It is like an involuntary 
experience that takes your breath away. Caspar David Friedrich captures this 





Gadamer wants to find a way to connect these kinds of fleeting experiences to 
more usual experiences, however Erlebnis does not offer a way of integrating 
this experience into ordinary experience. He accepts that the immediacy of the 
aesthetic experience exists and has value, but does not accept that such 
immediacy can offer a basis for ordinary experience. For Gadamer an 
explanation of aesthetic experience must do more than describe it as 
‘immediate’ experience, cut off from ‘usual’ experience. It must “[…] achieve 
that continuity of self-understanding which alone can support human existence, 
despite the demands of the absorbing presence of the momentary aesthetic 
impression” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 83).  
 
Gadamer’s response to this issue is to offer a different basis for aesthetic 
experience. Instead of experience understood as Erlebnis: the special, direct 
experience that you can only have ‘in person’, he proposes that experience is 
explained in terms of Erfahrung. This is a more objective and systematic 
approach to experience. Georgia Warnke describes the application of Erfahrung 
in science: “The concept of experience established in the natural sciences 
focuses on the repeatability of procedures and results, on the confirmation that 
one experience is able to give to another.” (Warnke, G. 1987: 26). Warnke goes 
on to suggest “The concept of Erfahrung that interests Gadamer, however is 
articulated by the notion of a “learning” experience, an experience that in a 
sense cannot be repeated and serves to negate our previous views.” (Warnke, 
G. 1987: 26). If Erfahrung is taken from a scientific perspective then you are able 
to return to a prior incident and replicate that incident in the present and 
therefore recapture the event. From the other perspective of Erfahrung that 
Gadamer favours, this is not possible. In this situation a ‘lived’ experience is 
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considered rather than a dispassionately observed event. During such occasions 
you cannot return to prior experience in an objective manner. You cannot 
fundamentally ‘unlearn’ experience. Past experience is always filtered through 
present experience. For Gadamer you are always within history and all your 
experiences of past events are shaped by your current historical situation. 
 
When integrated into a description of aesthetic experience Erfahrung alters the 
conception of aesthetic experience and also alters explanations of how aesthetic 
experience relates to ordinary experience. Initially Erlebnis describes an 
immediate experience of an artwork that can only happen ‘in person’ and is 
distinct from ordinary experience. When Erfahrung is coupled with Erlebnis then 
this helps to create an explanation that brings together the immediacy of 
aesthetic experience with the unbroken course of ordinary experience. It helps 
to explain aesthetic experience as part of a ‘learning’ experience not just a 
sudden, surprising instant that stands outside the rest of experience. You 
submit yourself to such experiences and emerge from them having undergone a 
change. Aesthetic experience may be something direct. You may not be able to 
exhaustively describe the experience. It may be that it has to be experienced in 
person and it may be an experience that is distinct from ordinary experience. 
Nevertheless all of these properties of the experience occur in the midst of the 
general course of everyday experience: “Since we meet the artwork in the 
world, and encounter a world in the artwork, the work of art is not some alien 
universe into which we are magically transported for a time. Rather, we learn to 
understand ourselves in and through it, and this means that we sublate 
(aufhaben) the discontinuity and atomism of isolated experiences in the 
continuity of our own existence” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 83). 
 
Gadamer’s notion of experience and how it is relevant to participatory art can 
be more fully illustrated if Dominic McIver Lopes and David Saltz’s discussion 
on the nature of digital interactivity is considered. They try to determine 
whether participants in an interactive artwork are paying attention to the 
experience of an instant of performance or the experience of the overall set of 
interactions that make up the interactive artwork. According to Saltz as a 
participant your performance exists within the work’s frame “interactive 
performance environments provide contexts within which actions are 
performed” (Saltz, D.Z. 1997: 123). Saltz also sees similarities between 
improvised music making and the interactive artwork because improvised 
music embodies a sense of the ‘immediate’, appears ‘impusively’ and happens 
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‘in-the-moment’. Saltz emphasises the aesthetic properties of the ‘instant’ of the 
participant’s performance and takes these to be representative of interactivity. 
 
On the other hand Lopes suggests that Saltz is mistaken in his understanding of 
how participants direct their attention while they are interacting. Lopes 
criticises Saltz for focusing on the instant of performance of an interaction at the 
expense of an appreciation of the entirety of all the interactions. I would say 
that Saltz does not consider the outline that this process leaves behind. He 
detaches the instant of interaction from previous instances and future instances 
and imagines the presently occurring instance to be the essential and only 
significant event of an interaction. He suggests that one aspect is representative 
of the whole and seals it off from previous and successive events. Conversely 
Lopes suggests that you are able to direct your attention to more than one 
situation at a time. You may be focused on the instant of interactivity but you 
can also monitor the progress of the artwork. You may recognise the 
spontaneity of actions in a presently occuring interaction but likewise you may, 
at the same time, grasp the whole sequence of interactive instances. “It is 
possible, indeed usual, to attend simultaneously to properties of a performance 
qua performance and to properties of the work performed.” (Lopes, D.M. 2001: 
79). Lopes demonstrates that a full appreciation of an interactive artwork is 
both an awareness of the performance of an action and an appreciation of 
“different histories of input” (Lopes, D.M. 2003: 110).  
 
I would say that Lopes’ definition presents a more convincing sense of the build 
up of events in interactivity. It hints at a more accurate reflection of an 
interaction as an accrual of affects that gives a broader and more inclusive sense 
of interaction. For Lopes interaction involves the immediacy of the action of 
interaction and an awareness of the overall set of interactions. I would suggest 
that this explanation of interaction corresponds with Gadamer’s explanation of 
aesthetic experience. Gadamer claims that Erfahrung connects the instantaneity 
of the experience of art with a chronicle of events that make up a history and 
connects the experience of art with the everyday world in which the artwork 
appears.  
 
The suggestion that interaction is like a chronicle of events can also be 
supported by the views of Krauss and Kester on the ‘durational’ properties of 
the experience of art. From their viewpoint your experience cannot be strictly 
described as ‘immediate’ in the way that Michael Fried suggests (§ 1.2.1). You 
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build up an understanding of an artwork and this experience integrates with 
how you generally have experiences in the world. Kester also shows how 
conceptual art made ‘duration’ one of the prevailing conditions of 
contemporary art. Conceptualist works by Marcel Broodthaers or Vito Acconci 
allowed the viewer to move through the space of the artwork and to read the 
artwork in a way that you would read a text. They introduced ‘non-visual’ 
elements into their works like texts, sound recordings and participatory action. 
These kinds of experience lack the kind of synchronic ‘presentness’ approved by 
Fried. When you move through a space you tend to experience the accrual of 
time and when you read an artwork you are building up an understanding of 
the work in a diachronic way. For Kester this places the viewer in a completely 
new set of circumstances.  
 
“This catalyzation of the viewer, the movement toward direct interaction, 
decisively shifts the locus of aesthetic meaning from the moment of creative 
plenitude in the solitary act of making (or the viewer’s imaginative 
reconstruction of this act), to a social and discursive realm of shared experience, 
dialogue and physical movement.” (Kester, G. 2004: 54). 
 
Scott Snibbe’s ‘Deep Walls’ (Fig. 10) demonstrates how interaction can be seen 
as an accumulation of events that take place within the realm of shared 
experience. His work captures the silhouetted movements of each participant as 
they move in front of a screen. These movements are then played back 







How does Gadamer’s description of Erfahrung play a part in an explanation of 
how aesthetic experience as a phenomenon is embodied in the participatory 
artwork? His description shows how an experience of an artwork like 
‘Untitled’, 1993 becomes part of an accrual of participatory experiences. Each 
participant takes from the artwork and in this way participation is specific for 
that moment yet each participant is a witness to all prior participations. 
Erfahrung suggests a way to connect the instantaneousness of a participatory 
experience with the set of previous and successive participations. It links the 
instant of participation with the overall participatory artwork. Taking a poster 
therefore becomes a unique, unrepeatable event that is part of a history of 
participatory events rather than just a repeatable series of similar participatory 
instants. Lopes’ explanation of interaction also confirms the idea that ‘different 
histories of input’ should be considered in participatory art and not simply 
specific instants of participation. From this perspective ‘Untitled’, 1993 is not 
presenting a special parallel region of experience that is discontinuous with 
everyday experience.  Erfahrung shows how the participatory action of taking a 
poster becomes a factor in an awareness that permeates into ordinary 
experience. As Kester suggests participatory action becomes part of the ‘realm 
of shared experience’. It becomes something analogous to a learning experience 




In the previous chapter it was recognised that aesthetic experience has to be 
articulated in relation to the practical and social experiences that participatory 
art introduces into your encounter with art. Aesthetic experience is no longer 
isolated from these other experiences. In this chapter the objective has been to 
find out if aesthetic experience responds to these other experiences and 
consequently if the ‘feel’ of aesthetic experience changes in participatory art. 
 
Participatory art introduces practical and social experiences into your encounter 
with art. I would say that this changes the conditions in which aesthetic 
experience comes to light. A student raises this point during the ‘Renascent 
Scission’ pilot study when she asks of the work “So therefore the aesthetics 
would change would they?” (Appendix II: Audio I). You could argue that 
aesthetic experience is not necessarily responsive to its changed conditions. 
However I suggest that if aesthetic experience has to be articulated in relation to 
other kinds of experience in participatory art and cannot be considered in 
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isolation to these other kinds of experience, then it does respond to its changed 
conditions. I suggest that these new conditions put aesthetic experience to a 
kind of test. The participatory actions that take place in participatory art offer a 
way of exploring the limits of aesthetic experience to see how receptive it can be 
to practical experience. Based on the different phenomenological perspectives 
considered in this chapter I would say that participatory action successfully 
transforms the ‘feel’ aesthetic experience. 
 
The conditions that produce this transformation are brought about by the way 
that participatory action causes the body and the practical encounter to be 
factored into aesthetic experience. When the body is incorporated into aesthetic 
experience then the distance between participant and artwork is altered. Your 
physical proximity to the artwork prompts you to regard the bodily aspect of 
your encounter with art and a degree of simplicity and directness presses 
forward in aesthetic experience. However it should also be recognised that the 
role of the body in participatory action should not be used to generalise the 
audiences in participatory art. Participation should not be reduced to an 
essential bodily experience and participation should not be referred to as a kind 
of universal state of being. Rather these ways of looking at participatory action 
are grounded on particular explanations of ‘the body’ and ‘man’ and should 
therefore be understood to be a consequence of discourses that highlight the 
authenticity of the corporeal. Following Foucault I would suggest that it is 
equally important to historicise these discourses and give ‘the body’ and ‘man’ 
a gender, an ethnicity and social position. 
 
From one point of view the phenomenon of aesthetic experience can be 
associated with immediate inner experiences that are discontinuous with 
everyday life. Stress is placed on the isolated instant and this is disconnected 
from preceding and succeeding events. I would say that this does not tell the 
full story of aesthetic experience in participatory art. A richer explanation of 
aesthetic experience in participatory art comes to light if the notion of learned 
experience is adopted. Learned experience is not an isolated incident that can be 
objectively separated from the rest of life but is accumulative and unrepeatable. 
It is continuous with ordinary experience and takes place as part of a history of 
events and adds to this history of events. In this way experience in participatory 
art is not simply about the individual instant of participation but how this 
instant links to the work’s history of participation, how these instances unite to 
from a work and how this work relates to a wider world. This view is 
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reinforced when the claims put forward by Fried are compared those of Krauss 
and Kester. For Fried the instant of timeless ‘immediacy’ offers a genuine 
modernist aesthetic experience. Krauss and Kester, on the other hand, suggest 
that it is more appropriate to consider other kinds of experience outside of this 
optimal moment of modernism. From their standpoint your experience of art is 
more like a chronicle of events or series of episodes that have ‘duration’. 
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Fig. 1a & Fig. 1b 
 
Context 
A memorable aspect of ‘Tropicália’ (Fig. 1a) was the way it presented an 
incongruous collection of experiences and diverse situations side by side. This 
prompted my curiosity and encouraged me to investigate every nook and 
cranny of the installation alongside other participants in the work. At some 
points there was a cheerful air and there was a holiday atmosphere, at other 
points a more disturbing atmosphere prevailed when the installation began to 
resemble a shantytown. The inclusion of some live cockatoos also gave the 
work an unstable and volatile feel. ‘Tropicália’ additionally had an unexpected 
practical dimension because in order to enter the work you had to take off your 
footwear. In my encounter with ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ (Fig. 1b) I had a clear 
impression that this work was not to be contemplated at a distance. The hoods 
lay in disarray on an anonymous white plinth and as I arrived someone was 
picking one up. While I tried a few of the masks on I felt slightly absurd and a 
little self-conscious just as I have felt in the past when I have been in clothes 






It could be suggested that the aesthetic, social and practical experiences of these 
participatory artworks are all distinct and that each has a specific role. This is 
the analytical explanation where aesthetic experience is articulated in relation to 
other experiences in participatory art. It could also be said that they influence 
one another in various ways. This is the phenomenological explanation where 
aesthetic experience is changed by participatory art. Aesthetic experience is 
influenced by other experiences in participatory art and is changed from the 
‘inside’. However it could also be suggested that these participatory artworks 
use rules and it is the way that these rules are applied that determines how 
aesthetic experience is distinguished from social and practical experience or 
how aesthetic, social and practical experiences influence one another. Aesthetic 
experience is understood as being determined by artistic conventions. This is 
the explanation that will be taken into account in the current chapter. In this 
account rules from social and practical life influence the rules of the art 
institution. The art institution in turn regulates the rules of participatory art, 
therefore participatory art is transformed from the ‘outside’. Equally 
participatory art introduces new rules in the art institution and this causes the 
art institution to accommodate these changes. It is proposed that an explanation 
of the receptiveness of participatory art to the influence of the art institution 
and an explanation of the receptiveness of the art institution to the influence of 
participatory art will help artists and participants to understand how sets of 




It is suggested that an institutional perspective can explain how aesthetic, social 
and practical conventions play a part in the relationship between participatory 
art and the art institution. From this perspective the assumptions that have 
accumulated around the art institution are explored. The development of 
aesthetic experience, the development of its relationship with social experience 
and the changing role of artists, galleries and museums are considered socially 
and historically. From this standpoint it is suggested that an institutional 
explanation of the relation between the conventions of participatory art and the 





It is suggested that a social and historical reflection on some of the assumptions 
that inform the present institution of art is relevant in an explanation of the 
participatory artwork because it places the participatory artwork in the context 
of art history. There are a number of observers who point out that the historical 
lineage of the participatory artwork can be traced back to the Happenings and 
Fluxus art of the 50’s and 60’s, (Bishop, C. 2005, Paul, C. 2003, Arns, I. 2004). It 
has also been suggested that the origins of these groups can be found in the 
avant-garde art of Dada and Constructivism at the start of the last century. 1. If 
it is accepted that there is a relationship between participatory art and avant-
garde art then it is proposed that an institutional explanation of how aesthetic 
experience is embodied in the participatory artwork will benefit from a 
reflection on institutional explanations of avant-garde art theory. 
    
Summary 
This chapter will ask how aesthetic experience is socially and historically 
determined by the development of the art institution. Aesthetic experience will 
be explained in terms of artistic conventions. The subjective phenomenon of 
aesthetic experience is rarely even mentioned in these discussions because 
attention tends to focus on the publicly shared and collective experience of the 
artwork and the social and political implications that this may have. The art 
institution’s distance from social life and engagement with social life will be 
assessed. The origins of the autonomy of aesthetic experience will be examined 
as will the role that the historical avant-garde had in attempting to reconcile the 
autonomy of art with ordinary life. The way that avant-garde art highlights 
these contradictions by confronting aesthetic experience with ordinary 
experiences will be considered. The historical formation of the artistic field will 
also be considered from a sociological perspective. The close link between the 
historical formation of the artistic field and the aesthetic attitude that props it 
up will be examined as will the relationship between the apparent magical 
power of the artist and the support structure of the artistic field within which 
he or she operates. More recent enquiries into the status of the participatory 
artwork will then taken into account. Experiments in ‘relational aesthetics’ and 
methods used to integrate art with social life will be explored. These accounts 
will provide a perspective that explains the institutional conditions of 
participatory art and throughout the chapter these findings will be compared to 
aspects of ‘Tropicália’ by Hélio Oiticica and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ by Lygia 
Clark. These comparisons will provide an institutional explanation of how 
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aesthetic experience is embodied in the participatory artwork. Once more it 
should be pointed out that in these comparisons philosophy will be used as a 
means to reach a fuller understanding of participatory art rather than a means 
to discuss the institutional nature of aesthetic experience on its own. Therefore 
these comparisons will place institutional accounts of aesthetic experience at the 
service of explanations of ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’. This will 
contribute to the main question of this chapter: How do the conventions of 
participatory art respond to the conventions of the art institution? 
 
3.2 Critical distance and social effect 
 
One feature I noticed when I took part in ‘Tropicália’ was the way that it 
employed a peculiar assortment of strategies to engage the participant. It made 
direct appeals to your senses by inviting you to walk through different kinds of 
material such as sand, bark, straw and water. You could lie down in odd 
hammocks and you could investigate cave-like mazes. There was a caged 
parrot that would occasionally cry out and there were tropical plants 
everywhere. I would say that these could all be described as aesthetic 
experiences. At the same time there were references to social issues associated 
with Brazil. I could not help but compare the sprawl of the work to a 
shantytown and the surrounding tropical plants made me think about the 
rainforest and its indigenous cultures. I would say that these features gave the 
work a political tone. In ‘Tropicália’ there appeared to be a tension between 
aesthetic experience and political awareness.  
 
Peter Burger traces the relationship between the aesthetic and the political back 
to when the original avant-garde movements of Dada and Constructivism 
emerged from aestheticism. 2. Aestheticism elevated art and turned its back on 
the norms of ordinary life. This position was also central to the avant-garde but 
they additionally presented a new anxiety about art’s “social functionless-ness” 
(Burger, P. 1984: 51).  
 
Artists of the avant-garde were faced with two main questions. The first 
question is: Should art have social consequences? The second question is: 
Should art have a critical perspective? These questions are usually answered by 
referring to the distance between art and life. The first position is that art should 
be connected with social life in order to have a social impact and the second 
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position is that art should maintain a distance from social life in order to 
comment on it. If the first position is taken then it can be argued that if art 
becomes overly integrated with everyday life then the ability of art to be critical 
is dissipated. On the other hand it can also be argued that by engaging with 
social life art begins to have actual social consequences. If the second position is 
taken then it can be argued that this kind of remoteness can reduce art’s 
relevance and influence. On the other hand it can also be argued that a certain 
amount of remoteness from day-to-day life is required in order to maintain a 
critical edge.  
 
An aim of the Dadaists and Constructivists was to somehow address the 
relationship between life and art. They were not happy with aestheticism’s 
withdrawal from ordinary life and questioned the ‘social functionless-ness’ of 
art. They wanted to integrate art more fully with life. Kurt Schwitters created a 
series of grotto-like ‘Merzbau’ (Fig. 2a), spaces in outhouses that were part of 
various homes he had in Germany, Norway and England: “I am constructing 
an abstract sculpture (cubist), in which one can come and go… I am building a 
composition without frontiers […]” (Curtis, P. 1999: 165). Lazar El Lissitzky 
created ‘Prouns’ (Projects for the establishment of a new art, Fig. 2b) that were 




Fig. 2a & Fig. 2b 
 
Burger points out that it is contradictory to expect that a critical distance can be 
maintained if art is entirely absorbed within ordinary life. The impetus to refuse 
the norms of ordinary life cannot be easily combined with the impetus to 
incorporate the norms of ordinary life. “In Bourgeois society art has a 
contradictory role: it projects the image of a better order and to that extent 
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protests against the bad order that prevails. But by realizing the image of a 
better order in fiction, which is semblence (Schein) only, it relieves the existing 
society of the pressure of those forces that make for change. They are assigned 
to confinement in an ideal sphere” (Burger, P. 1984: 50). Art opposes the 
dominant social order but in doing this it only offers consolation in the face of 
the realities of ordinary life.   
 
It could be suggested that here Burger is aligning himself with the modernism 
of Adorno. From this viewpoint aesthetic experience operates outside of use 
value, rationality or profit. Aesthetic experience has an ‘adversarial’ 
relationship to the dominant values of society becoming a “site of resistance 
against exchange value and instrumental reason.” (Carroll, N. 2001: 57). 
However Carroll has shown that ‘interpretative play’ has as significant a role to 
play in your experience of art as disinterestedness (§ Theme: Aesthetic 
Experience). On his account ‘interpretative play’ does not involve such a 
categorical denial of the values of the social order but actively implicates these 
values in your experience. Therefore if your experience involves ‘interpretative 
play’ that is grounded on social values as well as disinterestedness that denies 
social values then it could be said that the ‘adversarial’ role of aesthetic 
experience is exaggerated. Your experience of art does not stand in such 
extreme opposition to society. 
 
Jacques Rancière considers the social and critical aspects of art when he 
describes the predicament of what he terms critical art. He claims that the 
purpose of critical art is to present “an appearance of resistance that bears 
witness to the non-necessary or intolerable character of the world” (Ranciére, J. 
2004: 83). He proposes that Martha Rosler’s photographic series ‘Bringing the 
war back home’ epitomises the situation of critical art (Fig. 3). In response to the 
Vietnam war Rosler reassessed the tradition of socially satirical photomontage, 
producing a series of collages that brought together representations of the 
‘American Dream’ and photojournalism that documented the events at the 
front line. These images were originally published in the underground press at 






Ranciére points out that to have any kind of social impact then this critical 
perspective has to be communicated. However the paradox is that in order to 
be widely communicated it runs the risk of being co-opted by the dominant 
social order that it aims to undermine. Rather than accept that this situation can 
simply be described as a relationship between politics and aesthetics and that 
these terms can never mix, Rancière offers an explanation of their relationship 
that stresses the numerous ways that politics and aesthetics interconnect. This 
description hinges on the recognition that critical art has “to negotiate the 
relation between the two aesthetic logics that exist independently of it”, 
(Rancière, J. 2004: 84). For Rancière aesthetics and politics are not as cleanly 
separated as Peter Burger claims. In considering critical art he describes the way 
that politics is present within its aesthetics and aesthetics is present within its 
politics. One policy advocates that art become part of life in order to have a 
social function. The other policy suggests that art may be critical but only by 
being distant from ordinary life. Critical art does not just relate to a monolithic 
idea of politics separate from art but to two opposing policies within art. It is 
drawn towards an engagement with ordinary life and “the connections that 
provoke political intelligibility” (Rancière, J. 2004: 84), but must also find an 
orientation that allows it to separate from these connections and find a basis for 
its dissent in a critical distance that “[…] feeds the political energies of refusal” 
(Rancière, J. 2004: 84). Rancière is therefore proposing that at its source critical 
art is heterogeneous. It employs two ‘logics’ that differ from one another. An 
example of this may be found in the group ‘Atelier Van Lieshout’ (Fig. 4) who 
for a spell established an autonomous free state in Rotterdam, Holland that 
aimed to produce all the necessities of contemporary life. It was a community of 
artists and like-minded people who devoted their creative energy directly to the 
development and maintenance of their community. They created and exhibited 
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living spaces, plumbing, food, weapons and numerous other ‘basics’. Art was 
removed because it became unnecessary, but it only became unnecessary in 
view of the fact that it formed the foundations of new life praxis. They created 
an ideal situation where life and art dissolved into one another but where art 
remained the privileged term. 
 
 
Fig. 4  
 
I would suggest that the question about whether art should be connected with 
social life in order to have a social impact or art should maintain a distance 
from social life in order to comment on it is relevant to an explanation of the 
participatory artwork. This is because such art invites participatory actions that 
appear to bridge the gap between social life and art. It could be suggested that 
participatory action literally connects the ordinary actions used in everyday life 
with the critical perspective that can be adopted in aesthetic experience. 
Rancière’s explanation of the situation is useful because he embeds politics into 
aesthetics and transforms the contradiction into a positive feature of art. The 
contradiction becomes a diversity of approaches at the basis of art. This 
discourse contributes to an institutional explanation of how aesthetic 
experience is embodied in the participatory artwork because it positively 
addresses the heterogeneity of approaches at the foundations of art. In this 
sense participatory art accentuates rather than regulates these diverse 
objectives. Participatory art does not defuse the situation but calls attention to 
the volatility at the centre of art’s paradoxical aim to be critical and also to have 
a social effect. 
 
This plays a part in an explanation of how the conventions of participatory art 
are influenced by the art institution because ‘Tropicália’ celebrates a similar 
kind of instability. It brings incongruous elements together to demonstrate the 
conflicts between critical distance and social consequences. In my experience of 
‘Tropicália’ there was a sense that the work disturbed many of the standard 
 126 
practices of a gallery: participants were asked to take off their footwear, there 
was a live animal involved and most aspects of the work were to be 
experienced in a visceral and tactile way. At the same time there was also a 
festive sense of carnival surrounding the work that promoted an atmosphere of 
relaxation. It was an artwork in a gallery and therefore could be appraised on 
the basis of artistic criteria so in one sense it was separate from ordinary social 
life. In another sense it introduced the informalities of ordinary social life and 
day-to-day practice into the gallery space. It could be said that this work does 
not resolve the problem of whether art requires critical distance or social 
connectedness but it does bring the issue into clearer focus.  
 
3.3 Withdrawal and connection to the everyday 
 
When I was involved in trying on some of Clark’s masks I was presented with 
separate visual, aural and olfactory aesthetic experiences. Each mask isolated 
you from your surroundings in order to focus your attention on a specific 
sensation. However by wearing the work you were also engaged in other 
experiences that were not aesthetic. The work had a functional aspect and this 
presented another perspective. I did not just reflect on the sensation that each 
mask presented but was also aware of how it fitted and the fact that people 
were looking at me. In this sense the artwork was inextricable connected to 
practical and social considerations. I would say that this aspect of this work 




Gregg Horowitz describes these links between art and practical and social 
factors when he develops Burger’s claim that the autonomy of art is an 
“institutional fact” (Horowitz, G. 2003: 753). 3. For Horowitz art does not 
mysteriously have an automatic entitlement to remain detached from the values 
of ordinary life; the autonomy of art is not naturally given. The autonomy of art 
is determined and tremendously influenced by other cultural, social, political 
and economic institutions that support and contribute to art. When Clark’s 
masks are considered in this way I would say that they make references to other 
cultural institutions like fashion or the theatre. Horowitz recognises that 
because the autonomy of art is so thoroughly determined by other institutions 
outside of art then the conditions of this autonomy are constantly open to 
dispute and renegotiation. The independence of art from life is not a static 
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concept but an idea that has to be continually restructured in relation to new 
institutional forces that may claim to have an influence on the autonomy of art. 
The autonomy of art is “[…] actively produced and reproduced within the 
totality of the social formation” (Horowitz, G. 2003: 753). An artist like Hans 
Haacke was instrumental in the 70’s and 80’s in dealing with the art world’s 
relationship with big business and government. A work by Haacke such as 
‘MetroMobiltan’ (Fig. 5) exposes the relationship between corporate business 
and art. This work emphasised the contradiction between the ethics of a 
business that supported South African apartheid yet also sponsored exhibitions 





3.3.2 Relative Autonomy 
 
 
Horowitz points out that although the autonomy of art is determined to an 
extent by forces outside of art, there is also a sense in which art must have its 
own system of definition. Like any institution it must have its own rules 
otherwise it would be completely shaped by external forces and would be 
unable to be described as an institution. These rules are used to define art’s 
apartness from ordinary life and are also used to create a set of values within 
the art institution. Rules are implemented to exclude from the art institution or 
include within the art institution. They are also used to determine categories 
within the art institution. From this perspective there are rules to explain why a 
painting differs from an illustration. Horowitz notes that during the 
implementation of these kinds of rules a paradox surfaces. If art has autonomy 
from the organising principles of everyday life and exists in opposition to the 
efficiency of other kinds of institution then it seems contradictory that art 
should exist as an institution. Nevertheless this is what takes place because art 
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needs its own categories. To exist it must create standards but by doing this it 
adopts some of the values that it declares itself to be independent of. The art 
institution itself undermines the autonomy of art. Horowitz suggests “what art 
seeks to expel remains legislatively active within it, […]” (Horowitz, G. 2003: 
753), concluding that any attempts to discuss the essential nature of art as being 
completely independent of ordinary social life are misleading. For Horowitz the 
autonomy of art can only be described in terms of ‘relative autonomy’. Being an 
institution, art can only define itself in relation to other institutions and 
ordinary social life. 
 
3.3.3 Absolute Autonomy 
 
Horowitz looks more closely at the consequences of the persistent belief that art 
is ‘absolutely autonomous’. It could be argued that ordinary social life is so 
demeaning that the only source of human values can be found within art. In 
making art the focus of values you may then turn your back on the demeaning 
values of ordinary social life. Horowitz points out that this shift not only 
elevates art as the only appropriate focus for contemplation but also 
simultaneously deprives ordinary social life of any worth. However this does 
not constitute an absolute negation of the values of ordinary social life. 
Autonomous art defines itself in relation to these values through their denial; so 
they persist as denied values. Horowitz suggests that this denial will never be 
shaken off if this position is adopted: “[It is] this voiceless yet inescapable 
fragment of disdained life which lives at the core of artistic autonomy – and to 
which the aestheticist must remain unresponsive – that wreaks its vengeance on 
aestheticism” (Horowitz, G. 2003: 757). 
 
3.3.4 Non-artistic reminder 
 
Horowitz suggests that the avant-garde artists not only wanted to demonstrate 
that the art institution did not have absolute autonomy from ordinary social life 
but they also wanted to disturb the possibility that aestheticism could lead to an 
“integral life” (Horowitz, G. 2003: 758). If art is set up as the only source of 
value then this implies that you can live solely according to aesthetic principles. 
For Horowitz by unleashing aspects of ordinary social life into the autonomy of 
the art institution the avant-garde brought some recognition of the denial at the 
heart of aestheticism. Aestheticism may offer a better world but to do this you 
indirectly comment on the bad social world by turning your back on it. 
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Aestheticism doesn’t work to change the social world it disregards it. For 
Horowitz aestheticism cannot adequately fulfil its role as the only way to live 
life because the denied values of ordinary life such as economic and social 
problems continue to endure, “[…] the avant-garde impulse is the non-artistic 
reminder in art of the human needs that art has left unsatisfied” (Horowitz, G. 
2003: 758).  
 
In Horowitz’s explanation of the relative and absolute nature of autonomy he 
describes the way that the art institute remains linked to other institutions, no 
matter how much it may renounce the link, because it employs similar rules to 
these other institutions in order to become an institution itself. He shows how 
the connection lingers in a stifled form in aestheticism, claiming that one of the 
main spurs of the avant-garde project was to liberate this repressed feature of 
the art institute. He proposes that within the avant-garde project everyday 
social reality was to be encouraged within art as a ‘non-artistic reminder’ to 
show that aestheticism cannot meet every need.  
 
This plays a part in an institutional explanation of how aesthetic experience is 
embodied in the participatory artwork because it places another complexion on 
the status of the participatory actions that are invited by the participatory 
artwork. Just as the art institute declares itself to be independent of the values 
of other institutional practices yet employs these practices itself and just as 
ordinary social life persists within aestheticism in a stifled form, it could be said 
that participatory art highlights values that had previously been seen as 
separate from art and presents them as being suppressed in the experience of 
art. Participatory art brings social and practical values to the surface of art. 
From this perspective participatory action is not introduced from outside the art 
institute but acts as a catalyst to release the social and practical values that are 
always there and which persist in a hidden and denied form. In this sense 
participatory action is not inflicted on art or imported into art. It is present in 
order to restore social and practical values into your experience of art. In doing 
so it acts as a signal to show that there are aspects of social life that persist 
within your experience of art and that these challenge explanations of art that 
diminish the value of social experience.  
 
This situation is evident in ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ where it is essential to 
participate in a practical action in order to experience these works. There is no 
question of an alien action being introduced into this work; action is its 
 130 
fundamental constituent. Once you are wearing one of the masks you have to 
make adjustments to your stance and to the features of the mask to fully 
experience the sensations it offers. It could therefore be said that this work acts 
as a catalyst. It releases the latent social and practical values present within the 
experience of art.   
 
3.4 The ‘pure gaze’ and the artistic field 
 
When I took my footwear off to wander around the installation of ‘Tropicália’ 
or when I started wearing Clark’s masks I would say that these commonplace 
practices shaped my experience of these works and referred to institutional 
contexts other than art such as fashion or the theatre. Horowitz has shown how 
avant-garde art produces ‘non-artistic reminders’ of how institutions external to 
art influence the autonomy of art. Pierre Bourdieu questions the autonomy of 
art still further by considering how social and historical forces have determined 
the role of aesthetic experience. 
 
3.4.1 The ‘pure gaze’ 
 
Pierre Bourdieu questions why certain ideas should be entitled to represent the 
experience of art and recommends that the historical ground on which these 
ideas are founded should be explored. He casts doubt on the idea that aesthetic 
experience has an “ahistoric essence” (Bourdieu, P. 1989: 255). He wants to 
examine the assumption that an experience of art is somehow natural and that 
there is a pure viewpoint that is the same for everyone and has always been the 
same for everyone who has ever looked at art. He proposes that this 
assumption is arrived at because those with cultural authority take it for 
granted that their own aesthetic experiences represent the aesthetic experiences 
of the majority of people. In place of this assumption he points to the social and 
historical circumstances that determine these kinds of claims. 
 
He suggests that the only way to recover a true understanding of aesthetic 
experience is to counter the “active forgetting of history” (Bourdieu, P. 1989: 
256). This occurs when aesthetic experience is described in essentialist terms. 
He does this by examining the historical development of what is described as 
the ‘pure gaze’ from two perspectives. He considers it from the perspective of 
those active as artists. This group want to maintain their autonomy from other 
fields of culture. They argue that art has its own unique sphere of influence. 
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They promote the view that their work is produced with only aesthetic 
experience in mind. It comes from an unpolluted aesthetic source. Their 
products therefore require a special aesthetic attitude in order to be 
appreciated. He also considers the ‘pure gaze’ from the perspective of the 
education of the cultured individual. He considers the ‘pure gaze’ to be an 
achievement that is arrived at through the study of art history and an 
experience of museums and galleries. From either perspective he suggests that 
when aesthetic experience is understood as something ‘pure’ this glosses over 
the way that the very specific experiences of a very specific group of people 
have been upheld as the exemplary way of experiencing art. The ‘pure gaze’ 
“implicitly establishes as universal to all aesthetic practices the rather particular 
properties of an experience which is the product of privilege, that is, of 
exceptional conditions of acquisition.” (Bourdieu, P. 1989: 256). In his painting 
‘Higher powers commanded: Paint the upper right hand corner black’ (Fig. 6) 
Sigmar Polke satirizes this state of affairs. He comments on the mystifications of 





Bourdieu claims that the ‘pure gaze’ is an outcome of the desire on the part of 
artists to keep art autonomous and is a product of a specific educational 
background. He criticises the way that these two viewpoints champion the 
‘pure gaze’ as the correct way to look at art. In what way does this enhance an 
institutional explanation of how aesthetic experience is embodied in the 
participatory artwork? It could be said that there are parallels between the way 
he questions assumptions about the ‘pure gaze’ and the way that the 
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participatory artwork questions assumptions about aesthetic experience. If it is 
assumed that a ‘pure gaze’ is necessary in order to appreciate an artwork then it 
could be said that this assumes that a work is produced with only aesthetic 
experience in mind and that this requires a special aesthetic attitude in order to 
be appreciated. A participatory artwork does not rely on a special aesthetic 
attitude in order to be appreciated. It incorporates practical states of mind and 
ordinary actions that in this context could be described as ‘impure’. These 
impurities are states of mind and actions that may well be imported from other 
institutional contexts. Such works are not created for a ‘gaze’, therefore it is 
suggested that participatory action is incompatible with the ‘pure gaze’.   
 
In ‘Tropicália’ this is illustrated by the instruction to take off your footwear 
before you enter the arena of the work. This practical requirement has more in 
common with the rules found in public swimming pools or in temples. In ‘Six 
Sensorial Masks’ participants are invited to try on a fabric mask. You find 
yourself rifling through a pile of masks in a similar way to the way that you 
might select a hat at a jumble sale. From Bourdieu’s sociological perspective do 
you become familiar with the conventions of these artwork’s in the way that 
you normally would because they are ordinary conventions or do you need the 
correct cultural background in order to know how to act? There is a sense that 
these kinds of responses to the work are not informed by an education in art 
and its conventions. They involve a more general and straightforward 
involvement found in day-to-day experience and do not require sustained 
periods of study in museums or galleries. Consequently it could be argued that 
you receive confirmation that a hands-on approach to the artwork is suitable in 
a gallery when you see a fellow gallery-goer rummaging through a pile of 
fabric masks on a table. On the other hand it could also be said that the actions 
required by these works do require an art education. In order to transgress the 
‘pure gaze’ that is the usual policy of the art institution such work requires the 
special kind of confidence that education provides. This can only be achieved 
when it is recognised that other kinds of convention can be employed while 
appreciating the artwork. It could be argued that the recognition of what is an 
appropriate and inappropriate convention when appreciating an artwork can 





3.4.2 The artistic field 
 
As I took part in ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ my participatory actions 
not only disturbed any possibility of a ‘pure’ aesthetic experience but they also 
altered my role in the gallery. I was no longer simply a viewer of artefacts and 
no longer felt like such a self-contained observer. I was also a spectator or 
participant. As a spectator or participant my responsibilities and position 
broadened to encompass other spectators and participants. I would say that 
Oiticica and Clark broadened your perspective on the field of art by 
encouraging a different kind of relationship between agents. 
 
In his explanation of the artistic field Bourdieu asks “Who […] created the 
‘creator’[?]” (Bourdieu, P. 1989: 258). 4. Instead of trying to identify a 
fundamental starting-point from which the idea of creativity springs Bourdieu 
goes in the opposite direction. He refers to a study made by Marcel Mauss, 
(Mauss, M. 2001). In this work Mauss tries to find out why audiences are so 
willing to suspend their beliefs for a magician. Mauss looks for an explanation 
in the apparatus, in the magician and in the beliefs of the audiences. He finally 
concludes that an explanation of the phenomenon can only be found in a 
reflection on “the entire social universe in whose midst magic evolves” 
(Bourdieu, P. 1989: 258). Bourdieu proposes that a similar approach must be 
adopted in order to explain the transformative power of an artist’s signature. 
An artist is just one element in a composite arrangement. The artist is necessary 
to make the actual work but not sufficient to validate the work as art. Without 
the support structure of the artistic field the artist cannot validate what he or 
she makes.  
 
Bourdieu elaborates on this theme by identifying what artists and the artistic 
field depend on for their mutual continuation. Artists require educational 
certification that proves their basic artistic competence and also have to 
establish a link between their signature and their celebrity. The artistic field 
requires educational institutions that produce and nurture the ideas of the field. 
It also requires places to exhibit like museums or galleries and numerous 
intermediary staff like dealers, critics and historians. For Bourdieu these 
numerous mediators and institutions are all antagonistically trying to establish 
what is and what isn’t art. All of these forces are interdependent on one another 
and their roles intersect in complicated ways. In this sense Bourdieu is able to 
propose that the role of the artist is not so clearly defined within the field. The 
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edges of the various roles within the field blend into one another. The artist is 
rarely the sole interpreter of a work, the work’s fate is decided by many kinds 
of audience along with numerous institutions and the work’s position within 
art history is determined by the fate of many other kinds of work. Bourdieu 
states: “the ‘subject’ of the production of the artwork – of its value and also of 
its meaning – is not the producer who actually creates the object in its 
materiality, but rather the entire set of agents engaged in the field” (Bourdieu, P. 
1989: 261, emphasis mine). 
 
This adds to an institutional explanation of how aesthetic experience is 
embodied in the participatory artwork because by describing the art-world as a 
field of agents Bourdieu offers an interesting perspective on the way that the 
participatory artwork provides a role for the audience and the way that the 
artist surrenders a degree of authority in his or her role as the creator of the 
work. By pointing to the relationship between the artist and the audience and 
altering this relationship such work could be said to reveal the ambiguity of the 
circumstances in which agents in the field are engaged. Rather than cause you 
to discriminate between agents in the field and confirm their independence 
from one another, such work stresses instances of overlap between the agents in 
the field and in doing so highlights their mutual dependence and infers the 
general co-dependence of all agents in the field. By pointing to the instances in 
the experience of art where roles such as audience and artist can be said to 
coincide such work compels you to test the distinctions that form the basis for 
many of the conventions of the artistic field.  
 
While participating in ‘Tropicália’ I had an experience that emphasised the 
interdependence and the ambiguity of the roles that are adopted in the artistic 
field. While walking through this work I came across a maze-like set of cubicles 
that grew increasingly dark as I investigated them. Vine-like rags obscured the 
path and at the centre was a black and white television tuned to a current 
television programme. Oiticica has interpreted this part of his installation as a 
comment on the myth of an innocent tropicalism. You weave your way to the 
heart of the ‘jungle’ to find a mediated image. Upon leaving this den I 
negotiated the vine-strewn corridor again just as another participant entered. 
My presence gave her a shock and she shouted out. I had to explain that I was 
only another participant and not part of the experience. Initially I understood 
my role to be as a participant. Then another person interpreted me to be part of 
the experience of the artwork. After this surprise I then adopted the role of a 
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guide to Oiticica’s work explaining what the situation was. I would suggest that 
this incident gives a sense of the way that the roles of agents in the artistic field 
intersect. 
3.4.3 The codes of art 
 
In my encounter with Clark’s ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ I very briefly considered the 
work in aesthetic terms as sculptural objects. I knew that Clark’s work was 
participatory but nevertheless as I approached it I saw a random pile of 
different coloured fabric objects sitting of a white plinth (Fig. 7a & Fig. 7b). 
However another person picked up one of the masks and this was confirmation 
that the work was primarily participatory. Bourdieu tackles a similar situation 
when he looks at how artistic codes and everyday codes are employed in your 
encounter with art. 
 
  
Fig. 7a & Fig. 7b 
 
Bourdieu claims that the perception of art is similar to a decoding process and 
proposes that when artworks are decoded the rules and practices employed in 
the process tend to be overlooked. The process is so taken for granted that it is 
not remarked upon. Bourdieu’s description of the codes of art resembles George 
Dickie’s description of the conventions of art (§ 1.3.2). Just as Bourdieu suggests 
that an experience of art is mainly determined by an approved set of customs 
Dickie suggests that there is a body of knowledge that is already understood 
prior to an experience of art. Like Bourdieu, Dickie also suggest that this 
knowledge of how to behave is unnoticeably integrated into aesthetic 
experience. 
 
Bourdieu claims that in a successful perception of an artwork there is a tacit 
agreement between the artist and viewer that creates the impression that 
perception in art is an immediate experience. If the viewer employs the same 
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codes as the artist then this generates a sense that the ideal encounter with an 
artwork is direct. Perception is like the successful matching of viewpoints, “the 
culture that the originator puts into the work is identical with the culture or, 
more accurately, the artistic competence which the beholder brings to the 
deciphering of the work” (Bourdieu, P. 1968: 216). As an educated viewer it is 
assumed that you understand the classifications and groupings that are useful 
in the perception of art. Bourdieu suggests that these accruals of knowledge 
efface themselves during the perception and that as an educated perceiver you 
are unable to stand outside yourself in order to register the specificity of the 
codes that you are employing in perception. Educated viewers “do not see that 
which enables them to see” (Bourdieu, P. 1968: 217).  
 
Bourdieu considers the situation when there is an unsuccessful match in the 
decoding of a work. This would be when you are not aware of the required 
interpretation because you lack the cultural background to appreciate an 
artwork. In this case it is suggested that being without knowledge of the how 
an artistic style or method should be appreciated you employ an everyday 
realism and common sense in the decoding of the work. Therefore one 
decoding system is substituted for another. On these grounds Bourdieu is able 
to question the primacy of the idea of a ‘fresh eye’. It is often considered an 
asset in the art world if a viewer comes to art with no knowledge of how to 
respond to the art. Inexperience guarantees ‘authentic’ responses. It can be said 
that such simplicity is highly valued in art because it tallies well with the idea 
of a direct aesthetic experience that is unadulterated with other kinds of 
knowledge. This idea begins to lose credibility if Bourdieu’s principle is applied 
because a viewer cannot escape applying a way of decoding the artwork in one 
way or another. Without the specialised knowledge about artistic style or 
method you do not inhabit a pure state of aesthetic experience; you use 
everyday criteria in order to appraise the work. 
 
Bourdieu claims that aesthetic perception is a decoding process with rules that 
are usually overlooked. Artists and cultured audiences are primed to 
understand these codes, therefore there appears to be an accord between art 
and aesthetic perception. This creates the false notion that the ideal aesthetic 
perception has some ‘immediacy’. Without this ‘artistic competence’ and an 
ability to share the same codes as the artist, Bourdieu suggests that viewers call 
upon their everyday experience in order to appreciate an artwork. In this way 
Bourdieu claims that there is no such thing as an ‘fresh eye’ at the root of 
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aesthetic experience because when a viewer is ‘innocent’ of the codes of art, he 
or she does not inevitably have a pure experience but tends to employ the codes 
of realism.  
 
This discourse contributes to an institutional explanation of how aesthetic 
experience is embodied in the participatory artwork because participatory art 
does not require that participants have some kind of ‘pure’ experience but 
fundamentally incorporates everyday experience into its constitution. I would 
say that the introduction of this set of everyday codes provides a new 
perspective on the way that artworks are usually experienced. A participatory 
action sheds new light on the requirement of ‘artistic competence’ that had 
previously been concealed; challenging the suggestion that only a specific set of 
conventions are intrinsic to an experience of art. This position can be 
underpinned by the claims made about aesthetic experience by Krauss and 
Kester. From their standpoint your experience of art is like a chronicle of events 
that have ‘duration’ in the everyday world rather than an instant of 
‘immediacy’ proposed by Fried (§ 1.2.1).  
 
This position can also be supported by Kester’s view on the ‘transdisciplinary’ 
nature of dialogic art (§ 1.3). If ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ is considered from this 
perspective then it can be shown that by making participatory action such an 
integral part of her work Clark offers participants an opportunity to traverse 
the discipline of aesthetics. Indeed Clark emphasises that her work is not about 
an aesthetic experience but is best understood as a sensory therapy (Fig. 8). She 
is proposing that the ordinary ‘duration’ of day-to-day experience is adequate 
in order for participants to fully experience her work. According to Clark “The 





3.5 ‘Relational Aesthetics’ 
3.5.1 A community of viewers 
 
When I recall the episode where I was mistaken as an actor who was part of 
‘Tropicália’ and then found myself explaining myself to other participants I 
would say that this shows how meaning was produced in ‘Tropicália’ as part of 
a publicly observable discourse rather than as part of a private psychological 
experience. I participated in ‘Tropicália’ as part of a group of participants where 
the exchange of information and ideas about the work was encouraged.  
 
Nicolas Bourriaud stresses that current ‘relational’ art practice emphasizes the 
importance of shared meaning and suggests that the preferred audience for 
such work should be addressed as a community of viewers rather than a set of 
private viewers. 5. Meaning is an outcome of a publicly observable discourse 
and not the exclusive province of “private symbolic space” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 
14).  
 
It could be said that Bourriaud’s views on the public nature of culture resemble 
George Dickie’s. According to Dickie’s ‘institutional’ theory of art, aesthetic 
experience is more forcefully influenced by objective and public situations than 
a subjective and private sensibility (§ 1.3.2). Dickie is critical of explanations of 
aesthetic experience that emphasise its psychological dimension. It could also 
be said that Bourriaud’s emphasis on the shared nature of meaning in the 
experience of art has similarities to Hans George Gadamer’s approach to 
aesthetic experience (§ 2.5.1 endnote 4.). For Gadamer the “radical 
subjectivization” of aesthetics has marginalised the role of aesthetic experience, 
(Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 36). He questions the association aesthetics has with 
introspective states of mind and instead argues that art can be associated with 
more objective kinds of knowledge. These views also correspond with Grant 
Kester’s suggestion that participation can lead to an experience of art that is 
more open to discussion and closer to a “social and discursive realm of shared 
experience, dialogue and physical movement.” (Kester, G. 2004: 54).  
 
The work of Mark Dion shows how art can function in this more publicly 
negotiated domain (Fig. 9). He recruits participants to take part in pseudo-
archeological digs where the recent history of a site is revealed. He then 
categorises and displays the findings in the manner of a 19th century museum. 
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Presenting taxonomies of ordinary objects in ‘curiosity cabinets’. This example 
shows the results of a dig in New England. Dion’s work demonstrates how art 
can incorporate the objective conventions of other disciplines in order to test the 




3.5.2 ‘The Interstice’, ‘Social Aesthetics’ and ‘The Public Sphere’ 
 
‘Tropicália’ was made up of a series of environments. One of these 
environments was a room sized chipboard box with foam mattresses in it. 
Another environment was a polythene enclosure in which was placed a pool of 
cold water. Neither environment seemed particularly hospitable yet it seemed 
that Oiticica was suggesting that you were free to have a nap or have a paddle 
in the water. These kinds of invitations seemed bizarre in the context of a 
gallery but also demonstrated the utopian ambitions of ‘Tropicália’. 
 
Bourriaud speaks of the relational artwork as an “interstice” (Bourriaud, N. 
2002: 16). 6. A relational artwork offers “other trading possibilities” (Bourriaud, 
N. 2002: 16) where the usual rules of value and purpose fall away. So for 
Bourriaud the work provides an opportunity for other forms of sociability 
outside the strictures of capital. As a ‘social interstice’ it offers alternative 
patterns of living. He argues that because these works are operating as ‘social 
interstices’, the artists are not attempting to represent any social conditions. A 
relational artwork operates under another set of rules and is “defined in 
relation to the alienation reigning everywhere else” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 82). 
 
In his discussion on ‘social aesthetics’ Lars Bang Larsen describes his 
conception of participatory art that provides opportunities for the 
“transgressions of various economies” (Larsen, L.B. 1999: 172). The two 
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principle economies for Larsen are the ‘social economy’ and the ‘aesthetic 
economy’ and he suggests that art-institutional space is a key location for 
experiments that combine the social and the aesthetic. Art-institutional space is 
not simply a means of excluding aspects of ordinary social life from the 
mysteries of aesthetic experience. He argues that it ought to welcome social 
institutions extrinsic to the art institution but should not ask them to conform to 
their usual utility or function. It becomes a basis on which the boundaries of the 
art institution and social institutions are tested. It acts as an arena where the 
boundaries of the arena and the conditions of play are continually open to 
negotiation, “art and the art institution as resource become frames for activity 
that is real, because social interaction and the observation of its effects are 
allowed without conceptual rigidity” (Larsen, L.B. 1999: 172).  
 
For Simon Sheikh the gallery forms part of a wider art world that he describes 
in terms of the “public sphere” (Sheikh, S. 2004: 1). He describes the modernist 
ideal of the ‘public sphere’ that reflected a specific attitude to the artwork, its 
context and the viewer. An artwork was a self-sufficient object, presented in a 
stable context to a universal audience. This approach has since been scrutinised, 
particularly by artists and critics involved in public art and on the basis of this 
scrutiny the art object’s meaning was seen to be dependent on its heterogeneous 
context and highly differentiated audience. Artworks can be presented using 
numerous materials and methods, in places outside of the gallery to diverse 
social groups. This leads Sheikh to ask if the ‘public sphere’ of art is 
fragmenting. There is now no “generalized bourgeois public sphere” (Sheikh, S. 
2004: 4). Instead there is the possibility of a more pluralist approach where the 
‘public sphere’ is constituted by a series of formations that may be in 
competition with one another or allied with one another. From this standpoint 
it therefore becomes important to trace how these various formations connect 
and conflict with one another. 
 
Sheikh expresses dissatisfaction with recent efforts to explain this process of 
fragmentation as a straightforward acceptance of the market economy. He 
acknowledges that there is value in questioning the traditional universalizing 
role of the gallery where dominant social values are perpetuated under the 
guise of disinterested edification but he is also uneasy about the role of 
consumerism and the entertainment industry in the ‘new museum’. The market 
cannot offer a solution to the fragmentation of the public sphere because this 
kind of fragmentation provides the most fertile ground for marketing. The 
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market perpetuates this situation to an extent. “[…] Fragmentation and 
difference can be mapped in terms of consumer groups, as segments of a 
market with particular demands and desires to be catered to and to be 
commodified” (Sheikh, S. 2004: 6). For Sheikh unity and autonomy are absent in 
the plural series of public spheres that make up the art world. The spaces of art 
should now be seen as an opportunity to explore the emergence of alliances and 
discords between viewpoints. The variations that exist between public spheres 
can be seen as positive disjunctures where new approaches to culture can 
emerge. “I would suggest that we take our point of departure in precisely the 
unhinging of stable categories and subject positions, in the interdisciplinary and 
intermediary, in the fragmented and permissive – in different spaces of 
experience, as it were” (Sheikh, S. 2004: 6). For Sheikh therefore the modern 
gallery space may present the illusion of a unified and unbiased perspective on 
art but in actual fact the best way to approach something resembling a balanced 
view can only be achieved when these forms of ‘public sphere’ are critically 
compared to other methods of presenting and exploring art such as art sited 
within other institutions, in collaboration with other ‘non-art’ specialists as well 
as artist run spaces and community-based public artworks. 
 
How do Bourriaud’s, Bang Larsen’s and Sheikh’s discourses contribute to an 
institutional explanation of how aesthetic experience is embodied in the 
participatory artwork?  
 
I suggest that Bourriaud’s notion of the relational artwork as an interstice could 
be described in two ways. Firstly if the art institution is viewed as a place where 
the experience of art is controlled then the interstice could be seen as an 
idealisation of the space of art. From this perspective the interstice is 
determined by the regulations of the art institution. Therefore the ‘freedoms’ it 
promotes are limited. They only exist at the invite of the art institution. This 
structure is highlighted if Bourdieu’s point on this issue is reiterated. He 
suggests that you bear in mind “[…] the entire set of agents engaged in the 
field” (Bourdieu, P 1989: 261). If the art and the artist are dependent on the 
structures of the art system then so too must the interstitial space of the 
relational artwork.  
 
On the other hand if the more benign aspects of the art institution are taken into 
account then the interstice suspends the usual codes of action used in the art 
world and the social world and becomes a basis on which the boundaries of the 
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art-institution and other social-institutions are tested. The interstice becomes an 
agency where the different aspects of the art world and the social world are 
open to negotiation. In this sense the interstice becomes a means to develop 
alternatives to the way art is experienced. It becomes a means of inventing new 
kinds of exhibition and new relationships with the social world. 
 
For Larsen responses to art are not absolutely determined by a curator or the 
apparatus of the gallery or museum structure. This means that there is always 
the possibility of an unforeseen innovation when the social and aesthetic 
economies come together. From this perspective it should be kept in mind that 
there is always the potential that the gallery can permit combinations of 
experience that are ‘without conceptual rigidity’. There are opportunities for an 
artwork to generate something that extends beyond the influence of any artistic 
or social institute. 
 
Sheikh criticises the modernist self-sufficient object in the stable gallery context 
that addresses a universal audience. It could be said that the participatory art 
that is the focus of this thesis relies on a stable gallery context and addresses a 
universal audience of gallery goers. However it is arguable whether these 
works can be aptly described as ‘self-sufficient objects’ because they do not 
confine the participant to a specific aesthetic experience. I would suggest that to 
an extent they represent Sheikh’s emphasis on the ‘unhinging of categories’. 
They are ‘intermediary’ works because they positively encourage practical 
involvement and allow for publicly negotiated responses that cut across the 
discipline of aesthetics. 
 
From one perspective it could be said that the authority of the art institute had 
an adverse influence on ‘Tropicália’ (Fig. 10). Its innovation was neutralised by 
the prevailing institutional conditions of the Barbican. You were still aware of 
the white walls of the institution. However from another perspective 
‘Tropicália’ was free to negotiate new modes of operation for art and the social 
world and allowed for the possibility of unexpected connections. I would prefer 
to recognise how the art institution presents a broad range of permitted ways of 
experiencing art. When this is acknowledged then it can be said that ‘Tropicália’ 
is a development in the search for alternative ways to experience art. That its 
influence extends beyond the regulation of the art institution and that it plays a 







In ‘The Codes of Art’ I pointed out that I briefly examined the shape and colour 
of Clark’s ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ before recognising that the work was 
participatory and would require a different perspective. Bourriaud looks at the 
relation between these two perspectives in terms of ‘Form’. 
 
The basis for Bourriaud’s conception of form doesn’t rest on the organisation of 
a set of material rules that refer directly to an underlying medium, but to a 
looser series of “possible encounters [and] conditions for exchange” (Bourriaud, 
N. 2002: 23). 7. Bourriaud indicates how artists have adopted types of 
organisation that have developed in the broader context of the social, 
commercial and business world. He mentions the way that artists now view 
their role in terms of their relation to an “overall social arena” (Bourriaud, N. 
2002: 31). Artists are now creating “micro-utopias” that enhance ordinary 
experience rather than making efforts to create all-embracing utopias 
(Bourriaud, N. 2002: 31). The term “operative realism” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 35) 
is introduced to describe the practice that artists have of adopting and altering 
social or business models in a way that produces a “wavering between 
contemplation and use” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 35). Artists create pseudo-socio-
business concepts that aim to “re-stitch the relational fabric” (Bourriaud, N. 
2002: 36). Furthermore, Bourriaud stresses that the gallery is no longer 
considered to simply be a space for the contemplation of artefacts. He draws 
attention to the way that various artists have reconsidered the gallery space as a 
site of public surveillance, a production workshop, an information service or a 
distribution centre. It has become a “laboratory” (Bishop, C. 2004: 51). Vito 
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Acconci created an early example of this approach in the work ‘Service Area’ 
(Fig. 11a & Fig. 11b). For the duration of the show Acconci directed the post 
office to send his mail to the exhibition space. During this time he would show 
up at the gallery to pick up his mail.  
 
  
Fig. 11a & Fig. 11b 
 
How does this contribute to an institutional explanation of how aesthetic 
experience is embodied in the participatory artwork? Bourriaud’s desire to 
loosen up the terms of what may be called form is useful and it could be said to 
resemble Horowitz’s description of the strategies of the avant-garde. Just as 
Horowitz proposed that the avant-garde impulse involved releasing a “non-
artistic reminder” (Horowitz, G. 2003: 758) of unreformed social life into 
artworks in order to disturb the integrity and autonomy of aestheticism; 
Bourriaud notes that relational artists are adopting ‘non-artistic’ social or 
business models to reconfigure the gallery as a distribution centre or as an 
information service. The relaxation of what form may mean in contemporary 
art could be described as a means to ensure that the integrity and autonomy of 
aesthetic experience continues to be scrutinised. I would suggest that ‘Six 
Sensorial Masks’ introduces a non-artistic model into the gallery by 
encouraging participants to wear the work. When I encountered this work I 
would suggest that it produced a situation were participants engaged in the 
kind of roles that they would normally adopt in a retail situation when they are 






On the basis of Bourriaud’s explanation, the relational artwork calls attention to 
the shared aspects of your encounter with art. You experience art as part of a 
community of participants. As part of this group there is the possibility of 
having aesthetic and social experiences that test the influence of the institute 
that hosts them and a new definition of form embraces a diverse selection of 
methods outside of art. The exhibition space is now turned over to other kinds 
of social organisation. I would say that all of these aspects of the relational 
artwork emerge in ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’. In my experience 
these works did not isolate me from other participants but caused me to 
consider my role in relation to the participation of others. I would also say that 
these works allowed me to integrate other kinds of social and practical 
experience with my aesthetic experience. 
 
Bourriaud notes that the underlying interest for all relational art is “the sphere 
of inter-human relations” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 43). Traditional aesthetic issues 
like form, style and content have been replaced with an impetus to create 
audiences and a desire to enable alternative models of social relationship 
between these audiences. Through this description a more conciliatory version 
than that offered by earlier models of socially engaged art is offered. Bourriaud 
doesn’t want to align himself with any grand utopian project, preferring to 
portray ‘relational art’ as something occurring on a local scale with affiliations 
to everyday experience and independent approaches to politics. Moreover he 
contrasts the imaginative attitudes of those working in relational art with the 
prevailing imaginative attitude of past modernists. He suggests that modernism 
was “based on conflict” while relational art is formed around “co-existences” 
(Bourriaud, N. 2002: 45). By referring to contemporary art practices that use 
pseudoscientific principles to turn the gallery into a laboratory or use social and 
business models to turn the gallery into a distribution centre Bourriaud 
suggests that at its foundation relational art has assimilated the features 
necessary for the critical integration of art into general social life. He proposes 
that relational art is no longer produced in an atmosphere of absolute 
confrontation and is instead presented alongside the dominant social order. It 
operates in the spaces in-between to offer “moments of constructed 
conviviality” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 44). 
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Bourriaud’s discourse contributes to an institutional explanation of how 
aesthetic experience is embodied in the participatory artwork because he is 
addressing one of the key questions raised in the introduction to this chapter by 
Burger, Horowitz and Rancière. He is asking to what extent art should be 
connected with social life in order to have a social impact and to what extent art 
should maintain a distance from social life in order to comment on it.  
 
It could be said that Bourriaud’s notion of co-existence is problematic because it 
sidesteps the contradictory nature of the relationship between art and social life. 
If Burger and Horowitz’s more rigorously modern position is adopted then 
critical distance is not easily reconciled with having social consequences. From 
this perspective when art becomes absolutely integrated into ordinary life in 
order to have social consequences it tends to lose its critical distance or when 
art becomes absolutely separated from social life in order to maintain its critical 
distance it tends to lose any social consequences it may aim towards. 
Bourriaud’s claim that relational art can co-exist with ordinary social life but 
can also be critical of ordinary social life seems to eliminate the contradiction at 
the heart of the dichotomy. Relational art could be described as a compromise 
because the reconciliation of socially integrated art with critically distant art can 
never be categorically achieved.  
 
Looked at positively Bourriaud offers a conciliatory version of socially engaged 
art. He does not support large-scale confrontation but small-scale subversion. 
Contemporary art, being relational, seeks relative rather than absolute integration 
with ordinary social life so in a less stringent sense co-existence gives rise to a 
degree of criticality. From this perspective the relational artwork can then be 
integrated within social life and have actual consequences while maintaining its 
critical edge.  
 
For Bourriaud by directly engaging with social life, relational art has an ability 
to be “dovetailed within strategies of existence” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 100). 
There is a correspondence between this explanation of relational art and the 
way that Claire Bishop explains participatory art (§ Introduction. Theme: 
Participation). Bishop proposes that one of the main themes of participatory art 
is activation (Bishop, C. 2006: 12). According to Bishop participatory art is able to 
stimulate a renewed sense of freedom and this prompts you to apply this 
attitude in other areas of life. Participation galvanises you into contributing to 
wider changes in the social and political arena. In this sense participatory art 
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plays a role in social life in the way that Bourriaud suggests that relational art 
merges with other ‘strategies of existence’. 
 
I would say that Bourriaud contributes to an institutional explanation of how 
aesthetic experience is embodied in the participatory artwork because the terms 
form, interstice and co-existence change the emphasis in the discussion about the 
extent to which art integrates with ordinary social life or the degree to which it 
must maintain its autonomy as an institution. Bourriaud is at least 
acknowledging the changing nature of the terms of art production and the 
changing nature of how artists might engage with a changing social world. 
 
3.6 ‘Relational Antagonism’ 
3.6.1 Criticism of co-existence 
 
In ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ Oiticica and Clark were not only 
inviting you to take part in their work because they liked the idea of 
participation. You were encouraged to take part for a reason. In Oiticica’s case 
he intended to convey some of the qualities of the living conditions in the favela 
of Rio de Janeiro. Clark’s aim was to cause you to focus on and consequently 
heighten your experience of bodily sensation and action. 
 
Claire Bishop looks at how participation relates to social themes and meaning 
when she addresses Bourriaud’s phrase “criteria of co-existence” (Bishop, C. 
2004: 67). Bishop is critical of the way Bourriaud concentrates on the structure 
proposed by relational art at the expense of social, historical and political 
aspects of a work. Bishop questions how he isolates the notion of participation 
from these other aspects of an artwork. She points to his treatment of work by 
Rikrit Tiravanija. Many of Tiravanija’s installations tend to resemble a dining 
hall/kitchen/seminar room/library where viewers are free to cook, read and 




Fig. 12a & Fig. 12b 
 
Bishop comments “[…] what Tiravanija cooks, how and for whom, are less 
important to Bourriaud than the fact that he gives away the results of his 
cooking for free” (Bishop, C. 2004: 64). Bishop notes that Bourriaud isolates the 
relational aspects of the work but this seems to be all he does. He identifies that 
the artwork may be mainly about relationships but he does not examine why an 
artist wanted to cause them or how these relationships are defined against a 
broader set of social circumstances, “[…] although the works claim to defer to 
their context, they do not question their imbrication within it” (Bishop, C. 2004: 
65).  
 
Bishop contends that Bourriaud doesn’t ask whether such relationships are 
successful because he considers their existence is enough to prove their worth. 
He suggests that their mere appearance is itself “democratic and therefore 
good” (Bishop, C. 2004: 65). Bishop is not convinced. She asks “what types of 
relationships are being produced, for whom and why?” (Bishop, C. 2004: 65). 
Bishop is indicating that participation should not be assumed to be 
straightforwardly progressive or politically advanced. It is just as likely that 
participation can be used in a manipulative way. For example businesses 
frequently monitor your spending patterns under the guise of ‘participation’. 
 
It could be suggested that ideas associated with participatory or relational art 
underlie all art. At the very least audiences perceive, think or imagine during 
their experience of art and in a very broad sense this is participation. It 
therefore seems more pertinent to ask what manner of participation is being 
invited in an artwork. Bishop suggests that the means used by artists to invite 
participation should be considered. There should be a way to “analyze how 
contemporary art addresses the viewer and […] assess the quality of the 
audience relations it produces” (Bishop, C. 2004: 78).  
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Bishop offers a different perspective on the idea of co-existence. From this 
perspective it is not enough for an artist to simply promote relationships 
between participants. She wants to know if participatory relationships serve a 
purpose. She asks if a participatory relationship occurs within or in proximity 
to other social institutions. She asks what means are used to invite participation, 
how it comes about and how the quality of a participatory relationship can be 
gauged. In asking these kinds of questions about participation Bishop indicates 
that you have to pay attention to the whole work, not just its relational aspects. 
Consequently an artwork’s structure cannot be separated from its content and 
neutrally described as ‘relational’ or ‘participatory’. 8. 
 
In what way does this play a part in an institutional explanation of how 
aesthetic experience is embodied in the participatory artwork? Bishop’s 
recommendations are valuable because by recognising that participation must 
be considered in terms of the artwork as a whole she ensures that participation 
does not become remote from other experiences. She counters the idea that 
participatory art can be adequately explained with reference to an exclusive set 
of rules of participation. From this perspective the participatory actions that 
occur in ‘Tropicália’ should therefore not be isolated from the political and 
social context of the rest of the work. All of the artefacts and environments of 
‘Tropicália’ refer to the living conditions of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The 
tropical plants, the exotic animals, the cheap tarpaulins, the beat up television 
set and the informal construction of the architecture present elements of social 
experience and it is within this presentation that participatory action occurs.  
 
If Bishop’s notion of ‘relational antagonism’ is taken into account I would say 
that these works retain their integrity. Bishop would ask: How and why is 
participation being offered in this work? Both Oiticica and Clark developed an 
extensive vocabulary in order to justify their work in terms of art, sociology and 
psychology so they did not ever justify their work simply with regard to its 
participatory qualities. Clark’s primary intention in inviting participation is to 
heighten the participant’s experience of his or her own action: “It is not a 
question here of participation for participation’s sake, […] but rather for the participant 
to invest his or her gesture with meaning and for this act to be nourished by thought, in 




These reflections help to further define the purpose of participatory action that 
was established at the beginning of this thesis. Initially it was proposed that this 
project would focus on participatory action that was closer to ordinary practical 
action rather than participatory action that was in Kwon’s terms ‘artistic 
labour’. The aim of the project was to consider an audience participating in 
everyday action rather than to view the audience in terms of a ‘creative 
collective’ who collaborate in the making of the artwork (§ Theme: Participatory 
Art). Following Kester it was also proposed that the communicative and 
transdisciplinary aspects of participation would be highlighted. From this 
perspective participatory action traverses different disciplinary fields (§ Theme: 
Participatory Art). The part played by participatory action in this project is 
therefore ‘everyday’ and ‘transdisciplinary’. On the basis of Bishop’s argument 
it is also important to consider participatory action with reference to the total 
content of the artwork and the political and social context that the artwork 
arises within. 
 
3.6.2 Democracy and antagonism 
 
Throughout the large group show that ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ 
were part of there was a pervasive atmosphere of social involvement. The 
whole show was indeed a document of a particularly free and optimistic 
moment in Brazil’s history in the late 60’s and early 70’s prior to a harsh 
military clampdown. It therefore seemed likely that by being participatory 
these works were in some way contributing to the advancement of social 
equality. 
 
According to Nicolas Bourriaud relational art is inherently democratic because 
it generates ‘dialogue’. Referring to Lauclau and Mouffe (Laclau, E. and Mouffe, 
C. 1985), Bishop argues that Bourriaud has not sufficiently considered the 
nature of democracy. She states that Bourriaud’s version of democracy contains 
too much harmony. It appears in his discussion on relational aesthetics as a 
straightforward experience of togetherness and co-operation. While recognising 
that the concept of a utopian society is essential as an imaginary goal of 
democracy Bishop argues that such a utopia is not practically achievable. 
Instead she argues that a fundamental feature of all democracy is the situation 
where ”relations of conflict are sustained, not erased” (Bishop, C. 2004: 66). She 
does not mean conflict between opposition groups who have abandoned the 
 151 
possibility of communication. She is proposing that without opportunities to 
openly discuss differences of opinion and a forum for dispute where views on 
social life can be modified then by definition you don’t actually have 
democracy. For Bishop democracy revolves around “antagonism” (Bishop, C. 
2004: 66). This antagonism is defined by Bishop as both the “conditions of 
possibility for the existence of a pluralist democracy”, and “the condition of the 
impossibility of its final achievement” (Bishop, C. 2004: 67). She proposes that 
any aesthetic theory that attempts to characterise participation as undemanding 
and without discord is overlooking this significant feature of the process.  
 
Bishop’s criticism of Bourriaud’s ‘relational aesthetics’ is at its most convincing 
when she argues that his conception of the participatory relationship is based 
on a false impression of the nature of democracy. The antagonism that is an 
essential part of the process is overlooked in favour of a static ideal of co-
operation. From Bishop’s perspective the co-operative nature of democracy 
becomes exaggerated in Bourriaud’s version of the relational artwork. The 
relational artwork smoothly creates new social encounters between 
participants. This discourse contributes to an institutional explanation of how 
aesthetic experience is embodied in the participatory artwork because it 
highlights the contradiction that emerges when it is claimed that participatory 
art is democratic.  
 
This contradiction emerges when the nature of gallery exhibitions are 
considered. Galleries tend to limit the kind of audience that will experience 
artworks. It is common knowledge that the profile of gallery goers tends not to 
be representative of the ‘general public’. If artists are hoping to provide new 
social encounters in galleries then these are not emerging from a cross section of 
society but from a select group of art enthusiasts. If the social groups in such 
situations tend to be like-minded then it is unlikely that the kind of disputes 
that generally occur in more representative cross-sections of society will 
materialise, so any ‘co-existence’ that may occur in a relational artwork is a 
misrepresentation of social conditions and therefore not democratic. From this 
perspective the audience of ‘Tropicália’ could therefore not strictly be described 
as representative of a ‘general public’ because it was installed in the Barbican 
Gallery and being a gallery the participants were present mainly for art. In this 
sense there is a certain amount of common agreement among participants from 
the outset.  
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Nevertheless this does not rule out the possibility of spontaneous differences. In 
the “Whitechapel Experiment” in 1969 at the Whitechapel Gallery (Bishop, C. 
2005: 107) Oiticica mixed his works and installations together and encouraged 
participants to combine these experiences. As part of the 2007 exhibition there 
was a display of Oiticica’s ‘Parangolés’ works. These are capes designed by 
Oiticica that were made of mixed fabrics and blankets to be worn by 
participants (Fig. 13a & Fig. 13b). Bishop defines the term ‘Parangolé’ as “a 
slang term meaning an ‘animated situation and sudden confusion and/or 
agitation between people” (Bishop, C. 2005: 107). By encouraging some cross-
pollination between his works there is a sense in which Oiticica was actively 
pursuing antagonistic situations in the gallery. He wanted to create the 
spectacle of carnival in the space of art and this involved turbulence and 
confrontation not a calm ‘co-existence’. 
 
  
Fig. 13a & Fig. 13b 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
The analytical explanation has shown how aesthetic experience is re-articulated 
in participatory art. The phenomenological explanation asked how the ‘feel’ of 
aesthetic experience changes in participatory art. The current chapter has 
offered an institutional explanation of aesthetic experience. From this 
perspective aesthetic experience is explained in terms of artistic conventions 
and it is shown that participatory art changes these artistic conventions. It is 
also shown how the artistic conventions of participatory art question the 
conventions of the art institution. I would say that these questions demand 
some changes to the art institution and that these changes lead the art 
institution to address broader social issues.  
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Participatory art questions artistic conventions by offering you an opportunity 
to compare the experience of art with the everyday practicalities of your 
participatory actions. I would say that the presupposed immediacy and purity 
of artistic competence that is usually associated with an experience of art is 
disrupted by the ‘durational’ and ‘transdisciplinary’ nature of these everyday 
practicalities.  
 
Participatory art questions artistic conventions by accentuating the underlying 
and diverse social and critical forces of the art institution. These are not alien 
forces that are introduced into the art institution. They are already there but are 
kept in check. Participatory action does not resolve these contradictory forces 
but makes them more evident. It acts like a catalyst and brings them to the 
surface so that you are encouraged to establish your own equilibrium with the 
roles that these forces play in your encounter with art. 
 
Participatory art additionally questions artistic conventions by addressing its 
audience as a group of participants rather than as individual viewers of art. 
When an audience is approached as a collective I would say that this leads to a 
consideration of the interconnections between the various roles within the art 
institution. A collective audience provides grounds for questions about how 
these roles are differentiated, particularly the role of artist and audience.  
 
With these questions comes a change to an explanation of the art institution. 
From an affirmative perspective the art institution allows for a relative social 
integration of art and gives rise to a degree of criticality. It provides 
opportunities for the new strategies of participatory art. The art institution 
operates like an agency that is flexible enough to incorporate diverse practices 
from other social, business and commercial fields and is resilient enough to 
adapt to any trials that these practices may present. From a negative 
perspective the bringing together of socially integrated practices with critically 
distant art can never be firmly achieved. The art institution co-opts the social 
potential of participatory art and neutralises any critical distance it may 
achieve. In this sense an acceptance of a measure of social integration or 
criticality within the art institution is a compromise. If it is recalled that other 
institutions outside of art can shape the art institution and that its conditions 
are open to discussion then it is suggested that the art institution is not a fixed 
idea. It is “[…] actively produced and reproduced within the totality of the 
social formation” (Horowitz, G. 2003: 753). If the art institution is liable to being 
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restructured then I would suggest that a negative approach overlooks the 
potential emancipatory properties that can be revealed through the art 
institution’s responsiveness to change. The art institution still provides 
unforeseeable opportunities for aesthetic and social innovation. I would suggest 
that by adopting an affirmative perspective on the art institution you embrace 
the possibility that participatory art can generate publicly negotiated responses 
that cut across the discipline of aesthetics. You acknowledge that the 
‘intermediary’ nature of participatory art potentially ‘unhinges the categories’ 
of the art institution. 
 
Nevertheless it should also be acknowledged that there is always the possibility 
that the art institution can reduce participatory art to a neutral and formal set of 
rules. Participation becomes cut off from social concerns. In this sense as well as 
being defined as ‘everyday’ and ‘transdisciplinary’, the social context and 
meaning of participatory art should also be taken into account. Likewise just as 
participation does not take place in an impartial context, it does not always 
arise in a consensual environment. Participation can materialise in the middle 
of active dissension and if participation is removed from this context then it 
becomes idealised and excessively stable. Accordingly it is proposed that 
participation is more accurately captured in the context of discord and ongoing 
discussion. Claims concerning the ‘democratic’ potential of participation should 
be treated with care. 
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When I initially experienced ‘Untitled’, 1993 (Fig. 1), I treated it in the same way 
I would treat any other artwork. I looked at it from a distance and gradually got 
closer to it all the while wondering what it was made of and considering if I 
could place it in my memory. Had I seen something like this before in a 
magazine? When arriving at a reasonable distance I realised that it was a pile of 
posters and had a vague recollection from an article I had read that in these 
kinds of artworks you were allowed to actually take one of the posters from the 
pile. I was not entirely certain of this, but I was in the mood to give it a go and 
take the consequences from the gallery attendants. On lifting a poster from the 
pile I was extremely surprised by the brief feeling of excitement I got in this 
simple action. While I rolled the poster up in a manner that was unexpectedly 
clumsy, I turned to look at a gallery attendant to check for possible signs of 
disapproval. There were none, my actions had passed without comment. They 
were an accepted part of the routine of the exhibition.  
 
Problem 
I participated in this work and my behaviour was considered to be relatively 
unexceptional. From one point of view my actions were the norm and no one 
stopped me, the conventions of the work permitted the taking of a poster. 
However from another point of view I was not sure about the conventions of 
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the work and this caused a degree of personal ferment because I thought I was 
potentially breaking a convention. I was drawn towards the work, lifted and 
rolled up a poster and left the work all the time looking and moving. I was 
aware of numerous contradictory thoughts and emotions. I was trying to 
remember if participation was allowed so I was not sure how free I was to act. 
This uncertainty was overcome by a quick estimation that there were few risks 
involved. I was also aiming towards a goal but was driven by an impetus to act. 
Once my participatory action was achieved I then placed my behaviour in the 
wider context of the gallery to check for any problems. I would say that these 
conditions highlight how participatory action is comprised of a puzzling group 
of diverse elements.  It is proposed that an explanation of the diverse elements 
that produce a human action will help artists and participants to understand 
what might trigger participatory action. 
 
Resolution 
It is proposed that an explanation of these diverse elements may be found if 
human action is explained from an analytical perspective. The analytical 
philosophy of action explains human action in rational terms. This means that 
action is described as intentional and when it is described as intentional it 
means that a reason is given for it. The presupposition that is made in a rational 
account of action is that when a reason is given for an action a bit of extra 
information is provided about what is being done. This has been described as a 
“rationalization” (Davidson, D. 1963: 3). A rationalization explains an action “by 
revealing something that the agent was aiming at in performing it, and, 
therefore, something that makes the action “reasonable” or “agreeable”, to 
some extent.” (Mele, A.R. 2003: 71). It is suggested that this viewpoint will 




This account of human action has a broad application but it must be accepted 
that actions do not necessarily have any goal in mind and that actions can occur 
simply to produce the experience of action. You may act without any thought, 
in anger or fear. You may engage in an action because you ‘feel like it’: You may 
feel like whistling. All of these actions may be intentional but can they be 
described in the terms of a rationalization? This is where the analytical 
philosophy of action runs into difficulties. It also becomes problematic because 
it is suggested that participatory art involves actions that are equally resistant to 
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a rationalization. Participatory action can arise because you simply feel like 
participating, without any goal in mind and for the sake of action.   
 
Summary 
This chapter will introduce some of the topics associated with the analytical 
philosophy of action. It will look at how an action can be distinguished from 
what is not an action and how actions are distinguished from other actions. This 
chapter will also explore the widely accepted causal explanation of action. Its 
origins in Aristotle’s thought and its relationship to natural science will also be 
considered. Arguments against the causal explanation made by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein will also be taken into account and the central category of 
intentional action will also be explored. On the basis of this general exploration 
of action the work on intention and action theory by the prominent 
philosophers Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe and Donald Davidson 
will then be investigated in more detail. Anscombe’s work ‘Intention’ has been 
described as “the founding document of contemporary philosophy of action.” 
(Thompson, M. 1998: 280). Her views on action develop on Wittgenstein’s idea 
of the will and action and are also influenced by Aristotle. Davidson’s action 
theory develops Anscombe’s ideas and provides arguments that support causal 
explanations of action. His work also reveals the extent to which actions can be 
explained in human terms or if they are complicated physical behaviour. These 
accounts will provide a rational perspective on action and throughout the 
chapter these findings will be compared to aspects of ‘Untitled’, 1993 by Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres and Christopher Wool. These comparisons will provide a 
rational explanation of how action is embodied in the participatory artwork. In 
these comparisons the discourse on action will be used as a means to reach a 
fuller understanding of participatory art rather than a means to discuss the 
philosophy of action per se. Therefore these comparisons will place accounts of 
action at the service of explanations of ‘Untitled’, 1993. This will contribute to 
the main question of this chapter: To what extent can participatory action be 
rationally explained? 
 
4.2 General Issues 
 
When I took part in ‘Untitled’, 1993 alongside the action of taking a poster I also 
walked toward and away from the work. As well as directing my thoughts 
towards my actions I was also considering other things like the work’s possible 
meaning and working out if it was practical to take a poster away. I would 
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therefore suggest that it is useful to understand how significant actions and 
thoughts can be differentiated from less significant actions and thoughts in a 
work like ‘Untitled’, 1993. 
 
4.2.1 Basic questions 
 
When action is thought about the simplest question to be asked is: What is an 
action? It could be said that an action is something that a person does. It is the 
carrying out of an act. Normally it would also be said that a person moves their 
body or a part of their body when they carry out an act. Additionally, when a 
person carries out an act it is usually said that they do it because they have a 
reason to act. So I could describe one of my actions as something that I do that 
involves moving my body for a reason.  
 
This initial description of action is adequate for most day-to-day practicalities. 
Human action is so central to human affairs that it seems impractical to 
consider action in any way other than as something that is necessary if things 
are going to get done. Nevertheless because human action is such a deeply 
embedded and universal aspect of life many philosophers have attempted to 
capture and describe what human action may be. When contemporary 
philosophers look more closely at the common sense view of action they engage 
in ‘Action theory’. 
 
Alfred Mele suggests that a more detailed look at action stems from the simple 
kind of question asked at the start of this section. When action is looked at it 
should be asked: (a) What is an action? (b) How are actions to be explained? For 
Mele the first question causes you to ask a further two related questions: “How 
are actions different from events that are not actions? How do actions differ 
from one another?” (Mele, A.R. 2003: 65) 
 
4.2.2 Action and non-action 
 
In his examination of Aristotle’s philosophy of action David Charles provides a 
helpful description of how Aristotle created distinct groups of human action 
from the general diversity of all human action. This helps in a reply to the 
question: ‘How are actions different from events that are not actions?’ 
According to Charles, Aristotle emphasised that you should always consider a 
wide range of human action and not narrowly focus your attention on rational 
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action. In this sense this scheme could be treated as a spectrum of human 
action. It could be said that just as parts of a colour spectrum can be more 
visible and less visible then it can be said that at certain times it may be more 
appropriate to embrace a broad range rather than a narrow range of actions. 
The following scheme is developed from Charles’ treatment of Aristotle’s 
system (Charles, D. 1984: 104): 
 
Falling asleep, waking up and moving during sleep are not actions. 
 
a. Involuntary Processes: Birth, Breathing, Pulse of blood, Similar bodily 
 processes, Growing old, Death. 
 
b. Intermediate processes: Coughing, Sneezing, Blinking, Blushing, Sighing, 
 Frowning, Sneering, Sexual arousal, Biting one’s lip, Raising eyebrows, 
 Raising heartbeat. 
 
c.  Intentional processes not supported by practical reason (Central case of 
 agency): Sensual desires (Impetus to look, listen, taste, smell and touch), 
 ‘Instinctive’ behaviour. 
 
d.  Intentional processes supported by practical reason (Central case of 
 agency): All other actions. 
      
e.  Intentional states: Remaining at one’s post, Refraining from action, Being 
 at rest. 
 
George Wilson offers a similar though less detailed account of what may be 
called an action. He suggests considering the intuitive sense you have of what 
action may be. When you are passive then this is not an action, when you are 
more controlled then this is an action. There are “[…] the things that merely 
happen to people – the events they undergo – and the various things that they 
generally do.” (Wilson, G. 2002: 2). 
 
4.2.3 Differences between actions 
 
In attempting to formulate a reply to the question: ‘How do actions differ from 
one another?’ Jennifer Hornsby’s suggests that it is useful to distinguish 
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between the action and what you do. For example I may take a sweet and you 





When it is said that you do things you are not being so specific, so in this case 
you would tend to say that we have done the same thing. For Hornsby action 
captures things more precisely: “’action’ is given a definite meaning when 
actions are taken to be a species of events: it denotes particulars of a certain sort 
– concrete items in the spatiotemporal world“ (Hornsby, J. 1998: 37). Therefore 
the two instances of taking a sweet are two distinct actions. I took a sweet and 
this was a distinct event in time and space and you took a sweet and this was 
also a distinct event in time and space. 
 
When considering how actions are distinguished from what is done, a break 
occurs with the way action is usually thought about. It feels as though there 
must be an increase in the refinement of the account of action and an almost 
forensic attitude to the nuances of human action has to be adopted. This is 
definitely a tendency in action theory and it can be clearly presented in the 
different approaches that can be taken to ‘individuate’ straightforward actions. 
The main approaches to action ‘individuation’ are the “fine-grained” account 
and the “coarse-grained” account (Hornsby, J. 1998: 37). There is also a way of 
looking at action in terms of increasingly basic actions. Jennifer Hornsby 
(Hornsby, J. 1998: 37) describes a situation where an aeroplane pilot presses a 
lever and this causes the engines of the plane to shut down. In a fine-grained 
account of this situation two actions occur. The first action is the pilot pressing 
the lever and the second action is the engines shutting down. In a fine-grained 
account the pressing of the lever happened at one point in time and the shutting 
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down of the engines happened at a point in time afterwards. There are two 
distinct events and therefore two distinct actions. In the coarse-grained account 
of the situation only one action occurs. The pressing down of the lever and the 
engines shutting off happen at the same point in time. When you describe them 
as happening at the same point in time then there is only one event and if there 
is only on event then there is only one action. However in the coarse-grained 
account this single action is describable in two different ways. It can be described 
as ‘The pilot pressed the lever’ or as ‘The engines shut down’. When the 
situation is looked at in terms of basic actions it is said that moving an arm is 
more basic than pressing the lever and this is more basic than shutting down 
the engines. At the start there is a primitive sort of action and at the end a more 
complex action and each action depends on the preceding action. 
 
In asking what is an action the differences between action and a non-action 
have to be considered. When action is looked at in more detail there are three 
main explanations: the fine-grained, coarse-grained and the basic action 
account. In what way does this contribute to a rational explanation of how 
action is embodied in the participatory artwork? It is suggested that the 
participatory artwork focuses on the central cases of agency proposed by 
Charles. ‘Untitled’, 1993 invites an action that is supported by a practical reason 
or supported by a more intuitive or sensual reason. You would take a poster 
because you reason that they are free or because you like the way it looks. In 
‘Untitled’, 1993 you may weigh up the options or you simply reach out and 
take. In my experience I thought about what I was doing and was relieved that 
my actions were tolerated. Hornsby differentiates between action and doing. 
From this perspective participants could be described as doing the same thing. 
Everyone takes a poster. However as actions the participation of each individual 
is particular to the moment of its occurrence. I would say that this is the most 
appropriate method to differentiate participation because it highlights the 
uniqueness of each participant. When considering action individuation it is 
suggested that the coarse grained account is adopted. The other accounts may 
be useful in a legal context where these kinds of minutiae can be relevant but in 
the context of the artworks that are under discussion here this kind of 
refinement is not strictly necessary. It seems more appropriate to rely on 
descriptions of action rather than sharp distinctions between events and times. 
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4.2.4 The causal explanation of action 
 
In my encounter with ‘Untitled’, 1993, I briefly deliberated on my actions but I 
did not articulate my thoughts or have to argue in favour of my actions. Neither 
did I have to concentrate on my actions in any special way because they did not 
require any expertise. However my action was not a purely impulsive either. I 
had a rough awareness of my motives and the consequences of my actions. I 
wanted a poster and if I took one I could put it on my wall.  
 
The previous section has helped in a partial reply to the question ‘What is an 
action?’ When the question, ‘How are actions to be explained?’ is asked you are 
travelling over far more difficult terrain. Intuitively most people would agree 
that when you try to explain an action you tend to give a reason for the action. 
If asked ‘Why you are wearing a hat?’ you would give the reason, ‘It is cold and 
I want to stay warm.’ You want to be warm and you work out that a hat will 
keep you warm.  
 
The dominant explanation of action that can help in an understanding of this 
state of affairs is the causal explanation. Aristotle developed the most widely 
accepted causal explanation of action. In ‘The Nichomachean Ethics’ he states: 
“The origin of action – its efficient, not its final cause – is choice, and of choice is 
desire and reasoning with a view to an end.” (Aristotle. 1980: 139). Aristotle 
suggests that action is caused by a combination of psychological states like 
desire and reason. 
 
There is a central account of action in Aristotle’s theories that is most relevant in 
the current explanation of action. An action may be analysed as an event that is 
an “Intentional process supported by practical reason” (Charles, D. 1984: 104). 
Here action may be identified as the acceptance of a desire to act on a 
conclusion arrived at through thought and inference. In this account the desire 
to act is rational. 
 
Aristotle compares desire to assertion. When you assert something you affirm 
or deny a proposition. When you desire something you pursue or avoid it. So in 
having a rational desire, you are active towards the intellect. You pursue what 
is reasonable and true and avoid what is unreasonable and false. Nevertheless 
Aristotle objects that rational desire cannot adequately explain all your actions. 
He warns that “Intellect itself, however, moves nothing […]” (Aristotle. 1980: 
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139). The intellect may be involved in an action but for Aristotle it must be 
activated in some way. In this sense desire becomes the trigger for action. It is 
desire that has the job of “rendering the syllogism valid” (Charles, D. 1984: 90). 
In this work by Jurgen Bey the chair is supplied with on extremely short leg 
(Fig. 3). Other actions are therefore necessary before you can sit on the chair. 
You reason that it is better to have a stable rather than an unstable chair and 
your desire to have a stable chair turns your thought into an action. By 
acknowledging the links between intellect and desire in action Aristotle provides 





When a causal explanation of action is given then your reasons are described as 
being the cause of action. Your reasons are also considered to be a psychological 
state and it is claimed that these states cause actions. Alfred Mele describes the 
causal explanation: “It typically is embraced as part of a naturalistic stand on 
agency, according to which mental items that play causal/explanatory roles in 
action bear some important relation to physical states and events.” (Mele, A.R. 
1997a: 4). When a causal explanation of action is adopted then the claim that 
psychological states are in some way realized as physical events or states in the 
brain is accepted. 1.  
 
In such discussions about action, references have traditionally been made to acts 
of will or acts of volition to bridge the gap between the mental and the physical. 
However terms like this caused difficulties for Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(Wittgenstein, L. 1953, 1958). He argued against the causal explanation of action 
where mental states are used as a basis for the reasons that cause action. 
Wittgenstein presented numerous arguments that cast doubt on explanations 
where action is seen as being caused by ‘internal’ experiences such as volition 
 164 
or acts of will. Two of his arguments will reveal some of the assumptions that 
are made in the causal explanation of action. 
 
In the first argument Wittgenstein describes a practical situation: “I deliberate 
whether to lift a certain heavyish weight, decide to do it, I then apply my force 
to it and lift it.” (Wittgenstein, L. 1958: 150). He compares this situation with 
other situations like speaking. The former situation tends to be thought of as a 
“full-fledged case of willing” (Wittgenstein, L. 1958: 150) however he suggests 
that it is a mistake to think that the former situation is representative of all 
action. He points out that a ‘full-fledged’ description of speaking can be given 
but this kind of description is very specific and does not usually apply to 
speaking. I could say I pondered on what to say, weighed up the arguments 
and said something, but this is too special. Speaking usually happens in an 
impromptu manner with little planning. It is assumed that in the lifting case, 
because the various features of the action such as deliberation, decision and 
exertion can be differentiated that this should be done generally whenever 
action is explained. The impression is created that the force of the action is 
distinguishable from all the psychological states that occur prior to the action. 
This gives a sense that when you engage in action, you engage in a separate 
state of willing. It suggests that before acting you always think it over.  
 
In the second argument Wittgenstein describes another practical situation. A 
mirror is used to guide the drawing of a geometric shape. He advises 
attempting to draw the shape by only looking at the mirror. Naturally this gives 
a sense of detachment from what are normally considered to be your actions. 
Natural action becomes more difficult and you begin to focus on the correct 
movements of your muscles in more self-conscious way. This is instructive 
because it exposes the way that you are inclined to picture your will as being 
somehow prior to your actions. The experience of drawing in the mirror shows 
that “one is inclined to say that our real actions, the ones to which volition 
immediately applies, are not the movements of our hand but somehow further 
back, say the actions of our muscles.” (Wittgenstein, L. 1958: 153). 2. Wittgenstein 
proposes that you do not decide by an act of will which muscles to move in 
order to make your hands move in order to successfully complete the drawing. 
The idea of will has to be flexible enough to accommodate a more direct willing 
where you do not consider an intermediate series of events. A false impression 
of action is given if it is seen as willing and then action. 
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As an alternative to these images of a preceding will that causes a subsequent 
action Wittgenstein claims that willing is action. “Willing, if it is not to be a sort 
of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be allowed to stop anywhere 
short of the action.” (Wittgenstein, L. 1953: 160). Wittgenstein refers to 
numerous occasions such a speaking, writing or walking when you could 
ordinarily say that you do not deliberate or think of yourself as acting on the 
basis of a separate will. Speaking, writing and walking are central examples of 
action and on these kinds of occasions there is often an absence of pre-
meditation. It could be said that by saying willing is action in this way 
Wittgenstein is doing two things. Firstly he is bringing willing ‘to the surface’. 
He does this with the reminder that when action is explained you should not 
forget that actions are ordinarily understood as bodily movements that are 
observable. By suggesting that the will does not ‘stop short’ of action he is 
arguing that an underlying psychological explanation of action should not 
always be pursued. He is suggesting that actions can also be explained within 
the context of known patterns of ordinarily observable human behaviour. 
Secondly he is trying to explain what it means to be active because when he 
says that willing is ‘the action itself’ he does not turn willing into a mechanical 
physical event. Rather he is saying that the experience of the will in action is not 
necessarily something deliberate that mulls things over. He is saying that it also 
resembles a transitory instant of attention: “Doing itself seems to not have any 
volume of experience. It seems like an extensionless point, the point of a needle. 
This point seems to be the real agent.” (Wittgenstein, L. 1953: 161). To 
demonstrate the oddness of treating all action as though it is premeditated 
Bruce Nauman produced a series of videos where he meticulously 
choreographed walks around his studio (Fig. 4). He planned his movements in 
a grid-like diagram that showed that he was to take a step at right angles to his 
last step and that he had to move his legs to be a right angles to his other leg so 
that his body would always form a ‘T’ shape. By carefully scripting a casual 
action that is not exactly a dance move Nauman highlights the absurdity of 






Aristotle provides the blueprint for the causal explanation of action. Action is 
an outcome of a combination of reasoned thought and felt desire. The modern 
account of this explanation describes thought and desire in term of physical 
states in the brain. On this account these physical states cause physical actions. 
Wittgenstein argues against this mechanical explanation but also argues against 
the conventional anti-mechanical explanation that involves volition. He argues 
that action should not always be thought of in terms of willing and that action 
does not simply follow after willing. Things like walking can be thought of as 
an embodiment of willing. On this basis he reconsiders action as the fleeting 
experience of an agent. In what way does this discourse contribute to a rational 
explanation of how action is embodied in the participatory artwork? If 
‘Untitled’, 1993 is considered from Aristotle’s perspective then this kind of 
structure might describe the state of affairs: 
 
I reason that I can take a poster. (It is allowed) 
I am in a state where I want to take a poster. (I like their appearance) 
Therefore I will take a poster. 
 
This is a useful guide to participatory action but it cannot be assumed that all 
participatory actions occur like this. What about a participant who takes a 
poster absentmindedly or without any reasoning? It is suggested that Aristotle 
offers a basic though imprecise template for explaining participatory action 
from a rational perspective. When the modern perspective on the causal 
explanation of action is considered it is acknowledged that the explanations of 
human action given by natural science are extremely fruitful and valuable in 
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terms of empirical research into human motility. However these explanations 
will not be employed in an explanation of participatory action because a 
detailed causal explanation of participatory action is not necessary. I would say 
that it is more appropriate to draw attention to observable participatory actions. 
When ‘Untitled’, 1993 is considered from Wittgenstein’s perspective an account 
of participatory action is provided that does not need to be ‘full-fledged’. 
Wittgenstein accounts for participatory actions that are not thought about, 
decided on and then carried out. From his standpoint taking a poster could be 
like walking. It is observable behaviour that does not necessarily need a finely 
graded psychological explanation that includes an account of the human will. 





Some rough guidelines have been established to explain how participatory 
action can be distinguished from other actions and to explain what the causes of 
participatory action may be. Another way of considering participatory action is 
to take into account that it can be an action where you have an intention in 
mind. When I participated in ‘Untitled’, 1993, I didn’t take a poster by accident, 
by chance or without knowing that I was taking part. I was aware of my actions 
and purposefully took part. I would suggest that intention explains a central 
category of action and for this reason should be considered in an account of 
participatory action.  
 
4.3.1 Intentional action 
 
When looking at intentional action an action is being taken into account that is 
connected to a state of mind that steers current action or is primed to look 
forward. According to Mele it can be described as “executive attitudes towards 
plans” (Mele, A.R. 1997: 19). Intentions can guide simple planned actions or can 
co-ordinate groups of planned actions. They are described as being linked to a 
practical state of mind and they are also described as having a “settledness” 
(Mele, A.R. 1997: 19). When you intend to do something you are inwardly 
confirming your course of action in a way that is absent when you entertain a 
wish or contemplate the possibility of carrying out a future action. Another 
issue associated with explanations of intentional action is the connection 
between intending to act and giving reasons for acting. Usually it can be said 
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that an action is intentional when an act was intended. I shout intentionally 
when I intend to shout. I didn’t shout involuntarily in pain for example. It can 
also be said that in acting intentionally you act for a reason: I shout 
intentionally because the music is so loud. On this basis Mele suggests that 
“acting for a reason is often identified with acting intentionally” (Mele, A.R. 
1997: 19). When presented with the Gonzalez-Torres work ‘Untitled’, 1993 (Fig. 
5) you may take a poster because it appeals to you. You intentionally take a 




4.3.2 The psychology and physiology of intention 
 
In her enquiry into the concept of intention Anscombe states that there are a 
number of senses of intention. She describes a situation where someone might 
ask you, ‘What was your intention in doing that?’ In offering an answer to this 
kind of question you are making a statement about intentional actions as an 
explanation of past events. You might explain your current actions as 
corresponding to a presently held intention that fills out the meaning of your 
actions. This is an “intention with which” you act (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 25). 
You may also hold something in your mind as intention for the future. This 
intention may or may not be realised and so is an “expression of intention” 
(Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 1). 
 
Anscombe suggests that a natural understanding of these kinds of statements is 
misleading. Intention is not simply viewed as an inner state of mind like an 
emotion or a psychological desire. The key to this misunderstanding is in the 
fact that you engage in ‘expressions of intention’. You say what you are doing 
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or going to do. This points to the suggestion that intention is to an extent a 
public thing like language and in this sense it is “conventional” (Anscombe, 
G.E.M. 1957: 5). In her criticism of a physiological explanation of action she 
considers the merits of imagining intention as something that occurs in addition 
to an action. From this perspective an intentional action is depicted in such a 
way that intention becomes separate from the movement. This view separates 
an action into a series: something that starts at a source of inner intention, a 
muscle stimulus, a bodily movement, a known action, an object acted on and 
the external effect of the action on the object. If this perspective is adopted then 
there seems to be no justification why you should stop at muscle movement as 
the origin of an action. What about electrical impulses or chemical changes that 
precede the muscle movement? Additionally she asks how the separate ‘forces’ 
of action and intention relate to one another. Anscombe concludes that if this 
kind of logic is pursued you end up in “inextricable confusions” (Anscombe, 
G.E.M. 1957: 29). Intention is not something “in the action, or in the man […]” 
(Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 29 Italics mine). For Anscombe describing an action as 
intentional is more like a process of designation. It is “to assign it to the class of 
intentional actions” (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 28). Intention occurs as part of 
communication and as such is conventional in the way that communication is. 
 
In setting aside psychological and physiological explanations of intentional 
action Anscombe identifies its conventional nature. Could it be said that 
participatory action is like intentional action and has a conventional nature? 
When you describe your intentions as conventional it is like describing 
intention in terms of a contract. You are naming your actions. In this sense 
intention is not something like an emotion that appears ‘naturally’ but 
something you rationally articulate like language. Intention is conventional in 
the same way that language is conventional because others ask you about your 
intentions and you tell others about your intentions. If this sense of intentional 
action is applied to a participatory action then it can be said that it underlines 
the rule-based features of participatory action. From this perspective the 
participatory action of taking a poster from ‘Untitled’, 1993 becomes linked to 
language. The intentional act of taking a poster is placed in the context of 
communication. You may say that you are going to take a poster, are currently 
taking a poster or that you have taken a poster. This could take the form of an 
obvious statement like ‘I plan to take a poster’. It could also take the form of 
something more inward like “addressing a command to oneself” (Davidson, D. 
1978: 91) although it should also be acknowledged that you don’t always 
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articulate your intentions in such clear terms. In this sense intending is more 
like forming a pact with the self. This casts doubt on the view that the 
intentional act of taking a poster primarily takes place in the context of bodily 
movement. Anscombe cautions against viewing intention as a natural 
phenomenon that is somehow ‘in’ an action. As though it is the first 
psychological event in a series of subsequent physical events. If this warning is 
observed for a participatory artwork then further reasons are given to avoid 
describing participatory action in simple physical or psychological terms. An 
intention to take a poster is not ‘in’ the taking of a poster. The taking of the 
poster falls into the category of being intentional. 
 
4.3.3 Single action under many descriptions 
 
There were no unintended consequences from my participation in ‘Untitled’, 
1993, however when I was briefly uncertain about the legitimacy of my actions I 
imagined how others might see me. I thought: If this is not a participatory 
artwork then my actions could inadvertently be seen as theft or vandalism. 
 
An important feature of an intentional action is that you must be aware of what 
you are doing. Anscombe uses the example of a man sawing a plank of wood 
that is an historical artefact. He may not have noticed that its underside 
displays ancient carvings. Therefore this action can be described as a man 
intentionally sawing a plank of wood. It can also be described as a man 
unintentionally destroying a historical artefact. Additionally the sawing may be 
causing a lot of noise, which he doesn’t notice or he may be creating a pile of 
sawdust on the floor, which he doesn’t notice. This example is used to highlight 
that a single action may have various aspects. One may know one of the aspects 
and in knowing this, one is acting intentionally, but there may be numerous 
other aspects, none of which can be said to be intentional even though they 
outline the same act. Therefore to act intentionally is ”to give a description of 
what he is doing under which he knows it” (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 12). All 
these descriptions of sawing apply to ordinarily observable aspects of the 
obvious action, but the sawing can also be described as the firing of multiple 
nerve ends and the flexing of muscles in the man’s arm. In these kinds of 
description a very specialised way of looking at action is focused on and 
ordinarily these descriptions would not be linked to the man’s act of sawing the 
wood. In this sense it can be said that these kinds of action description are also 
 171 
unintentional because the man may acknowledge that nerves and muscles are 
involved but he would not usually say that he intends to stimulate his muscles 
with his nerves. In this context this is not a description of an intentional action. 
It is not a description under which he knows his action of sawing. 
 
Anscombe accounts for an intentional action as being an action under a 
description. Considered in this light can participatory action only be known 
under a description? I would suggest that there are situations where 
participants engage with a work without fully knowing all that they are doing. 
Your participation may take place under one description that you are aware of, 
but the artist may capture your participation under another description that 
you are not aware of. It is also suggested that there are situations where artists 
present a participatory artwork and unintended effects take place while people 
participate. Your description may not be the one anticipated by the artist. This 
highlights the discrepancies that occur in the participatory artwork like 
‘Untitled’, 1993. A participant may think that by taking a poster they are 
receiving a free gift. A child may think that it is being mischievous and its 
mother may think that too. In my experience of the work I was not certain how 
to describe my actions. I was concerned that I may cause some trouble but was 
also willing to take that risk. On the other hand the gallery staff were indifferent 
because they were operating under a description that permitted the act of 
taking a poster. The artist, gallery staff and the participant can put the intention 
under different descriptions. Therefore participatory action can be known 
under numerous descriptions. 
 
4.3.4 Public and private intention 
 
In an encounter with art you would usually not consider your intentions unless 
you were talking about a work. Your contemplation of an artwork is typically a 
personal matter. You would only worry about your intentions if something you 
said about the work had an unintentional effect. Based on what you say 
someone might think that you are being critical when in fact you admire the 
work. When you take part in a work like ‘Untitled’, 1993 you are in a similar 
position. You no longer privately reflect on the work; your participation is ‘in 
the open’ but what do your actions indicate about your intentions? 
 
To get near to describing someone’s intentions you have to refer to what they 
are up to and this description has to “coincide with what he could say he was 
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doing” (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 8). So you have to describe what an action 
looks like from the outside and this description has to match what the person 
knows within himself or herself. Immediately you see that there is a tension 
between what is observable and what is private. Anscombe acknowledges this 
by describing various circumstances where it could be said that you must rely 
on the other’s report to settle what they are doing. If a person’s intentions are 
clear you don’t ask, if they are unclear you usually ask. In these cases intention 
seems to surface first of all in the mind and action comes afterwards. Anscombe 
wants to resist this temptation and instead places the emphasis on the action: 
“what physically takes place, i.e. what a man actually does" (Anscombe, G.E.M. 
1957: 9). 
 
Anscombe looks at intentional action from an external perspective. She 
describes how intention provides a more complete picture of action. For 
example if you were standing up to leave a room and someone asked: ‘What are 
you doing?’ it would be facetious to say ‘Standing up’. It would be more 
appropriate to say ‘I have to leave’. Anscombe describes a sense where you say 
an intention “with which” something is done (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 34). What 
is important during such situations is the appropriateness of the answer. As is 
stated in the example of standing-up-to-leave if your answer is overly obvious 
then it is provocative. If your answer clearly corresponds with a potential 
future state of affairs then your intention is evident, however if your answer 
leapfrogs over a logical chain of events it appears absurd. 3. Anscombe refers to 
such situations to indicate that an intentional action is not always something 
that only an agent can describe adequately. She demonstrates that an intentional 
action must sometimes be described with an external perspective in mind. “A 
man’s intention in acting is not so private and interior a thing that he has 
absolute authority in saying what it is – as he has absolute authority in saying 
what he dreamt” (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 36). 
 
Anscombe also contemplates an internal perspective on intentional action. To 
summarise a classic example, Anscombe describes a situation where a man is 
pumping water from a reservoir into a cistern that is the main water supply to a 
house. In the house are a group of evil party chiefs. While he is doing this 
someone appears to tell him that some poison has been put in the reservoir and 
that he is in the process of poisoning the evil party chiefs. On this occasion, in 
asking the man doing the pumping: ‘What are you doing?’ Anscombe states 
“’In the end only you can know if that is your intention or not’” (Anscombe, 
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G.E.M. 1957: 48). If he was doing what he normally did prior to being told 
about the poison only the man can know the truth of his intentions. He may say 
‘I don’t care’, ‘I was just doing what I normally do’, ‘I am glad to have helped’ 
or he may just grunt and not give anything away, scheming that none of his 
actions prove with certainty that he collaborated or not. It appears that there is 
no definitive test for intention. It seems to boil down to a convincing match 
between exterior appearance and a trust in what an agent can only know 
privately. In the series ‘Objects for human use’ (Fig. 6) Marina Abramovic chose 
to use ‘spiritual’ materials in order to encourage participatory actions from her 
audience. In this work participants could press their bodies against blocks of 
crystal. It could be said that your actions in this work demonstrate the public 
and private nature of your intention. You could participate in the work and 
externally it may appear that you are having a special kind of experience. You 
could also declare that the work had a psychological affect but there is no 





In her account of what is observable and what is private in an intentional act 
Anscombe stresses the external action rather than the internal mind. Could this 
characterisation coincide with a way of understanding the participatory action? 
An explicit and observable physical act is invited as part of the interpretation of 
participatory art. However this work also exhibits the problem that Anscombe 
points out, namely that there may not be an agreement between what you do 
and what someone else says you are doing. For example you could participate 
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in ‘Untitled’, 1993 with the intention of stealing a poster, but anyone around 
you who knew about the conventions of the work would accept your action. So 
in a sense your participatory action presents the ambiguity between your 
private intention and public appearance. It could be argued that the action that 
is invited in a participatory artwork isn’t a straightforward external sign of an 
inner intention. The doing of the act places the participant on the threshold 
between a personal goal and a shared goal.  
 
For Anscombe intention is publicly observable. It can also be asked to what 
extent participatory action should also be publicly declared. It seems to be true 
that in participating with an artwork you cannot have absolute authority in 
saying what you are doing. You haven’t decided to act privately. You are 
following the conventions of the participatory artwork. The primary convention 
of this kind of artwork is that the artist gives you authority to act on the work. If 
an onlooker who was not aware of the conventions of a participatory artwork 
challenged you to explain what you were doing you would have to provide an 
appropriate answer. You may be with a friend who is unaware of the 
conventions of ‘Untitled’, 1993 who is aghast that you should take and begin to 
roll up a poster. You would have to adopt an external perspective to describe 
your actions. It could be said that a participatory artwork supports the view 
that a part of intention when challenged must be publicly declared. A 
participatory artwork diffuses the authority of the artist who produces the work 
by allowing participation but this does not mean that participants then adopt 
absolute authority about their own intentions. In this sense if someone 
attempted to set fire to Torres’ pile of posters and claimed that this was a 
legitimate participation and not an act of vandalism, it could be said that this is 
not a participatory act but is instead an attempt to enforce a personal 
authoritative action on the participatory artwork. Just as the artist sacrifices his 
authority in a participatory artwork the authority of the participant is also 
diffused because participatory action can be described by others or may need to 
be explained to others. A student raises this point during the ‘Renascent Scission’ 
pilot study when he discusses the potential for “sabotage” and “destruction” in 
participatory art (Appendix II: Audio V). 
 
When participation is considered along with Anscombe’s argument in favour of 
the privacy of intention it may be that here the private interpretative element 
that accompanies any participatory action is being considered. It can be 
accepted that an individual’s participation may be public but it must also be 
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accepted that in discussing art there may be a contemplative aspect that 
perhaps can only be embodied in privacy. In Anscombe’s example of the man 
pumping the poisoned water she talks about the ambiguity of his role. He may 
be indifferent to the poisoning, a collaborator in the poisoning or feigning 
neutrality about the poisoning. In a participatory artwork it could be said that a 
similar degree of ambiguity is present. An artist will often withhold a full 
declaration of their intention in a work, not because they are trying to deceive 
anyone but because they are aware of their influential position in interpreting 
their work. He or she doesn’t want to overemphasise a preferred meaning. It 
follows that in a participatory artwork participants would be encouraged by the 
artist to follow a similar approach. One needn’t fully declare in what sense 
one’s participations are to be taken. When one of the posters in ‘Untitled’, 1993 
is taken there is no clear way of establishing if participants think of themselves 
as taking what they are entitled to, as stealing from Torres or conspiring with 
him. Participatory action is ambiguous because it has an aspect that is known 
only to the participant. 
 
4.3.5 Causes, reasons and appropriate reasons 
 
When I took a poster from ‘Untitled’, 1993 I worked out that this was an 
appropriate thing to do based on a vague memory I had of a description of the 
work, on my observation that there were multiple posters and also based on a 
measure of self-assurance. I was motivated by a number of factors and was not 
simply prompted to take part. I was not told to take a poster by an attendant 
and I did not read any instructions. 
 
A feature that distinguishes intentional action is your response to the question 
‘Why?’ if it is asked of your actions. For Anscombe a reply to this question can 
provide a reason for acting and in providing a reason you provide an intention. 
However the reply does not always lead to reason. Anscombe recognises that 
there are differing senses of reply to the question why; some providing reasons, 
some providing causes. While acknowledging that the two senses are not 
sharply defined, she points to instances when there is an extreme separation to 
clarify the difference. A ‘cause’ is a simple response to an event like being 
surprised by a car alarm as you walk down the street. This may give you a 
fright and you may collide with another pedestrian. The car alarm is not a 
reason for your action; it is a cause of your action. A ‘reason’ is a response 
“surrounded with thoughts and questions” (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 23). To 
 176 
have a reason your reply to the question ‘why?’ has a “place among reasons” 
(Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 24). For example if the question is: ‘Why did you take 
a poster?’ the answer that is presented as part of a group of reasons may be: 
‘Because it was free.’ Or, ‘I liked the image’.  
 
In her explanation of causes and reasons Anscombe reveals an important 
distinction to be made in an explanation of the participatory artwork. In what 
sense can it be said that a participant is caused to participate in a work and in 
what sense could it be said that a participant has a reason to participate in it? In 
Anscombe’s terms if your action is caused then it is a simple event. If you have 
a reason to act then there is a complex of thoughts and ideas. It could be said 
that an attempt to cause a participatory action may be too close to a command 
or instruction. On the other hand if reasons are provided for a participatory 
action then this may add to the works subtlety.  It could also be suggested that 
the simplicity of being caused to act is necessary in order to provide a suitable 
degree of accessibility for the greatest amount of participants or it could be 
claimed that if too many reasons are sought for why you should participate 
then this inhibits the spontaneity of the participation. This perspective explains 
why it is so difficult to satisfactorily create a participatory artwork. An artist has 
to conciliate between an audience’s ability to participate and its tolerance for 
demands that may be made on it. This issue is raised during the ‘Renascent 
Scission’ pilot study when the importance of the “everyday” nature of a 
participatory action is discussed (Appendix II: Audio III). I would say that 
Torres’ work succeeds because he chose the simple action of taking a poster that 
requires no skill, instruction or explanation. Christian Marclay involved an 
equally simple action when he produced ‘Footsteps’ (Fig. 7). In this work 
hundreds of vinyl recordings of tap dancing were placed on the floor of the 
gallery and visitors, simply by walking around the space, contributed to the 
work. Marclay then repackaged the scratched recordings and sold them as 






The correct senses of the responses that give reasons for intentional action can 
now be summarised. Appropriate responses may be a description of past 
history, an interpretation that provides the “intention with which” (Anscombe, 
G.E.M. 1957: 25) and a declaration about the future. I could say that I took 
poster because it was free; I am taking a poster now because I want to 
participate in a work by Torres and Wool or I plan to take poster because it will 
look good on my wall. You may know what you are doing and describe it as 
intentional but you have to be aware that you, the artist, attendants and other 
participants can all have different views of your actions. The artist may see you 
as an accomplice but you may feel like a consumer. Your intentional action is 
also ‘in the open’ and in this situation you give up the final authority you have 
to describe your actions. You cannot say that vandalising ‘Untitled’, 1993 is a 
valid participation because you are not the only person who has a say. 
Consideration has also been given to how answers that provide causes are 
sometimes not considered to be sufficient to suggest an action is intentional. If a 
loudspeaker or bright lights somehow triggered your participation then it may 
not be intentional. However you could take a poster without being fully aware 
of your actions. Your action may descend without warning. 
 
This is the commonly reported reply to the question ‘Why?’ that occurs outside 
of the summary. This is the kind of reply where neither a cause nor reason is 
clearly revealed. Anscombe lists answers like: ‘It was an impulse’. These kinds 
of answers allow you to speculate about involuntary behaviour and are 
sometimes adequate replies. Anscombe states that such replies could be 
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explained as “the answer is that there is no answer” (Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 
26). She also describes odd replies like, ‘I found myself doing it’. Again in such 
cases this can be fine but it can often just seem garbled. Anscombe accounts for 
these replies by describing a situation where there may be a permitted scope of 
replies. When you ask what your reasons were by asking ‘Why?’ you may limit 
the scope of the answers. ‘I felt like it’ may not be permitted. In this situation 
the scope of the answers you allow restricts the scope of potential answers to 
the question ‘Why?’ Anscombe suggests that in order to explain an action as 
intentional you must have a fix on the scope of replies that are permitted. She 
describes replies to the question ’Why?’ as being “more extensive in range” 
(Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957: 28) therefore answers like ‘I found myself doing it’ 
generally fall outside of intentional action. Anscombe reflects on the 
consequences of allowing ‘I just did it’ into range. If such answers are legitimate 
then she can’t find a clear way of distinguishing an intentional action from any 
other kind of action. All actions, voluntary or involuntary can potentially be 
relegated to this undifferentiated retort.  
 
How does Anscombe’s concern with prohibiting the acceptance of the ‘non-
answer’ help in a description of the participatory artwork? She describes the 
need to regulate the scope of replies to the question ‘Why?’ when asked of an 
action. It could be said that this kind of control is acceptable in everyday 
situations. You want a comprehensible reason when someone explains his or 
her action. However it could be said that in the context of art and the context of 
participatory artworks it has to be admitted that you would frequently get the 
‘non-answer’ from a participant. It could be suggested that there has to be an 
extension to the scope of satisfactory responses when you are dealing with art. 
The ‘non-answer’ moves from the marginal position it occupies in daily life to 
become a more central reason. ‘I felt like doing it’ becomes legitimate in this 
context. I would say that an intuitive impetus to participate in ‘Untitled’, 1993 
doesn’t necessarily need to be plainly articulated. I would suggest that many 
participants probably participated in ‘Untitled’, 1993 without fully knowing 
why but where simply curious. 
 
4.4 Action Theory 
 
If it is accepted that your participation can often be explained as something you 
‘feel like’ then it has to be acknowledged that an analytical philosophy of action 
can only offer a partial explanation of participatory action. However Donald 
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Davidson claims that if rationality is given a chance it can help to convincingly 
describe instantaneous actions and more deliberate actions, (Davidson, D. 1978: 
85). He accepts that every time you act you don’t necessarily go through a 
demanding process of deliberation. He acknowledges that your acts often 
escape you ‘straightaway’, nonetheless he assumes that there is some kind of 
sequence that can explain these kinds of actions. Davidson’s point is that a 
rationalization is valuable because, if it is called upon, it can be applied to any 
type of action.  
 
4.4.1 Actions, Reasons and Causes 
 
When I took part in ‘Untitled’, 1993, there was an element of spontaneity to my 
actions however I would not say that I simply took part because ‘I felt like it’. I 
did have a straightforward desire to simply participate but there was also an 
incentive to participate in order to take possession of a poster. I would say that 
a diverse set of motives was at the starting point of my participatory action.   
 
In Donald Davidson’s analytical treatment of action he describes the link 
between a reason and an action. This is described as a rationalization which is 
composed of a “pro-attitude” (desire or duty etc.) and a “believing” (knowing 
or perceiving etc.), (Davidson, D. 1963: 3). For example you may act because 
you want to. In acting you may believe, judge or sense that what you are doing 
is what you want. For Davidson this forms the “primary reason” for action 
(Davidson, D. 1963: 4). He also emphasises that an action is a physical event 
that is given a fuller description when you give your reasons for acting. You 
may describe an action as  ‘I moved the books’ or ‘I wanted to move the books’. 
For Davidson the specific event of the movement of the books must happen for 
the first description to have any certainty. The event is fastened to the first 
description in a way that wanting is not. The second description gives 
additional information, a reason for the moving of the books. The wanting that 
occurred in the action could have been other attitudes like ‘I had to …’ or ‘I 
remembered to …’. In this example it could be said that Davidson is underlining 
that the natural or causal relation in the event of action has a place alongside 
any rational explanation of an action. 4.  
 
When Davidson links causality to actions and reasons he points out that the 
‘pro-attitudes’ and beliefs that make up the reasons for an action do not cause 
action in any coarse way. They are not best described as simple events. Instead 
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he describes attitudes and beliefs as “states, dispositions or conditions” 
(Davidson, D. 1963: 12) and he describes the way you become aware of your 
states. “States or dispositions are not events, but the onslaught of a state or 
disposition is” (Davidson, D. 1963: 12). The mental event that causes an action is 
not always a singular instant “like a stab” (Davidson, D. 1963: 12). It is the 
change in conditions that you undergo. It is the coming into awareness. This can 
happen in an instant. Like the way you can suddenly realise you’re late by 
looking at your watch. It can also happen in other ways and there are numerous 
metaphors that accompany such transitional states. “A wish floods into your 
mind” (Davidson, D. & Hornsby, J. 1997). An emotion can reveal itself, a 
thought can dawn on you or an idea can spring to mind. In this image of people 
taking posters from the Gonzalez-Torres work ‘Untitled, (Republican Years)’ 
(Fig. 8) it is clear that participation in this work is not as instant as glancing at 
your watch. It is an involved action that may involve a variety of immediate 
and more deliberate actions. One of the participants appears to building a paper 





Before I took a poster from the pile that made up ‘Untitled’, 1993 there was a 
gradual realisation that this kind of action was permitted and after I carried out 
my action any doubts I had swiftly dissipated upon realising that I had done 
nothing wrong. The action itself surfaced from this complex or reasons like a 
sudden event. This seems to support the view that causality should be ruled out 
of explanations of action. It suggests that actions emerge from more complex 
patterns of reasoning. Davidson accepts that the mental event such as the spike 
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of awareness you get when you look at your watch should not be upheld as the 
universal explanation of the way that action is caused. However this does not 
rule out causal explanations of action, he argues that a gradual coming to 
awareness of a mental state that is also associated with action can equally be 
explained causally. 
 
Nonetheless Davidson stresses the difficulty in associating natural causal laws 
to your reasons for action. Causal laws can be confidently used to explain a 
solitary event so in this case the “singular causal connection” is acceptable 
(Davidson, D. 1963: 16). However when it comes to reasons for action you have 
to deal with more of a narrative. Someone may respond to a situation in one 
way and another respond to the same situation in a different way, depending 
on their beliefs, attitudes, character, history etc. In Martí Quixé’s participatory 
design work ‘Do scratch’ you are supplied with a light-box that has been 
painted black (Fig. 9). You are invited to scratch into the surface to ‘complete’ 
the object. In one sense you can predict that the nature of the work will 
probably cause its owner to act on the work in some way. They will probably 
scratch something onto it but in another sense you cannot easily predict what, 
why and how they may scratch onto it. These decisions involve a complex 





So there does seem to be a mismatch between causal explanation and reason 
explanation. Overly rational explanations of action only deal with singular 
events of decision, as though there is no milieu of competing reasons out of 
which decisions are reached. In hindsight reasons for action become 
streamlined. The confusing influences that make up the process seem to fall 
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away to reveal a core of rationality. “What emerges […] as the reason frequently 
was, to the agent at the time of action, one consideration among many, a 
reason” (Davidson, D. 1963: 16). Davidson holds that casual explanation has a 
place in his descriptions but also acknowledges that there are difficulties in the 
relationship between causal and rational explanations. 
 
Davidson splits his description of the primary reasons for an action into a ‘pro-
attitude’ and a ‘believing’. If the participatory artwork is considered from this 
perspective then it could be asked what kind of primary reasons best describe 
participatory action in such works. While engaged in participation do 
participants want to take part, feel obliged to take part, remember to take part, 
have an expectation that they will take part or that they must take part? Do 
participants know, believe, judge or perceive that what they are doing is what they 
want or feel obliged to do? If ‘Untitled’, 1993 is considered from this 
perspective then it could be suggested that the ‘pro-attitude’ I experienced 
when I took a poster was primarily that I wanted to take a poster. There was an 
element of expectation in my action because I was unsure of its legitimacy but I 
did not feel obliged to act, that I was remembering to act or that I must act. If 
my action is considered from the perspective of belief then my action was not 
something that I knew about or perceived as something to do. I judged that I 
could take a poster if I wanted one. 
 
Davidson suggests that in hindsight explanations of action are often 
oversimplified in order to bring them closer to a simple causal explanation. 
Could it be said that this account can also describe the way participatory action 
is oversimplified to a simple causal explanation. Following Davidson it is not so 
easy to view participatory actions as being simply caused. From this 
perspective if the range of causal conditions that generate action is recognised 
then it could be said that this enriches an explanation of participatory action. 
Participatory action can be explained as being caused by a broad spectrum of 
mental states ranging from sudden events of attentiveness to states that unfold 
little by little over an extended period.  
 
In Anscombe’s explanation of causes and reasons it was claimed that the 
simplicity of being caused to act by a single reason may be necessary in order to 
provide a suitable degree of accessibility for the greatest amount of participants 
although this could reduce the work to a series of instructions. It was also 
argued that if too many reasons are sought for why you should participate then 
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this perhaps inhibits the spontaneity of the participation although a number of 
reasons to participate may add sensitivity to the work. It could also be claimed 
that the more a participatory work dictates only one possible reason for action 
the less participatory it may be. It could even be that a potential participant 
would tend to look more sceptically at the participatory claims of such an 
artwork.  
 
It could be said that a stronger sense of participation surfaces when there is one 
reason for participatory action considered among many reasons because this 
more accurately resembles the variable ways that you ordinarily make 
decisions. It may lead to a participatory action that feels less contrived. I would 
say that this again highlights the fine balance required in order to successfully 
encourage participation. Torres presents a situation with a set of reasons for 
participation that allows for a free response in the midst of the ‘narrative’ of the 
situation. It is a manageable situation but not so regulated that you may feel 
coerced into action. You may take a poster on the basis of a group of reasons 
not because you are compelled by a single cause.  
 
4.4.3 Free action 
 
‘Untitled’, 1993 like all participatory artworks is exposed to an unstable 
situation. There may be participants who want to test the limits of what is an 
acceptable participation. Someone could attempt to take away more than one or 
two posters. In theory you could return to the gallery every day and take away 
as many posters as you could carry away knowing that the stack would always 
be renewed. In a sense this is part of the question that ‘Untitled’, 1993 asks. 
There are unspoken constraints in place in works like ‘Untitled’, 1993 but to 
what extent are they publicly negotiable and to what extent do such works offer 
genuinely free participation. 
 
Davidson is interested in a causal analysis of the freedom to act. He investigates 
the extent to which your behaviour is caused by your surroundings or the 
extent to which your actions influence your surroundings. 5. He disregards 
explanations of human action where belief and desire are portrayed as being 
absolutely governed by “events outside the agent” (Davidson, D. 1973: 63). 
Instead he favours accounts that identify free action as a “causal power of the 
actor” (Davidson, D. 1973: 63). Davidson suggests that there is neither an active 
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nor passive sense in which you can describe your free actions. You may think 
that you instigate your own desires but there could be evidence to show that 
someone or something else has caused these desires. Equally events happen to 
you and determine your actions but often it is valid to represent free action as 
an inner transformation that leads you to cause changes in the world.  
 
Davidson remains doubtful about the possibility of achieving a clear causal law 
that could say what should be in place in order for an action to be described as 
intentional or free. He points to the idea that for something to be described as 
intentional there must be some kind of conformity between the practical 
reasoning behind it and the action. Davidson is responding here to cases of 
‘causal deviance’ that create problems for causal explanations. An action is 
usually said to be deliberate because you formed a plan in your mind before 
carrying it out, but there are occasions when an unexpected sequence of events 
still provides you with the planned result. Following Mele (Mele, A.R. 1997: 7) 
‘I may try to shoot you and miss, but the shot stampedes a herd of cattle and 
they trample you to death’. This kind of ‘causal deviance’ raises problems 
concerning intentional action and leads to a consideration of whether your death 
can be described as an intentional action. In terms of causality Davidson says 
the link between the reason and the act “[…] must follow the right sort of 
route” (Davidson, D. 1973: 78. This kind of example shows the multiplicity of 
potential causes that may link a reason with an action. The effect may be what 
is wanted but this is achievable in more than one way. Thomas Hirschorn’s 
work ‘Altar to Raymond Carver’ demonstrates the kinds of deviance that can 
appear in participatory art (Fig. 10). Hirschorn has produced numerous public 
altar-pieces and likens them to the shrines that often spontaneously appear at 
the sites of fatal car accidents or crime scenes. In this work he installed 
photographs, mementoes and texts associated with Raymond Carver in a site in 
Glasgow’s Gorbals area. Typically Hirshhorn finds that his work is respected 
and sometimes people may add their own token of respect. On this occasion he 
found that residents began to steal elements of the work and was obliged to 






In using the phrase ‘causal power of the actor’ Davidson emphasises the 
freedom of individuals in choosing their own actions rather than more 
deterministic accounts of freedom. This contributes to an explanation of 
participatory action because in being invited to participate in an artwork, to an 
extent, you relinquish your own freewill. You are free to choose to participate, 
but to an extent the range of the participation is limited and only has legitimacy 
under the auspices of the artwork. From this perspective it could be said that 
the controlled participation that is invited by ‘Untitled’, 1993 reveals the 
contingency of freewill. It could be said that ‘Untitled’, 1993 does not present 
unconditional freedom but demonstrates a viable freedom within prevailing 
conditions. ‘Untitled’, 1993 demonstrates that a participant is both compelled to 
act and free to act in conditions that are not within their control; an individual 
acts on the ratio between the phrases: ‘events happen to you’ and ‘you cause 
changes’. For example you may attempt to write or draw on a poster by Torres 
and return this to the pile of posters. Similar incidents have been reported to 
happen in other examples of Torres’ work and members of the gallery staff 
have not permitted these actions. From this perspective Torres permits a degree 
of freedom but also insists on a level of control. 
 
When Davidson describes the ‘right route’ in explaining an intentional action 
he draws attention to how a desirable outcome is achievable in more than one 
way. If this condition is applied in an explanation of participatory action then a 
counter argument is presented that suggests that participatory action should be 
as free as possible. If it is accepted that artists are often unwilling to control the 
range of interpretations that their work may produce, then it could be said that 
they may be equally unwilling to strictly control any approaches to 
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participation in with their work. In this sense it could be said that an artist 
would have to accept that participation might not follow the ‘right route’. It is 
easy to imagine participation occurring in divergent ways, so in making a 
participatory artwork no artist can absolutely prescribe how participation 
comes about. In this way it could be said that a participatory artwork should 
have an inbuilt flexibility and openness in order to accomodate a broad range of 
potential approaches to participation. From this perspective ‘Untitled’, 1993 
avoids being overtly prescriptive. Gonzalez-Torres does not instruct or 
announce warnings to participants. The work presents a tolerably free exchange 
for participants to the extent that he is confident that audience response will 




The aim of this chapter has been to understand participatory action from an 
analytical perspective. When participatory action is understood from this point 
of view it is recognised that a categorisation and explanation of action is 
required and it is assumed that a participatory action involves reason and 
intention. The main question of this chapter was: Can participatory action be 
rationally explained? I suggest that participatory action can be rationally 
explained. However it should be recognised that rationality should not be 
applied to rigidly explain participatory action as a deliberate process or 
physical event. Rather it should be employed to ensure that participatory action 
is explained in terms of the reasonableness of communication.  
 
When an analytical perspective is taken on participatory action then an 
appropriate measure of thoroughness has to be considered. How rational can 
accounts of participatory art be? I suggest that participatory action can be 
generally categorised as a central case of agency. Participatory action is 
something you do because your senses draw you towards it or because you 
have thought about it. It can also be adequately summed up by a ‘coarse-
grained’ description. Therefore a finely detailed psychological or physical 
representation of participatory action is not required. However it is suggested 
that a measure of precision is used to differentiate between actions. In this way 
the temporal and spatial particularity of each person’s participation is 
preserved.  
An analytical explanation takes into account how language is used to describe 
action and criticises explanations of action that overlook the role of language. A 
 187 
naturalistic or volitional description where the series - neural activity or act of 
will/muscle movement/action is used to explain action is considered to be 
inappropriate. Consequently it is unsuitable to think that some kind of 
primitive occurrence sparks off a sequence that leads to the final physical event 
each time participatory action takes place. Rather participatory action arises in 
artworks that are described and discussed. Participants, onlookers and artists 
offer questions and descriptions about their participatory actions. In the context 
of communication participatory action operates on a threshold where the 
private authority of the artist and participant is surrendered. You privately 
know in what sense you participate but you must also openly explain yourself 
if asked. It is suggested that participatory action may also occur in different 
ways. Participation may be ‘triggered’ in a direct way but this can feel too much 
like coercion. Instead I would say that participation is most successful when 
you feel like you are freely taking part or when you feel like you don’t have to 
explain why you took part.  
 
It is additionally suggested that analytical explanations of action theory offer 
the possibility of a participatory action theory. In line with Davidson’s action 
theory I would say that the explanation of participatory action as being caused 
by a ‘pro-attitude’ and a ‘believing’ is appropriate. In correspondence with this 
action theory I would say that participatory action may arise from complex 
combinations of possible motives and can be caused by a sudden awareness or 
the gradual realisation of the possibility of action. Finally I would say that a 
participant’s right to test the limits of a participatory artwork should always be 
taken into account. In an artwork you may not have unhindered freedom to 
participate in any way you feel but it should present a satisfactorily open 














Fig. 1a & Fig. 1b 
 
Context 
When I experienced ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ (Fig. 1a & Fig. 1b) I 
wholeheartedly embraced the opportunity to participate. I took my footwear off 
and walked around the environment of ‘Tropicália’. I walked through sand, 
beds of bark and straw and strayed into a pool of water. I negotiated hanging 
tarpaulins and badly lit ‘mazes’ while a cockatoo occasionally cried out 
overhead. Other participants were also present and for the most part we kept 
our distance although as I left one of the ‘mazes’ I unintentionally gave 
someone a bit of fright in the dark. Throughout the experience I was often 
hesitant but I also got completely caught up the world of ‘Tropicália’. When I 
came across ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ I immediately started rummaging through 
the works and tried on three masks in quick succession alongside another 
participant who was also trying out the masks. I tried on a mask that had 
mirrors over the eyeholes and spent some time staring at the weirdly intimate 
reflection of my own eyes and tried to look around the gallery. I tried on a mask 
that had maraca-like pods paced over the ears and shook my head back and 
forth and I also tried on a mask that had herbs and spices sewn into a pocket in 
its nose cone and I spent a short time breathing in the aroma. 
 
Problem 
When I participated in these works I was aware that there was a definite 
intention to bring the participant closer to an experience of the work. You had 
to take your footwear off and walk into a space and you had to wear the work. 
There was a sense that Oiticica and Clark were endeavouring to place the 
participant ‘in’ the work. Through participatory action you were placed at the 
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centre of an experience of the work. However it is suggested that during this 
experience you did not examine your own participatory actions in a 
dispassionate way. You were not making the kind of external observations of 
your participatory actions that an onlooker would be making. Instead you had 
a sense of being active and this sense of activity was a personal way of being 
conscious of your own actions. Following from this it can be said that not all of 
the participatory actions in these artworks were done so consciously or can be 
clearly explained in terms of rationality. In ‘Tropicália’ it could be said that I 
acted because I felt like it, acted without thought or in response to enthusiastic 
emotions. Additionally it is suggested that participatory actions in these 
artworks highlight the role of bodily sensation in the experience of action. It is 
proposed that an explanation of the experience of human action will help artists 
and participants to appreciate that participatory action can be treated as a 
phenomenon rather than a rationalisation.     
 
Resolution 
It is therefore proposed that the experience of participatory action can be 
explained from a phenomenological perspective. From this viewpoint it is 
recognised that participatory action has a personal and intuitive dimension, 
participatory action is not always produced by reasoning individuals but 
frequently has an affective aspect and participatory action can also be viewed as 
a transitive event that is closely connected to the human body. From this 
viewpoint it is suggested that key aspects of participatory action as a 
phenomenon will be demonstrated. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter a phenomenological viewpoint will be introduced with a look at 
the role of intentionality in accounts of action. Jean-Paul Sartre’s views on the 
role of human action will be explored and the phenomenology of action will be 
developed with an explanation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the 
intentionality of bodily movement. The remainder of the chapter will then focus 
on aspects of Paul Ricoeur’s early phenomenological descriptions of the human 
will and action. He considers many aspects of the human will, however this 
chapter will concentrate on the aspects that are closest to an explanation of 
action. These accounts will provide a phenomenological perspective on action 
and throughout the chapter these findings will be compared to aspects of 
‘Tropicália’ by Hélio Oiticica and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ by Lygia Clark. These 
comparisons will provide a phenomenological explanation of how action is 
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embodied in the participatory artwork. In these comparisons the discourse on 
action will once more be used as a means to reach a fuller understanding of 
participatory art rather than a means to discuss the philosophy of action on its 
own terms. Therefore these comparisons will place accounts of action at the 
service of explanations of ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’. This will help 





In my encounter with ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ I was able to think 
about what they may be about but at the same time was able to actively engage 
with them. I explored ‘Tropicália’ in the same way I would when exploring the 
interior of a building and I approached ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ as though they 
were items of clothing. In each case I was able to inwardly feel or think about 
the works as I would if I was surveying art that involved no direct participation 
but there was not such a neat separation between my contemplative state and 
my active state. It is suggested that the phenomenological term ‘intentionality’ 
will help to explain this state of affairs.   
    
5.2.1 Basic conditions 
 
From the outset the way that the terms intention or intentionality are used in 
phenomenology should be distinguished from the everyday usage of intending. 
Intending in everyday usage means: ‘To have a plan or expectation’. Intention or 
intentionality does not mean this in phenomenology. It is used like a technical 
term in phenomenology to describe a property of your mental states. It could be 
said that when you are in a mental state that has intentional properties then it 
means that you are in a mental state that is directed at something. It is the 
directedness of your mind. For example you can have a perception of a bowl. 
You may also have a memory of that bowl. In this example your mental states 
have different intentional properties when you perceive and remember the 
bowl. Similarly if you admire or dislike someone then it could be said that your 
admiration or dislike is directed to a person. Your admiration and dislike have 
intentionality. 1.  
 
There are many other mental states that are directed outwards: You can be 
amused by an event, be proud about an achievement, feel affection for a person 
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etc. These kinds of examples tend to suggest that intentionality draws you 
towards the external world and away from the notion that thoughts and 
feelings are so inward looking. In this way it could be said that 
phenomenology, owing to its concern with intentionality, aims to question 
descriptions of human affairs that are based on crude divisions between the 
private, inner world of the mind and the public, outer world of ‘reality’. By 
addressing the way the mind is oriented towards the world phenomenology 
emphasises an underlying acceptance that the world is shared in common with 
others. 2. It could be said that minimalism tends to focus on how an experience 
of art can also have these shared characteristics (Fig. 2). Sol Lewitt uses 
numerical systems and geometry to demonstrate that sculpture is not 
necessarily about the expression of the inner experience of the artist. He uses 
number to demonstrate that art can also have its basis in methods that question 







If intentionality is not included in a model of consciousness it can be argued 
that there is a tendency to sink back into a crude understanding of the mind as 
being some kind of inner existence as opposed to outer existence. There is an 
inclination to think that the mind is “an enclosed sphere with its circle of ideas, 
the term “consciousness” is usually considered to be univocal.” (Sokolowski, R. 
2000: 12). Consciousness is imagined as being wakeful but unvarying until an 
experience comes along to give it some character or direction. De Boer comes to 
 192 
similar conclusions. The mind becomes like a uniform medium. A state without 
changes where experience can be located. These experiences are then said to be 
in consciousness. Consciousness becomes an “[…] undifferentiated concept. It is 
a passive receptacle, a box: the contents ‘are simply there’” (De Boer, T. 1978: 
160). Intentionality provides a sophisticated model of consciousness and 
sensitivity to the diversity of human experience. When intentionality is taken 
into account consciousness is no longer seen as an unvarying phenomenon. In 
phenomenological terms, consciousness is constituted by intentionality from 
the beginning and because intentionality is “highly differentiated” 
consciousness is therefore not considered to be so invariable (Sokolowski, R. 
2000: 12). De Boer suggests that if a phenomenological outlook is adopted then 
this offers a description of consciousness that “[…] consists of a finely branched 
out system of intentional functions” (De Boer, T. 1978: 160).  
 
Edmund Husserl describes intentionality as the intentional act and suggests that 
what is significant in intentional acts is that they “[…] constitute a unity of 
consciousness” (Husserl, E. 1970: 540). 3. Husserl teases consciousness apart and 
recognises that it is not just one thing. It does not exist prior to and 
independently of intentionality. Consciousness is not an already composed, 
uniform presence that hovers silently behind intentionality. Intentionality is 
what consciousness is comprised of. Intentionality such as the perception of an 
object or the memory of a past event merge in particular ways to form 
consciousness: “These contents have, as contents generally have, their own law-
bound ways of coming together, of losing themselves in more comprehensive 
unities […] consciousness is already constituted, without need of an additional, 
peculiar ego-principle”. (Husserl, E. 1970: 541). Intentional acts join together 
and disconnect in countless ways, revealing the numerous, suitable modes of 
consciousness for each experience. “[…] whether perceivingly, imaginatively, 
retrospectively, expectantly, conceptually or predicatively” (Husserl, E. 1970: 
550). In this way Husserl can describe consciousness as a “contemporary 
‘bundle’ of experiences” (Husserl, E. 1970: 561). 
 
Another feature of intentionality is that when evidence of its presence is found 
then it can be said that it is a sign that some kind of mental state is at work and 
that the laws of the natural sciences are not completely applicable in this 
instance. “It is the intentionality of mental phenomena that distinguishes them 
from physical phenomena” (Crane, T. 1998: 819). If the example of the bowl that 
was perceived and remembered is reconsidered, it can be said that the bowl 
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exists in the natural world but perceptions and memories of it have an 
intentional property that is unlike the bowl. From a phenomenological 
viewpoint the intentional properties of perceptions and memories occur 
differently to the way natural objects occur. The intentionality of perceptions 
and memories is a “mark of the mental” (Crane, T. 1998: 819). This kind of 
distinction is what marks phenomenology off from other more empirical 
approaches to consciousness that tend not to recognise the centrality of 
intentionality and attempt to explain consciousness in terms of raw sensation or 
“immanent data” (De Boer, T. 1978: 159). Consciousness simply faces the data 
of sensation while the property of intentionality recedes. 
 
Intentionality has been described as the directedness of mental states. It has 
additionally been suggested that this directedness encourages an outward 
looking awareness that is responsive to the world rather than sealed against the 
world. Intentionality also demonstrates that consciousness appears in diverse 
ways and cannot be described as a steady state and that consciousness is 
associated with mental states rather than explained in physiological terms. 
Intentionality plays a role in an explanation of participatory action because it 
stresses the ties between an internal and an external reality. The way that 
intentionality highlights the directedness of mental states could be said to be 
similar to the way that the externally oriented features of action are emphasised 
in the participatory artwork. The participatory artwork encourages a publicly 
observable action that is an outwardly directed attitude to the artwork.  
 
I would say that ‘Tropicaliá' is experienced in this way. You walk through its 
compartments and practically negotiate a set of circumstances. There may be 
moments of reflection within the installation but these stand in relation to the 
required participatory actions. You participate in activities that appeal to the 
practical and inquisitive side of your character as well as the impartial and 
thoughtful side. This kind of practical exploration does not lead to distance 
between participants but an acknowledgement that they share the same space. 
In Clark’s work the emphasis is on the senses. The wearing of a mask directs 
your attention towards a singular optical, aural or olfactory sense. Considered 
from a phenomenological perspective these works do not accentuate how 
sensation is a physical fact that gives direction to a passive consciousness. 
Through an active engagement rather than a contemplative distance these 
works demonstrate how you are actively engaged while sensing. You do not 
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observe yourself sensing. You inhabit an active kind of awareness that has 
many distinctions within it.  
 
If intentionality is used to explain participatory action then participation can be 
associated with the connections between your thoughts or emotions and your 
actions ‘out there’. Participation links outwardly directed attitudes with mental 
states during a participatory action. This can offset any tendency there may be 





Oiticica and Clark’s works physically drew you in. To fully experience the 
works you had to walk around the environment of ‘Tropicália’ and actually 
wear one of the ‘Six Sensorial Masks’. It could be suggested that by being 
surrounded or contained within these works that you became part of them to 
an extent. By being so physically involved it could therefore be asked if you are 
getting emotionally and intellectually involved to the same extent. It is 
suggested that Jean-Paul Sartre’s view on human action will help to explain 
participation in these works. He describes how actions create links with an 
individual and his or her surroundings.    
 
When it comes to explaining human action phenomenologists and 
existentialists like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur have all challenged the 
dualist view of mind and body. 4. Their main argument is that the separation 
between mind and body does not in fact exist and that there is no need to 
examine the difficulties in unifying the mind and body because they were never 
apart to begin with “[…] only what is first separate can be united […]” (Danto, 
A.C. 1984: 100). They argue that the tendency to assume that there is a split 
between mind and body is a consequence of an excessively objective approach. 
In the search for certainty about the world Cartesianism immoderately rejects 
most of human experience. In place of a dualism they propose that primarily 
there is an undivided way of being in the world that can be summed up as “I 
am my body” (Danto, A.C. 1984: 99).   
 
Arthur C. Danto explores the consequences of accepting the traditional dualism 
in explanations of human action. He considers a simple action where you may 
move a stone with a stick that you hold. The relationships between the stone the 
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stick and the hand can be clearly observed. This can be explained in objective 
and physical terms but how is the relationship between what lies ‘behind’ the 
hand explained? Between the hand and the self? Again physical terms like 
muscles, nerves or even neural connections can be used, but in doing this there 
is the risk at some point of coming up against the idea of an act of will. There is 
an attempt to explain that there is a mind behind all the apparatus of the body. 
This results in the claim that there is a dualism between the complex 
mechanism of the body and the guiding mind. For Sartre this conception of the 
body in action is not helpful. The body should not be conceived as something 
that is used in the same way that the stick is used to move the stone. It can be 
argued that there are occasions when the body is used in this way. There are 
points in life where the body is objectified. In hospital you may look at your 
body as a damaged system. As an athlete you may treat your body a system of 
muscles but these are not representative accounts of the body. You do not 
usually treat your hands or even your muscles, nerves and neurons in this way, 
“[the body] is not used because it is the very fact of using.” (Danto, A.C. 1984: 
99). An unnecessary division between the body and the mind should not be 
introduced in an explanation of action. For Sartre the active state presents an 
underlying single state of being in the world. It could be said that minimalism 
reinforces this understanding of human action. The viewer does not 
contemplate a work like Robert Morris’ ‘Untitled’ in detached visual terms (Fig. 
3). The work reminds the viewer that they are an active person who is bodily 
present in space. The viewer is encouraged to negotiate the situation that the 







From Sartre’s point of view when you say, ‘I am my body’ you are not saying 
that you only have a physical being and you are not oversimplifying the 
mind/body problem. Sartre is suggesting that the sense of being a body is the 
way you should start to address the problem. You start with an unbroken sense 
of being one thing. Actions are not ordinarily observed as physical movement 
nor are actions usually analysed with reference to some psychological impetus. 
In this sense you may say that you do not have a body. You do not possess a 
body and a body does not accompany you in life. You have always been your 
body. The body is not a mere physical and spatially extended thing to be 
viewed from the privileged realm of the mind: “one does not know it, one lives 
it” (Danto, A.C. 1984: 100). It could be suggested that when he acknowledges 
the possible alternatives in an explanation of human action Sartre is not 
advising that you disregard all objectivity. He is not denying the value of 
natural science in explaining physiology and psychology. He is recommending 
an approach to human action that recognises that there are numerous ways of 
interpreting action but is pointing out that specialist approaches to the problem 
should not necessarily be given preference. He is suggesting that when human 
action as it is generally lived is talked about, it is worth bearing in mind that 
there is a basic sense of the body in movement and that this basic sense is in a 
very direct way a single experience that allows an engagement with the world, 
“We do not survey the world, but rather are engaged.” (Danto, A.C. 1984: 101). 
 
Sartre suggests that the experience of action should be used to reconnect 
consciousness with the world. In this way he argues that the body is unsuitably 
objectified when the traditional separation between mind and body is 
supported. Instead he underlines that mind and body are one thing and that 
existence has its basis in an indivisible state of being. Consequently he claims 
that when you generally act in the world this is an experience that you ‘live’ 
and not an objective event that you gain knowledge of. 
 
How do Sartre’s ideas on human action assist in an explanation of participatory 
action? It could be said that just as action is employed by Sartre to reconnect a 
detached consciousness to its surroundings, so participatory action overcomes 
the traditional separation between viewer and artwork. The underlying 
philosophy of the participatory artwork then becomes a challenge to the 
traditional dualism of mind and body. The disembodied mind is re-connected 
to the body. The participatory artwork re-engages consciousness with the world 
through its invitation to participate in action. I would suggest that the way that 
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participatory art overcomes the viewer/artwork separation echoes how 
participatory art cuts across and goes beyond the discipline of aesthetics (§ 1.3). 
Participatory action places your experience alongside other kinds of experience 
in the world and brings to light the idea that aesthetic experience and ordinary 
experience are connected. Participatory action tests the modernist notion that 
aesthetic experience takes place in ‘immediate’ time and instead offers grounds 
for conceiving of aesthetic experience within ‘durational’ time. 
 
This explanation is also supported by Carolyn Korsmeyer’s re-evaluation of the 
hierarchy of the senses in aesthetic experience (§ 2.2). She questions the way 
that the ‘higher’ senses are traditionally favoured over the bodily senses 
because they are associated with supposedly inferior concerns. This causes her 
to doubt the associations that are conventionally linked to the senses. She 
rethinks the body’s role by reconsidering why the ability of the ‘higher’ senses 
to function at a distance is associated with the objectivity of thought and 
queries the superiority of the detachment and independence that this distance 
brings.  
 
The participatory actions that comprise artworks like ‘Tropicaliá’ or ‘Six 
Sensorial Masks’ introduce some equivalence between the intellectual senses of 
contemplation and the bodily senses of action. In this sense mind and body are 
assumed to be less separable. As a result the traditional explanation does not 
apply to a participation in an artwork because for the duration of the 
participatory action it is assumed that there is indivisibility between participant 
and artwork. Sartre’s existentialism where mind and body are undivided from 
the beginning begins to seem more appropriate in this case. Through action the 
mind is reconnected with its bodily situation and through action the 
disembodied participant is reconnected to the context of the artwork. 
 
How does Sartre’s resistance to an objective view of human action play a part in 
an explanation of the participatory artwork? When Sartre resists objectivity he 
is resisting the idea that the body should be known in the way that things can be 
known about a complex mechanism. When you are saying action is known you 
objectify it and understand the body as an instrument of a detached 
consciousness. As an alternative he claims that the body should be lived. It is 
through the body that a feel for the experience life is achieved. When you say it 
is lived you are acknowledging that general human action is a constant presence 
in life and your experience of this action gives you a certainty about how it feels 
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to act in the world. Clark’s masks reinforce this notion of the single state of 
being in the world. By inviting the participant to wear the work Clark weakens 
the impression that your participatory actions can be explained in objective 
physical terms. When you wear glasses they tend to blend in with your ‘lived’ 
experience of vision. To be most effective you ordinarily do not use your glasses 
in a self conscious way. Clark’s masks merge with the participatory action in a 
similar way so that the participant’s state of being active is closer to a ‘lived’ 
experience of action rather than a self-conscious knowledge of being active. 
There is less of a separation between a self who surveys the participatory action 
and the self who engages in the participatory action. 
5.4 Merleau-Ponty 
5.4.1 Body Image 
 
When Sartre talks about a ‘single state of being’ where the experience of the 
body is ‘lived’ he is referring to an everyday experience of the body. He is 
describing a way of looking at ordinary action in the world that does not divide 
it into a psychological motivation and a physical phenomenon. From this 
perspective human action connects internal and external reality. I have 
suggested that when I participated in ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ I 
had a similar everyday experience that felt like ordinary action in the world. I 
was connected to the art object through participatory action. Merleau-Ponty 
captures the feel of this ordinary action in the world in his phenomenology of 
bodily movement.   
 
Merleau-Ponty proposes that the body is experienced as a “body image” 
(Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 98). For Merleau-Ponty body image should be 
described in terms of its form and in terms of its orientation towards tasks. When 
body image is described as a form he is suggesting that the space of the body is 
experienced in a different manner to the way that the space of the world is 
experienced. Objects in the world are next to one another but you do not 
experience parts of your body in this way. You experience the body as a total 
arrangement that does not usually differentiate between its parts or between its 
experiences: “the space of my hand is not a mosaic of spatial values.” (Merleau-
Ponty, M. 1962: 98). According to Merleau-Ponty with this wholeness of body 
image comes an increased awareness of how the body integrates with its 
endeavours. Just as the space of the body is considered differently to its 
surrounding space you also have a different way to direct your bodily space. 
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You operate with a personal set of coordinates. When you are engaged in a 
purpose you do not think about the abstract location of the body, you 
experience “a spatiality of situation.” (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 100). The body 
image is experienced as a singular volume, not as just another impersonal 
region in space. In this sense Merleau-Ponty is able to say that the body image 
is experienced in a special way as “the laying down of the first coordinates.” 
(Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 100). 
 
By explaining action with reference ‘Body Image’, Merleau-Ponty proposes that 
the body is experienced as a totality of experience that occupies space in a 
personal way. It is not a “compendium of our bodily experience” (Merleau-
Ponty, M. 1962: 98) that takes up an abstract position in space. This theory of the 
body image has a role in an explanation of participatory action because it offers 
a description of what it feels like to act in the world. Merleau-Ponty captures a 
sense of the body in action that is more than a physical or quantitative 
explanation and also does not detach the acts of the body from a pure kind of 
consciousness. He acknowledges that the body image is responsive and open to 
its environment as a set of circumstances rather than as a set of spatial co-
ordinates. I would say that this conception of the body is consistent with how it 
felt to participate in the work of Oiticica and Clark. As a participant in these 
works I did not view my actions in simple physical way nor did I spend all of 
my time in a detached state where I contemplated my actions. As the image of 
the original installation of ‘Tropicália’ in the Whitechapel art gallery 
demonstrates (Fig. 4) the way that you could take part in the work had a 
measure of everydayness to it. When I took my footwear off and wandered 
around ‘Tropicália’ these participatory actions had the same qualities as 
ordinary actions that occur in practical and everyday experience. My 
participatory action had a sense of wholeness that is similar to the wholeness I 
usually experience in my actions. In this sense if the notion of the body image 
accurately captures the feel of the actions in ordinary situations then it can also 
be accepted as a satisfactory description of the participatory actions that were 






It has been suggested that when an artwork like ‘Tropicália’ generates 
participation that feels like ordinary action in the world then this is one of the 
work’s virtues. Participatory action is enhanced when it feels like an everyday 
action. It could be said that in the discussion based on Donald Davidson’s 
explanation of causes and reasons that similar virtues of everydayness in 
participatory action also come to light (§ 4.4.1). Davidson proposes that 
explanations of action are often oversimplified in hindsight. A single reason is 
frequently isolated as being the cause of most actions. Instead he suggests that 
it is more correct to explain that a reason that causes an action usually emerges 
from a group of potential reasons. In the discussion it is proposed that a more 
convincing sense of the cause of participatory action can be captured if one 
reason is considered among a group of reasons because this more accurately 
resembles the variable ways that decisions are typically made. I would say that 
just as participatory action that has the ordinary feel of the body image is less 
contrived so a participatory action that is not compelled by a single cause is less 
contrived. 
 
5.4.2 Concrete and Abstract Movement 
 
My participatory actions in ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ may have had 
an ordinary and unaffected ‘feel’ but they took place in the context of art. From 
one standpoint it could be said that this does not make any difference. My 
participatory action is the same as my ordinary actions ‘in the street’. From 
another standpoint it could be argued that my actions no longer had a 
straightforward purpose because they were part of art. I was not acting for an 
ordinary reason and this introduced a degree of self-consciousness into my 
actions. 
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In his work Merleau-Ponty considers the responses of a patient who can act 
more or less normally but who is unable to carry out simple body movement to 
order. He differentiates two types of movement and describes these as “concrete 
movement” and “abstract movement” (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 104, 107). He 
proposes that a simple example of concrete movement may be reaching to hold 
your nose and an example of abstract movement is simply pointing to your 
nose. Merleau-Ponty notes that the patient was able to hold his nose but unable 
to point to his nose. This leads him to ask what the difference is between 
holding your nose and pointing to it. They seem so similar. For Merleau-Ponty 
when you engage in a concrete movement like holding you are surrounded by 
the everyday purposes of life. You are familiar with the feel and scope your 
actions. You are immediately attuned to the purpose of your movements and 
you do not scrutinise your actions. When you engage in an abstract movement 
like pointing you inhabit a more detached situation. You occupy objective space 
and view your actions like an observer. Abstract movements are the kinds of 
things that you may be asked to do in an experiment or as part of a drama. 
They involve an element of artificiality or imagination.  
 
Based on the evidence demonstrated by a patient Merleau-Ponty outlines the 
notions of concrete and abstract movement. I would say that this notion of 
concrete and abstract movement is relevant in an explanation of the actions that 
occur as part of a participatory artwork. It could be said that my participatory 
actions in the work of Oiticica and Clark are best described as concrete rather 
than abstract movement. These actions took place in practical situations that 
had tangible tasks. The engagement with ‘Tropicaliá’ and the trying on of 
masks in Clark’s work took place in a ‘real life’ set of circumstances. These 
participatory actions retained the feel of ordinary real life situations so in this 
sense they were concrete. They were not like an experiment because 
participants were not instructed to carry out a neutral set of exercises or tested 
on their ability to participate. Nonetheless I would say that these actions also 
had an abstract dimension because they all took place in the arena of an art 
gallery and it could be argued that this is similar, (although much less 
controlled) to the way that an abstract movement may take place in the arena of 
a clinic. I would suggest that my actions were endowed with some minor 
abstract qualities in the context of these participatory artworks. Examples of 
participatory actions that are more fully abstract can be seen in the ‘Adaptives’ 
produced by Franz West in the seventies and eighties (Fig. 5). West made a 
series of abstract objects that where made primarily with the human body in 
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mind. He exhibited these objects and encouraged viewers to try them out, often 
taking photographs of the outcomes. In each case participants pose and add 







Participatory action in ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ could be described 
as both concrete and abstract. As I explored these works my temperament 
varied between these two poles. My actions felt quite ordinary and were 
focused on the practicalities of the situation or were tinged with a measure of 
self-consciousness. It could therefore be asked if participatory action always has 
this plurality.  
 
Merleau-Ponty found that his patient was able to engage in concrete 
movements that involved real situations and actual purposes but if the patient’s 
concentration was broken he observed that the original smoothness of the 
movement was lost. In an attempt to regain the movement the patient began an 
extremely awkward sequence of gestures that looked as though he was going 
through a series of measuring actions to help him to re-engage with the 
concrete action. Based on this evidence Merleau-Ponty suggests that when the 
patient is withdrawn from the usual unbroken tasks of life he ran into 
difficulties. When the patient was asked to complete an abstract movement in 
the form of an experiment a similar kind of behaviour occurred. When the 
patient was asked to move an arm and asked to pinpoint its position after the 
movement he again went through an awkward sequence of actions “a laborious 
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decoding of stimuli and deduction of objects.” (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 109). 
From this study Merleau-Ponty proposes that because it is usually easy to 
complete both concrete and abstract movements then it can be said that you 
usually have the flexibility to cope with these two different situations. You can 
act in a world of particular tasks where your movements have a practical 
purpose but you can also deal with more artificial situations where you are 
asked to concentrate on isolated movements that are divorced from practical 
purposes. The patient does not have this flexibility. The patient is unable to 
easily incorporate the artificiality of the abstract movement required by the 
experiment. He describes this as a “confinement within the actual […]” 
(Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 109). The patient can comfortably act in the context of 
actual tasks but can only translate actions that are disconnected from the usual 
course of practicalities such as the abstract movements required in an 
experiment by treating the situation in terms of impersonal coordinates. This is 
why the movement emerges so awkwardly because his position is only known 
through an abnormal system of calculation. 
 
Merleau-Ponty highlights the significance of this flexibility in dealing with 
different kinds of movement and the problems that emerge when the 
conception of movement becomes inflexible. He describes how you can be fully 
absorbed in a concrete action or objective about an abstract action. The states of 
absorption in action and of objectivity towards action demonstrate how 
important it is to recognise that there are different ways to direct the self 
towards action. He argues that these different ways of approaching action have 
intentional properties. The difficulties of his patient show that without a full 
sense of intentionality, without the flexibility to move from concrete to abstract 
movement you are not free to move the body. You do not have the flexibility 
that allows you to pay close attention or to pay no heed to your movements. 
Like the patient without intentionality the body is treated in simple physical 
terms. It approaches “the condition of a thing”(Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 121). 
Erwin Wurm tests this notion of the human body as a thing with his series ‘One 
minute sculptures’ (Fig. 6). He exhibits some instructions and invites 
participants to photograph their actions with the stipulation that they hold the 
pose for a minute. It could be said that these works involve an extreme version 
of Merleau-Ponty’s abstract action. The participant’s body is removed from the 







With normal motility you are flexible enough to move between concrete and 
abstract movement. Merleau-Ponty puts forward the idea that the directedness 
of intentionality is like the degree of flexibility that you have when you deal 
with concrete and abstract situations. Intentionality can explain how you adapt 
when you act in the world and different demands are made on you. 
Intentionality helps to explain the diversity of experiences that your actions are 
likely to focus on.  
 
At this point it should also be emphasised that Merleau-Ponty affirms the 
significance of intentionality in an experimental situation. He compares clear 
examples of concrete and abstract movement to prove his argument. It is not 
my aim to experimentally verify that intentionality occurs in participatory 
action. As has been discussed earlier it could be said that participatory actions 
have concrete qualities but may also have abstract qualities therefore 
participatory action is not such a clear example of concrete or abstract 
movement. As a result it is not so easy to demonstrate how intentionality can 
inform an explanation of participatory action. Nevertheless when Merleau-
Ponty states that there are “several ways for a body to be a body, several ways 
for consciousness to be consciousness.” (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 124). I would 
suggest that this helps to describe the feel of participatory action in artwork like 
‘Tropicália’. In this work I was active in a number of ways. Following Merleau-
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Ponty it is suggested that the sense you have of the body in movement gives 
you a sense of the diverse group of intentional properties that may be linked to 
action. Intentionality integrates experiences in the form of an outwardly 
directed state of mind and is responsible for “centring a plurality of experiences 
round one intelligible core” (Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962: 121). I would say that in 
‘Tropicália’ my actions were ‘concrete’ with a mild abstract quality. They felt 
like ordinary experience but were part of an artwork. While I took part in the 
installation I experienced pleasure, amusement, doubt, puzzlement, expectation 
and hesitancy. I would say that these dispositions and the dispositions of others 




The everyday feel of participatory action has been compared to Merleau-
Ponty’s description of body image. Your actions come together in a total 
arrangement of bodily space. The feel of participatory action has also been 
compared to Merleau-Ponty’s description of intentionality. He describes how 
you need a certain amount of flexibility to move from concrete to abstract 
movement and suggests that this flexibility is an indication of presence of 
intentionality. Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of action has provided a way of 
looking at participatory action as a bodily phenomenon. It is suggested that the 
treatment of action and the will offered by Paul Ricoeur can add to this 




When I tried on one of Clark’s ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ I was aware that my 
attention was focused on a specific sensation. Each mask gave you an 
opportunity to isolate yourself from the gallery and privately reflect on the 
aural, visual or olfactory. The mask also made me feel anonymous. I felt like I 
had been coaxed into assisting in a strange kind of art experiment and had 
become a member of a group of test subjects who had all undergone a similar 
set of experiences. 
 
Paul Ricoeur explains the human will in terms of freedom and nature. 5. This 
could be described as an explanation of the way that you do not choose your 
bodily and physical nature but your freedom to choose is dependent on this 
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nature. For Ricoeur this link between freedom and nature forms the primary 
relation at the heart of the human will. The relation between the voluntary and 
the involuntary is reciprocal. As a result it is incoherent to study the voluntary 
will in isolation from involuntary nature. The will can only be captured in the 
light of its involuntary conditions. For example according to Ricoeur 
explanations of voluntary things like a decision must always be tempered by 
the conditioning influence of what is frequently outside of your control such as 
your character, habits and emotions. “The involuntary is for the will, and the 
will is by reason of the involuntary” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 86). 
 
Ricoeur describes how the will moves from decision through action to consent 
while always considering reciprocity as the underlying theme. In these 
descriptions Ricoeur identifies the points where the voluntary becomes 
restricted by the involuntary and where the reciprocity between the voluntary 
and the involuntary is fully realised. For example he looks at the way that your 
character may inhibit your voluntary action or the way that your voluntary 
action may be explained by an objective scientific account of your behaviour. In 
such cases he wants to find the border regions between phenomenology and 
natural science. “Objective studies are used as counterfoci which limit 
phenomenology” (Ihde, D. 1971: 29). For Ricoeur it is important to stress 
instances where you have objective descriptions of involuntary states and where 
you may have experiences of those involuntary states. There is a sense in which 
you can understand an objective description of an involuntary action such as 
breathing but there is also a sense in which you can only live through such an 
experience. Through always acknowledging the reciprocity between the 
voluntary and the involuntary Ricoeur aims to highlight the fulcrum on which 
existential life tilts into objectified nature. 
 
His method of identifying these points of reciprocity refers to the two different 
schemes used when the body is described. An objective and subjective scheme 
is used to describe the body in terms of the “object body” and the “personal body” 
(Ihde, D. 1971: 32). You consider yourself as an object body when you refer to 
empirical psychological studies. You become an accumulation of objective facts. 
You also simultaneously refer to yourself as a personal body when you refer to 
the intentional properties of mental states. You become a private subject. For 
Ricoeur these two readings of the will are radically different but there are 
overlaps where you can see one influence the other. Ihde refers to this as the 
“ambivalence border” (Ihde, D. 1971: 33). 6. 
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Ricoeur’s work looks directly at action and the human will. When the actions 
that take place during a participatory artwork are being considered Ricoeur’s 
perspective is particularly relevant because he stresses the significance of the 
reciprocity between the constraints of the human nature and the free human 
will. Ricoeur explains that an explanation of the freedom of action rests on the 
fulcrum between the involuntary forces of bodily objectivity and voluntary 
experience of choice. How does this assist in an explanation of participatory 
action? I would say that there are parallels between the way that Ricoeur 
emphasises the reciprocity of the will that can be realised in objective or 
subjective terms and the way that participatory action be explained objectively 
or subjectively. Ricoeur presents a model that allows participatory action to be 
viewed as operating on the boundary between public action and private 
experience. He provides a vocabulary for discussing participatory action as an 
overlap between action that is known in its objective sense and as it is lived in 
human experience.  
 
From this perspective ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ highlights this ‘ambivalence border’ 
between the object body and the personal body (Fig. 7). The masks have an 
empirical and experimental dimension to them. When you participate you 
isolate your senses. You put a mask on and you focus on the reflection of your 
own eyes or concentrate on the smell of herbs. These participatory actions can 
be viewed as evidence of your objective behaviour. Participants who tried on 
Clark’s masks were all responding to the stimulus of the work and these 
responses could all be independently compared. Everyone had an actual 
physical reaction. Yet from a phenomenological viewpoint participants also had 
a personal experience of their participatory action. They had an experience that 
tied them to their own distinct series of participatory actions that are not so 
easy to put side by side with another’s ‘lived’ experience. In this sense 









The main incentive for taking part in ‘Tropicália’ was that it was part of my 
research. I had specifically travelled to the Barbican to see this kind of 
participatory art. However there were other people exploring the work while I 
was there. I assume that they were driven to participate for other reasons. They 
didn’t have to take part and in many ways it was easier not to; so did they 
participate simply because they were inquisitive and were in the mood to join 
in?  
 
Ricoeur carries out his discussion on motivation by describing it as series of 
levels starting with a very basic sense of decision-making found in primary 
needs and ending up in rational deliberation. When a decision is made Ricoeur 
suggests that you are forming a project in the world and when you do this you 
tend to find that you have motivations or reasons for your projects. However he 
claims that the involuntariness of the body lies at the basis of the voluntariness 
of your reasons in decision-making. The origin of how the self is oriented 
towards its projects and carries out its projects is found in your bodily situation. 
It can be argued that there are many other factors that have an influence on 
decision-making. You inhabit a social and political world and usually think 
about your projects in a rational way. Why should the body be such a 
significant aspect of decision-making? Ricoeur wants to identify a primitive sort 
of decision that can act as a model for general decision-making. He has an 
interest in identifying the overlap between the voluntary and the involuntary so 
when he proposes that the body has a role in decision-making he is locating a 
point of tension between a free decision and something that may limit this 
freedom. He locates this point at the lowest threshold of what could be called a 
decision. He sees this point of tension arising in the experience of basic needs. 
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He proposes that the experience of hunger for example, gives an indication of 
the borderline between a freely taken decision and a bodily requirement. This 
ambivalence border is a veiled region in experience where you are unable to track 
any conscious decision-making because it is where the body takes over. You 
need to eat and drink to survive. You need to breathe and the heart needs to beat.  
 
When Ricoeur refers to need to highlight the body’s central position in an 
explanation of decision he claims: “To experience is always more than to 
understand” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 86). For Ricoeur the experience of life comes to 
you as fundamentally as the objectivity of thought. He also characterises need as 
at once a lack and an impetus. Basic needs are experienced as both an inner 
drive and an outward movement. He embodies them as an “[…] uneasy, alert 
absence, an active, directed lack” which can “carry me beyond myself” 
(Ricoeur, P. 1966: 90). In this sense hunger drives me toward food and tiredness 
leads me towards sleep. Ricoeur shows the lower range of experiences that are 
associated with decision and demonstrates at what point it is appropriate to 
consider these in the physiological terms of the object body and at what points 
experience becomes accessible to phenomenology and is explicable in terms of 
the personal body. 
 
Having established need as an indication of rudimentary corporeal experience 
Ricoeur considers higher corporeal motivations such as ease and difficulty and 
suggests that the reciprocal relationship between ease and difficulty has a 
significant bearing on your sense of well being. For Ricoeur this willingness to 
face difficulty or the “taste for overcoming obstacles” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 119), 
surfaces once stability is achieved with your surroundings. When security to 
well being is established, the imagination turns to the rewards of further 
striving, you present to yourself “[…] the pleasure of struggle, […] the value of 
energy” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 119).  
 
Ricoeur then associates these corporeal motivations with the broader field of 
rational deliberation. Ricoeur refers to the deliberate will of intellect and a 
spontaneous will of feelings. Intellectually the will is seen as being subject to an 
idealised system of reason. Actions are rationalised without regard for how 
they relate to the material world. In terms of your feelings you have a will beset 
with all the contradictions of material existence like emotion and desire. For 
Ricoeur you cannot treat these two systems independently, you have to assume 
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they are connected in some way. You have to assume “a phenomenology which 
goes beyond the opposition of reason and sensibility.” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 131).  
 
Ricoeur describes need as both a lack and an impetus. He also considers 
difficulty alongside ease and assumes that the intellect and feelings have a 
primary connection. He stresses that there is interdependence between each of 
these poles of motivation. Ricoeur’s discussion of motivation contributes to an 
explanation of participatory action because he highlights the two-fold nature 
that lies at the basis of motivation. I suggest that Ricoeur’s depiction of 
motivation can explain how you are motivated to take part in a participatory 
artwork. At the basis of participatory action there is a dual aspect that is always 
aiming beyond its limits. Lack carries you towards something external, the 
rewards of difficulty disturb your sense of ease and feelings can influence your 
rational deliberations. Each of these cases demonstrates how motivations 
engage with their opposite. Using this as an explanation of participatory action 
shows it as a realisation of “other-directedness” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 90).  
 
Ricoeur’s descriptions of need do not have a direct bearing on ‘Tropicaliá’. I did 
not have any need to take part in the work. However it is suggested that the 
model for decision-making that he creates from his description of need is useful 
in an explanation of this artwork’s participatory actions. In ‘Tropicália’ you are 
motivated to go beyond yourself and actively participate on the basis that you 
are willing to introduce the difficulty of participation into the easy situation of 
detachment (Fig. 8). You could easily look on as others navigated around the 
various inhospitable and slum-like environments of ‘Tropicália’. Ricoeur’s 
model suggests that the motivation to move from ease to difficulty stems from 
an appetite to ‘go beyond yourself’. I would say that this is one way of 








My participation in ‘Tropicália’ and ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ was pre-meditated. I 
had thought it over and expected to come across these works. However these 
kinds of plans seemed remote when I was actually in the gallery and moving 
from being a spectator to being a participant. I was focused on the overt 
consequences of my actual participatory actions rather than my plans.  
 
According to Ricoeur to choose is to sum up all previous hesitations and to end 
the argument. “[…] it completes it and at the same time breaks it off.” (Ricoeur, 
P. 1966: 164). A choice brings everything together and starts something new 
simultaneously. He describes this state of affairs as offering the main paradox 
in the description of choice. How do you escape endlessly considering your 
options if you don’t interrupt the considering? When you interrupt your 
considerations you decide, but in deciding, everything you went through 
previously becomes concealed in a sudden outcome that is unlike the process. 
For example in choosing a television channel, you go through the options, 
evaluate them and then decide. But the instant of decision seems to swallow up 
the period of selecting options. 
 
Ricoeur tackles this paradox of choice by viewing the situation in terms of 
“deliberation” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 168) and “irruption” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 171). A 
‘deliberation’ aimed at a choice is understood to be a slow process. For Ricoeur 
a choice under consideration becomes the trying out of hesitations where you 
seek to refine a mess of in-decision “Thus choice is a resolution of deliberation.” 
(Ricoeur, P. 1966: 169). Understood in terms of ‘irruption’ all your trials join 
together. They become a singular “leap” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 171). There is no 
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slow acquisition of certainty. Precision is arrived at through a sharp declaration 
and the moment is described as a dare or risk.  
 
He concludes that in order to do justice to the full scope of the journey towards 
a choice ‘deliberation’ and ‘irruption’ should be reconciled. The hesitation and 
the ‘leap’ of choice become resolved in the physical act. In Ricoeur’s words “The 
act reconciles practically the theoretical discord of the two readings” (Ricoeur, 
P. 1966: 181). I would say that this description of choice captures how it may 
feel to encounter a work like Ernesto Neto’s work ‘Mime Glip’ (Fig. 9a, 9b & 9c). 
This is a stuffed object with openings on all sides. I recognise the initial 
cautiousness that would be feature in an encounter with such an object but I 
also recognise the sense of risk that would overcome this sense of cautiousness. 
 
   
Fig. 9a, 9b & 9c 
 
Ricoeur suggests that choice is very considered and also quite abrupt and that 
both of these aspects are brought together when they result in an action. In his 
description of choice he suggests that action can take on the responsibility of 
resolving the ‘paradox of choice’. How does Ricoeur’s description of choice play 
a role in an explanation of participatory action? It is suggested that there is a 
link between the emphasis that Ricoeur gives to the conciliatory power of action 
in his description of choice and the emphasis that action is given in the 
participatory artwork. In a description of how you choose to participate in the 
work of Clark and Oiticica you would tend to describe your choices as 
impulsive when your participatory actions are literally like a ‘leap’ and you 
would tend to describe your choices as calculated when your participatory 
actions are more like a considered set of activities. In trying on one of Clark’s 
masks I arrived at this decision in a moment, without any specific deliberation 
during the action although I was aware that this artwork was being exhibited 
and had deliberated to an extent about whether to participate in the hours prior 
to arriving at the gallery. ‘Tropicaliá’ involved a series of actions with a lot of 
immediate decisions and tentative trials. It involved a degree of spontaneous 
daring and some clear deliberation from its participants. Ricoeur’s explanation 
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of choice allows for the recognition that in the participatory artwork all action is 
a practical manifestation that is simultaneously a sudden decision to participate 
and a gradual process of reaching that decision. In this sense participatory 




When I came across ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ I had already planned to take part 
and was prepared. My participation was not impulsive. However it must be 
assumed that many others may have been taken by surprise by Clark’s works 
and took part in the spur of the moment. In this sense they did not choose or 
were not clearly motivated to take part. 
 
In his description of spontaneity Ricoeur states that it is more apt to say that it 
arises from “preformed skills (know-how)” rather than reflexes. (Ricoeur, P. 
1966: 231). Preformed skills demonstrate a familiarity with your bodily 
movements. In carrying out a ‘preformed skill’ there is more of a negotiation 
between the world and the self. It is skill that “regulates” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 242) 
between something outside itself and an emerging recognition of a potential 
impetus to move. It is initiated from a sense of making-even a situation that is 
fluctuating. Reflexes are not relevant because they appear suddenly with a 
natural force. They cannot be decided on. A reflex is a response to something 
outside that produces an action like a blink in the form of a “signal” (Ricoeur, P. 
1966: 242). There is no persuasive element, no reflecting will. Reflex is a sharp 
occurrence with no development. For Ricoeur a conception of rudimentary skill 
that uses ‘reflex’ as a base only offers the “addition of rigid partial movements” 
as an account of the elements of action, (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 244). In its place he 
proposes a primitive situation for action embodied in a “[…] dynamic tension 
capable of variable resolution” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 244). 
 
Another approach to the roots of spontaneity is to consider the influence of the 
emotions on actions. Ricoeur claims that rather than viewing emotion as a 
driving force for your actions they should be seen as a process through which 
an action is achieved. It is suggested that prior to the experience of emotion you 
inhabit a steady state of “self-possession” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 252) and it is 
through an emotional experience that you are prompted to act. In this situation 
the will seeks to reinstate a sense of balance. Ricoeur views emotion as a “fertile 
disordering” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 253). Upon the introduction of an emotional 
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state the uniformity of experience becomes excited, drawn together and fixes on 
a goal. Extreme involuntary emotions can have a visceral impact. You can end 
up ‘beside yourself’ or in a feint. In this instance you summon up stability with 
an equally physical, corrective response. In this sense emotion works as an “[…] 
amplifying in the body” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 256) 
 
Habit is also considered to be associated with spontaneity. For Ricoeur habit 
does not arrive in one go but develops in time through experiment and 
adoption. The gaining of a habit grants a dormant sense of ability. Ricoeur 
describes how one becomes “[…] in some sense charged” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 
288). Furthermore habits present a situation where you can engage in actions 
“inattentively” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 291). They can give you an easy option. This 
reveals their negative aspect, which is their capacity to turn you from a life of 
development and new starts towards a life of reliance on what is already 
known. For Ricoeur it is always possible that “man is buried under habits” 
(Ricoeur, P. 1966: 299).  
 
Ricoeur looks at know-how, emotion and habit and in each case highlights the 
need to maintain some kind of equilibrium when you undergo a spontaneous 
action. These kinds of action are all in a ‘dynamic tension’. In the case of know-
how there is a tension between the physical world and the self, in the case of 
emotion there is a tension between a steady emotional state and a ‘disordered’ 
state and in the case of habit there is a tension between the ‘charged’ abilities 
habits offer and the complacency that they can also induce. Ricoeur’s 
explanation of spontaneity plays a part in an explanation of participatory action 
because it could be said that there is a parallel between Ricoeur’s explanation of 
spontaneous action and the spontaneity that may generate a participatory 
action. His emphasis on the need to maintain a balance even in the midst of a 
spontaneous action suggests that there is a kind of elasticity to spontaneous 
action. On an occasion when you spontaneously participate in Clark’s artwork: 
with reference to the subject of reflex you may be so familiar with the idea of 
rummaging through items of clothing that you ‘automatically’ participate in 
‘Six Sensorial Masks’ by searching through the collections of masks and trying 
them on; with reference to the subject of emotion you may be so amused by the 
absurdity of Clark’s masks that this may prompt you to take part; with 
reference to the subject of habit you may not participate because you are so 
accustomed to the idea of not participating in such situations. If Ricoeur’s 
explanation of spontaneity is adopted then the spontaneity of your decision to 
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take part in ‘Six Sensorial Masks’ is not like a ‘signal’ of reflex or ‘driven’ by 
emotion and habit. From this viewpoint the impulsiveness of a participatory 
action has its basis in a dynamic tension between stability and instability. Your 
spontaneity springs from the ‘give’ between the extremities of your physical, 




In my encounters with Oiticica and Clark’s works I would say that there were 
only some minor difficulties to overcome. You only had to take off your 
footwear and enter an installation or wear a strange looking mask but in doing 
this you risked being embarrassed, uncomfortable or looking stupid. This did 
not present me with a physical challenge but you still had to have an active 
outlook and be willing to try these works out. 
 
Ricoeur conceives of action as something in which the body becomes an organ 
of the will. However like an internal organ it isn’t considered when you 
ordinarily act. It disappears. He describes an ideal action as something that 
passes across “the docility of a yielding body” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 309). It could be 
said that the optimum conditions for such depictions of action would be in 
athletic or dance performance. However such absolutes of freedom in the direct 
response of a docile body are a momentary flaring up of just one side of the real 
situation. The situation must also include resistance. The most basic form of 
resistance in action is an awareness of muscular heaviness otherwise known as 
‘effort’.  
 
In explaining how effort relates to the actual act of movement Ricoeur points to 
the inadequacy of descriptions of action and effort that deal with the situation 
as a group of component parts. He is critical of models which lead to 
illustrations “[…] of effort” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 318) or models that illustrate how 
efforts “precede movement” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 319). In these cases a theory of 
effort is sought in terms of how effort is sensed. For Ricoeur sensation cannot 
fully account for an effort. Sensations can only provide a partial view because 
they don’t coalesce to explain the unity of an effort. Sensations may indicate 
your movements but they don’t illuminate the effort. “[…] the register of 
sensation is a register of fact.” It is a “sensual multiplicity strewn about the 
muscles” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 319). Sensation offers numerous pieces of data but it 
does not offer the effort. Ricoeur posits instead that effort inhabits a totally 
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different level of experience: “a radically non-representative, radically practical 
dimension” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 319). He suggests that the “properly active 
moment” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 319) must be kept to the forefront of conceptions of 
effort otherwise its practicality and transitive identity is degraded to a 
succession of theoretical components. An event is spoken about as though it 
were an object. According to Ricoeur you settle for a “spectator representation of 
effort” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 320). 
 
How does a discussion of effort enhance an explanation of a participatory 
action? Ricoeur states that the body tends to be overlooked in action and you 
tend to concentrate on the activity at hand. However, he also argues that an 
ideal bodily transparency is rare and that the body is commonly encountered in 
the efforts you make towards action. For Ricoeur this effort should not be 
understood as a sensation because this only offers the objective data of effort. 
Effort cannot be objectified and you cannot ‘spectate’ on your efforts. The works 
by Oiticica and Clark do not pay particular attention to the significance of 
physical effort. They do not call for an optimum kind of athletic or 
choreographed action or have any aspects that obviously resemble exercise or 
dance. In this sense effort appears in these works in the way that it ordinarily 
appears in your everyday actions and is barely remarked on. Nevertheless 
Ricouer’s explanation of effort plays a part in explaining the overlooked 
presence of effort in a participatory action when it is recognised that according 
to Ricoeur personal effort is an indication that a person is involved in the action. 
Effort guarantees the inimitability of each participatory action carried out by 
the individual. Effort particularises each action. No matter how minimal, its 
presence is an assurance of the existence of an experiencing subject: “The effort 
of attention that none can take in my place gives to knowledge the personal 
mark of ‘I’ […]” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 337). If Clark’s work is considered from this 
point of view then everyone who participates tries on a mask. However their 
individual participatory actions are distinguished by being connected to their 
own specific set of particular ‘active moments’. In ‘Tropicaliá’ all participants 
negotiate the installation’s numerous environments yet participation is 
individuated by the particular effort linked to each individual’s participatory 




Fig. 10a & Fig. 10b 
 
It has been suggested that when an artwork like ‘Tropicália’ is explained in 
terms of effort then the specificity of each person’s participation is highlighted. 
Jennifer Hornsby’s explanation of action and doing also draws attention to the 
way that participatory actions can be individuated (§ 4.2.3). From Ricoeur’s 
perspective personal effort guarantees the distinctiveness of each participatory 
action. Participants may all do the same thing in a participatory artwork but 
their individual effort particularises each action. On the basis of Hornsby’s 
explanation all participants could be described as doing the same thing. 
However the action of each participant is particular to the moment of its 
occurrence and its concrete position in space. It is suggested that these two 
ways of individuating participatory action identify the nature of each personal 
contribution to participatory art. Each participant has a subjective experience of 





The previous chapter has shown that participatory action can be rationally 
explained. Participatory action can involve reasons, intentions and can take 
place in the context of communication but it was also recognised that there are 
aspects of participatory action that are not so easy to rationalise. These are the 
aspects of participatory action where your feel for action takes precedence over 
your reasons for action. Participatory action is not always such a deliberate 
process; it can come about with no clear goal in mind, straightaway without 
any thought, because you ‘feel like it’ or simply for the sake of the action itself. 
In this chapter the objective has been to look at how general human 
dispositions and the body may influence participatory action in order to 
capture the ‘feel’ of participatory action. Participatory action has been explored 
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in terms of the phenomena of the mind and body in action, ordinary bodily 
movement and voluntary and involuntary action. 
 
In this phenomenological explanation the distinction that is made between the 
inward looking mind and the physical body alters. In place of this distinction is 
a series of connections between outwardly directed states of mind and the 
body. The separation between participant and artwork is similarly 
reconsidered. For a participant the body is no longer described as a mechanism 
that is detached from the will and the world is not observed in a detached 
manner. The body participating in an artwork forms a unified state of being. 
Through this respect for the association of participant and artwork I would 
argue that participatory action traverses the discipline of aesthetics, placing 
ordinary experience on level pegging with aesthetic experience in art. 
 
When the feel of ordinary bodily movement is explored in terms of 
participatory action I would say that it is convincingly captured by the notion 
of ‘body-image’. Participatory action is acknowledged to have a similar 
wholeness to ordinary bodily movement and is considered to be receptive to 
the everyday purposes of life even though it occurs in the relatively atypical 
setting of a participatory artwork. I propose that the more participatory action 
has this everyday feel then the more at ease participants will feel in their 
actions. They will be able to suspend the usual impassiveness encouraged by 
the gallery and their participatory action will feel less contrived. 
 
When the relationship between voluntary and involuntary action is compared 
to participatory action this provides an opportunity to consider the boundary 
between the lived experience of the body in voluntary action and objective 
accounts of the body in involuntary action. In this explanation the boundary is 
not strictly defined but is thought to be reciprocal. From this perspective 
participatory action arises from the convergence of the ‘personal body’ of 
experience and the ‘object body’ of knowledge. The motivation to participate 
surfaces from the ‘two-fold’ nature of an inner need that always carries you 
towards something external. A decision to participate may be measured or 
impulsive but the actual act of participation reconciles these divergent attitudes. 
The spontaneity of participatory action emerges from the energy of the 
movement from calm to disturbed physical, emotional and habitual states and 
finally I would say that the slightest personal effort is enough to individuate 
your participatory action.
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When I experienced ‘Test Site’ (Fig. 1) it was a busy Thursday afternoon at the 
Tate Turbine Hall. There were lengthy queues for all the exhibitions including 
‘Test Site’. As I waited with two friends in the queue I watched blurred forms 
slide down its chutes and observed the clusters of onlookers surveying 
participants as they shot from the outlets. The chutes looked enormous and my 
friends and I were keen to take part. We picked up our free tickets and were 
informed that there would be a delay because they were spreading out 
participants at half hourly intervals. We split up and I made my way to the 4th 
floor and visited another gallery for an hour. At the designated time I joined a 
queue that led to the entrance of the 4th floor chute. As I waited I noticed that 
there were large bins filled with knee and elbow pads, helmets and white 
cotton bags. I put on a helmet and picked up a bag in time to be briefly 
instructed by an attendant about how to sit at the mouth of the chute. As I 
adopted the position for sliding there was a momentary wait while he looked at 
a surveillance monitor trained on the outlet of the chute to check that the 
previous participant had arrived safely. I made a rapid descent down the chute 




When I participated in ‘Test Site’ the scale of the group participation and the 
extraordinary architectural scale of the project initially struck me. Alongside 
these observations I was also aware of the social nature of the event and was 
surprised that participation seemed to involve a set of quite everyday tasks but 
that these tasks amounted to such a remarkable experience. It could be said that 
the central participatory action of ‘Test Site’ is the physical experience of 
descending down a chute at high-speed. There is no doubt that this is the main 
reason why most people participate but it is also suggested that there are other 
significant aspects to ‘Test Site’ that draw attention to the social aspects of 
participatory action. Some very ordinary actions have to be completed to 
prepare you for the high speed-descent. Numerous conventions have to be 
observed, a lot of the participatory action involves public negotiation and much 
of the participatory action takes place in a functional or utilitarian context. It is 
proposed that an explanation of the social aspects of action will help artists and 
participants to appreciate that participatory action appears in a public context 
that involves social conventions. 
 
Resolution 
It is therefore proposed that participatory action can be explained from a social 
perspective. From this point of view it is recognised that participatory action 
should not be isolated from the particular circumstances in which it takes place. 
A social perspective does not neutralise the context of action in order to 
rationalise it or describe the experience of action. This approach does not 
represent participatory action as though it appears on its own but connects 
participatory action to previous and successive actions. From this viewpoint it 
suggested that key social aspects of participatory action may be demonstrated. 
 
Summary 
This chapter will survey human action from a broad social perspective. 
Aristotle’s explanation of practical wisdom will initially be considered because 
this provides an introduction into how human action can be placed within a 
more general context. Aristotle places action alongside theory, skills and ethics. 
Human action will then be considered from a sociological perspective. From 
this viewpoint the assumptions that are made about rational human action, 
action as an expression and collective action will be explored. A Marxist 
standpoint will then be taken on human action and it will be considered in 
association with work and production. These accounts will provide a social 
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perspective on participatory action and throughout the chapter they will be 
compared to aspects of ‘Test Site’ by Carsten Höller. These comparisons will 
provide a social explanation of how action is embodied in the participatory 
artwork. It should be indicated again that in these comparisons the discourse on 
action is used as a means to reach a fuller understanding of participatory art 
rather than a means to discuss the philosophy of action by itself. Therefore 
these comparisons will place accounts of action at the service of explanations of 
‘Test Site’. This will contribute to the main question of this chapter: What social 
values influence participatory action? 
 
6.2 Practical Wisdom 
 
When Aristotle considers practical wisdom he is talking about a very general 
sense of knowing what should be done so that a person may live a fulfilled life. 
To clarify this very broad definition he compares practical wisdom to other 
groups of problems that have a connection with practical wisdom. He compares 
practical wisdom with craft skills and moral action. 
 
6.2.1 Craft skills 
 
While ‘Test Site’ can be described as participatory art the participatory actions 
that it invited did not contribute to the literal ‘making’ of the work. 
Participation involved using the work in the way you would use a feature of a 
building like an escalator or a lift. Does your use of this work highlight that 
participation is simply done and nothing is made? 
 
When he compares practical wisdom to craft skills Aristotle acknowledges that 
there are differences and similarities. There are differences between practical 
wisdom and craft skills because the former is concerned with a very general 
sense of knowing what to do, while the latter concentrates on very specific 
situations such as being skilled at woodwork or gardening. There are 
similarities between the two because having a skill allows you to produce a 
good end result and it could be said that if you have practical wisdom then this 
allows you to attain the end result of a ‘good life’.    
 
Aristotle underlines the differences between practical wisdom and craft skills 
when he identifies what actions are closest to practical wisdom and what 
actions are more like craft skills. In his ethics he makes the classic distinction 
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between praxis (action and doing) and poeisis (production and making). 1. He 
suggests that the thoughts that go into craft skills are controlled by more 
decisive thoughts that are oriented toward a fulfilled life: “[…] that which is 
made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular 
relation, and the end of a particular operation) – only that which is done is that; 
for good action is an end, and desire aims at this.” (Aristotle. 1980: 139). It 
appears that there is a straightforward distinction between skilful actions that 
are applied in a concrete way and can be assessed on a practical level and 
ethical actions that appear to refer to higher values. Honest and kind actions 
contribute to a more worthwhile life because they embody a good life. However 
J.L. Ackrill points out that this difference is not so clear. “[…] one cannot divide 
performances up into those that are actions and those that are productions: one 
and the same performance can be both. Indeed it might be claimed that all 
actions are in a broad sense ‘productions’; in acting we intervene in the world to 
produce some change – actions are directed to outcomes” (Ackrill, J.L. 1981: 
143). For example in clearing the snow off a neighbour’s path you are being 
considerate so this action involves a practical production but also contributes 
towards a fairer social order. You may be honest in a courtroom but your 
honesty also contributes towards a just verdict. This action is ethical but it also 
produces a tangible result.  
 
Ackrill’s commentary on praxis and poeisis contributes to an explanation of the 
participatory artwork because he emphasises that it is best to explain action in 
terms of a making and a doing. According to Ackrill it is difficult to think of 
human action solely in terms of something that is abstractly done. Instead 
action should be seen as having both a tangible result and as being a transitory 
event that constitutes an ethical life. At first glance it appears as though a 
participatory artwork is not a product but only involves doing. As a participant 
it seems as though you are not involved in making anything. You are not 
explicitly producing an artwork in the way that you may conventionally 
produce artworks. You are not working on an object or manipulating materials. 
It could be said that Höller’s ‘Test Site’ stresses ephemeral and participatory 
actions that refer to a wider social life not the particularity of the artwork as a 
product. However the participatory actions of ‘Test Site’ such as waiting, 
preparing, actually sliding and the aftermath of the event can be considered 
from another point of view. They do not seem to be related to any kind of 
making, however it could be said that you are helping to produce the artwork 
in the same way that you are helping to produce justice if you act as a witness 
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in a courtroom. You are not producing an artefact but your actions as a 
participant play a role in the creation of participation. 
 
In ‘Test Site’ the act of sliding may have been the focus for participation and in 
this respect the work resembled a skateboard park. However you could not say 
that some participants were employing any special skills while they took part. It 
encouraged a more general impetus to participate in the social context that 
surrounded the work. 
 
Aristotle suggests that there are similarities between practical wisdom and craft 
skills because just as you would say that in order to have a rewarding life you 
would have to possess some practical wisdom you would also say that in order 
to make a good table you must have some carpentry skills. You would have to 
have some prior knowledge about what makes a good life or a table and then 
employ this in your actions. Nevertheless there are differences between 
practical wisdom and craft skill because there are no hard and fast set of 
standards that can be uniformly employed in life that guarantee that it will be 
rewarding. Practical wisdom can help to decide on an appropriate action in the 
contingency of the here and now but it can only come up with a very general 
and rough outline. Practical wisdom is unlike craft skill because it has to be 
more flexible in order to respond to the individual situations in life. “There is 
no blueprint for living well and in that sense no clear cut definition of what 
living well consists of.” (Hughes, G.J. 2001: 92).  
 
Hughes also suggests that you have to distinguish practical wisdom from craft 
skills because practical wisdom retains an overarching moral dimension. When 
using practical wisdom you are concerned that what you are doing is 
commendable from the perspective of a rewarding life. Practical wisdom has 
more potent lessons attached to it and you take a longer view. When you are 
employing craft skills you are concerned with actions that lead to good 
products or results. At this level you pursue optimum efficiency. “In the case of 
a good life, one has to think specifically of the quality of what one is doing, and 
only secondarily, on occasions, of the causal effectiveness of what one is doing.” 
(Hughes, G.J. 2001: 93). 
 
Hughes’ remarks on the differences between practical wisdom and craft skills 
play a part in an explanation of participatory art because although it has been 
suggested that ‘Test Site’ produces participation, it is not suggested that 
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participation should be solely evaluated in terms of craft skills. You could 
comment on the efficiency of the total participatory procedure of ‘Test Site’ and 
say that it was well built or well run. The chutes traced smooth curves from the 
upper floors of the Tate and were attractively designed in polished metal and 
clear plastic. The process of participation also ran smoothly with attendants 
ready to help at important points. However the actions of participants did not 
require any overt skills so it could not be said that one participatory action was 
more accomplished than the other. Waiting, preparing and sliding down a 
chute are the kind of actions that resemble the everyday actions that practical 
wisdom is frequently applied to. These were not skilful actions that required 
practice but very general actions. ‘Test Site’ invited actions that are part of 
everyday life rather than actions that require expertise (Fig. 2). In this sense 
they are actions that could be placed in the context of a general comprehension 
of life linked to practical wisdom rather than actions that can be placed in the 




6.2.2 Moral action 
 
It has been suggested that when ‘Test Site’ is explained with reference to 
practical wisdom that you do not simply ‘do’ participation you also ‘make’ 
participation but it has also been suggested that participation is not ‘made’ with 
any special skills. Practical wisdom ensures that participation is seen as an 
everyday sort of action. However given that they contribute to a participatory 
artwork can participatory actions be exclusively described as everyday? 
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For Hughes practical wisdom starts with a rough understanding of how you 
should act based on a limited experience of life but this understanding is 
continually enhanced by the demands that are placed on you by individual 
situations. As your practical experience of particular examples increases so too 
does your universal understanding of what should be done. You gather 
together individual situations where you can estimate that you acted in a 
commendable way. “We come to understand the end – what a fulfilled life 
involves – better precisely by deliberating about what to do, situation by 
situation.” (Hughes, G.J. 2001: 105). In this way it can be said that a fulfilled life 
coincides with and is constituted by your every day actions. You gradually 
assemble an image of what you are generally aiming at in life through practical 
wisdom. 
 
Ackrill offers a similar explanation of practical wisdom where moral action 
contributes to an atmosphere of philosophical awareness. According to Ackrill 
practical wisdom offers a moral guide when everyday actions are carried out. In 
these instances you are usually not in a position to speculate philosophically or 
have profound insights, you rely on practical wisdom to help you to decide 
whether an action is good or bad. In this way by relying on practical wisdom 
you try to ensure that a general kind of honesty surfaces in your everyday 
actions. In line with Ackrill this is how the right kind of environment is 
generated where it is likely that enlightened attitudes can prevail and if these 
kinds of attitudes prevail then it boosts the chances of the occurrence of 
philosophical speculation. Practical wisdom is distinctive because it does not 
provide an unyielding template for ‘the good life’ but indicates the general 
outlines of a fulfilled life. In this sense practical wisdom works from the ground 
up by providing a fertile ground for the growth of deeper insights into how life 
should be lived. Following Ackrill, “The theory that the ultimate objective of 
morality is the promotion of theoria is quite compatible with saying that its 
more immediate objective is that balanced satisfaction; the society that achieves 
the latter will be the society in which theoria has the best chance to flourish.” 
(Ackrill, J.L. 1981: 141). 
 
Hughes and Ackrill underline how practical wisdom is accumulative. You 
achieve a more universal knowledge of what to do in life through the gathering 
together of individually instructive experiences. Deeper insights into how life 
can be lived are accomplished through the build up of moral actions that are 
informed by practical wisdom. These descriptions of the nature of practical 
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wisdom contribute towards an explanation of the participatory artwork because 
they provide a wider context for the everyday nature of the participatory 
action. The participatory actions of waiting, preparing, actually sliding and the 
aftermath of ‘Test Site’ have more of a resonance because they can now be seen 
as contributing to a wider set of circumstances. It is no longer just another 
unremarkable action such as the walking or sitting down that you may do in a 
gallery. If a participatory action is informed by practical wisdom then by taking 
part you are involved in an ethical question. Is this a good thing to do? What 
good does this action do? If Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom is adopted in 
these circumstances then the participatory action is not only a response to the 
individual situation with all of its immediate problems but it is also seen to be 
playing a role in the constitution of a wider social life that involves the build up 




When participatory action is explained from the viewpoint of practical wisdom 
then it is placed in a broad social context. Participatory action becomes an 
everyday action that has ethical outcomes and is not just a special skill that you 
can complete successfully. When participatory action is understood from the 
perspective of sociology then this broad social context is considered more 
thoroughly. From a sociological position everyday actions become influenced 
by social conventions and norms. Human actions become less rationally 
explicable and are viewed with more pragmatism while a social view on 
personal expression and collective action becomes relevant. 
 
6.3.1 Analytical philosophy 
 
At a key moment during my participation in ‘Test Site’ I lay on my back on a 
sheet and allowed the force of gravity to pull me down the chute (Fig. 3). I 
submitted to some very simple physical forces. However this key moment was 
co-ordinated by an attendant who was observing a monitor that showed when 
it was safe for me to go. I had to wait to get to this moment and was only in this 
position because I had complied with the rule to wear protective clothing. 
Therefore in one sense the central act of participation in ‘Test Site’ is a simple 






R.J. Bernstein sheds some light on this state of affairs when he suggests that 
human action must be understood not just in the precise context of physics but 
also in a broad social context. The aim of an analytical approach to action is to 
demonstrate that a human action can be described as movements of the body 
and the same human action can also be described as the behaviour of an 
individual. The objective is then to show that descriptions of action as 
movement and descriptions of action as behaviour are distinct from one 
another. To illustrate exactly what this means an example can be considered 
where bodily movement and behaviour are combined. A man may be at an 
auction and during the bidding he raises his hand to bid for a piece of furniture. 
Analytical philosophers of action concede that in such situations the raising of 
the hand can be described in terms of physiology and that this can provide the 
causes of the action, however they also claim that this kind of explanation can 
never adequately explain the raising of the man’s hand in the wider context of 
the auction. A physiologist would describe the raising of the hand in purely 
material terms as being caused by events like the firing of nerve endings in the 
brain. The analytical philosopher of action on the other hand explains the 
situation using an entirely different vocabulary. He or she may explain the 
raising of the hand in terms of the man’s reason for acting, his purpose in acting 
or in terms of the rules that regulate bidding. 
 
This example shows the clear division between ways of describing an action 
and also shows the implications of an analytical philosophy of action: Human 
behaviour cannot be reduced to the laws of physical science and as a result the 
laws of physical science do not have a privileged role in descriptions of human 
activity. Consequently explanations of action that use notions like purpose or 
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intention cannot be converted into a more elementary sequence of underlying 
physical or biological processes. According to Bernstein the analytical 
philosopher of action claims that “there is something non-reducible and 
distinctive about the nature of human action and agency such that it requires a 
conceptual framework which is radically different from, but no less legitimate 
than, those employed in the physical sciences.” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: 237). 
 
Bernstein explains the further implications of his claim. A physiologist claims to 
explain purpose, intention and reason as being caused by physical laws. This 
means that you do not need to rely on any other kinds of explanation for 
human action. All activities can fundamentally be reduced to physical laws. 
Bernstein suggests, “Such a view is a necessary […] condition to support the 
thesis of the mechanistic materialist that man is nothing but a complex physical 
mechanism.” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: 237). If on the other hand analytical 
philosophy can prove that there is something in human action that cannot be 
reduced to physical laws, if analytical philosophy can prove that purpose, 
intention and reason are categorically distinct from physical laws then this 
proves that human beings are more than very complex mechanisms. It can 
show that when human behaviour is being discussed a special class of concepts 
has to be used that highlight the human aspects of an activity rather than just its 
physical aspects. 
 
To support this argument Bernstein explores A.R. Louch’s proposal that you 
use moral explanations when you explain human action and when you use 
moral explanations, you cannot use scientific explanations because these two 
systems of explanation are irreconcilable. Louch claims that you never turn 
your explanations of action into a neutral set of motions or reflexes. Human 
actions are not like events that occur in the natural world and cannot be boiled 
down to stimuli and responses that can be dispassionately analysed. Louch 
disagrees that the approach should “[…] begin with colourless movement and 
mere receptor impulses as such, and from these build up step by step both 
adaptive and maladaptive behaviour.” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: 263, italics mine). 
He is suggesting that in explanations of action you don’t first of all register a 
neutral motion and then assess it in the light of reason as an action. An 
explanation of what you do cannot be understood like a bare fact under 
laboratory conditions because your actions are always encountered within a set 
of circumstances and these circumstances tend to be extremely variable. As a 
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consequence you ensure that your explanations reflect this extreme variability, 
so they tend to be flexible and are often improvised. 2. 
 
Bernstein explains that an analytical theory of human action sets out to prove 
that human action cannot be described exclusively in physical terms. Instead a 
description must also include references to the experiences of reason, purpose, 
intention and social convention that play a part in all human action. From an 
analytical perspective these experiences are definitely distinct from the physical 
aspects of human action. This sociological evaluation of the aims of the 
analytical theory helps in an explanation of the participatory artwork because 
this allows participatory action to be associated with a state of mind or shared 
conventions rather than simple physical movement. If it is accepted that a 
participatory action has these features then this provides support for a 
description of Höller’s ‘Test Site’ where participatory action materialises against 
the complex background of reasons, purposes, intentions and social 
conventions as well as in terms of a simple physical movement. In this sense the 
participatory action that is invited by ‘Test Site’ is not just about waiting, 
preparing and sliding. In the context of a gallery participants may be taking 
part because they want to fulfil the conventions of the artwork, because they 
want to accomplish a personal goal by participating or because they see 
participation as a donation towards a communal principal. In each case 
behaviour can be linked to numerous reasons and social conventions that 
would not be satisfactorily explained if you were to rely entirely on a simple 
physical explanation. 
 
6.3.2 Rational action 
 
When I encountered ‘Test Site’ there was no doubt that it was participatory art. 
There was an overriding recognition by the audience in the Turbine Hall that 
anyone could take part. In a way the remarkable feature of ‘Test Site’ was not 
simply that you could participate but how easily this possibility caused the 
usual norms of gallery behaviour to evaporate.      
 
Hans Joas’ reflections on excessively rational explanations of action help to 
explain if this move from detached viewing to participatory action only has 
novelty value because it is a change in the audience’s usual routine or is a 
serious proposal to transform the conventions of the art institution. Joas is 
critical of the focus of analytical philosophy because it is mainly concerned with 
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the actions of an individual who operates in an abstract realm outside of social 
relationships and is critical of economic theories where action is treated as the 
outcome of a rational choices made in the market place. He also questions 
certain kinds of psychology where action is understood as behaviour that is a 
response to external stimuli. He suggests that one way of gaining a valid 
perspective on all of these theories is to explore how human action has been 
explained in sociology and proposes that the best way to understand action in 
the context of sociology is to stress the creative features of human action. 
 
The gist of his proposal is that the theories of action described above tend to be 
extremely selective about what kinds of action should included and excluded 
from an account of human action. Actions that are not the result of individual 
deliberation, rational or behavioural become marginalised. As a result a large 
swathe of human action is relegated to a “residual category” (Joas, H. 1996: 4). 
As an example Joas highlights the contradictions that emerge when a rational 
theory of action is used in sociology. He points out that when sociologists adopt 
an economic model of human action it becomes difficult for them to adequately 
explain human actions that occur outside of the economic model. For Joas there 
are aspects of institutions like work, leisure or the family that fall outside of 
economics and it is these aspects of social life that a sociologist is often most 
eager to address. Joas proposes that a theory of action is needed that defines 
itself on the basis of its connection to these social practices rather than a theory 
of action that treats human actions that fall outside of its frame of reference as 
abnormal. He claims: “[…] sociological action theory is permeated with the 
theory of rational action precisely because it sees types of action only as 
gradations of deviation from rationality” (Joas, H. 1996: 35). Joas refers in full to 
Max Weber’s typology of social action: 
 
“Social action, like all action, may be oriented in four ways. It may be: 
(1) instrumentally rational (zweckrational), that is, determined by expectations as 
to the behaviour of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these 
expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s 
own rationally pursued and calculated ends; 
(2) value-rational (wertrational), that is, determined by a conscious belief in the 
value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other forms of 
behaviour, independently of its prospects of success; 
(3) affectual (especially emotional), that is, determined by the actor’s specific 
affects and feeling states; 
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(4) traditional, that is, determined by ingrained habituation.” (Joas, H. 1996: 39). 
 
He notes the sophistication of the categories of social action but also underlines 
that there is a continuing need to refer to rational action as the privileged model 
of action. For Joas what is taken for granted has to be exposed when a 
preference is shown for rational as opposed to non-rational theories of action.  
 
A participatory action can be considered from an analytical, economic or 
psychological standpoint. It can be seen as the result of the rational deliberation 
of an individual and a behavioural response to stimuli. Each of these 
approaches may reveal some aspects of a participatory action but if Joas’ 
sociological perspective is adopted then it becomes clear that these points of 
view on human action can often fail to encompass other more ‘creative’ 
expressions of human action. Joas’ approach has value in an explanation of 
participatory action because he would not consign participatory action to a 





The dominant rational model of action in art galleries is that the visitor should 
not touch any objects. You usually observe exhibits as shown in this image of 
the Turbine Hall during a show of portrait sculpture (Fig. 4). It could be said 
that this model is described in Weber’s terms as social action that is value-
rational. Your action in a gallery is based on a belief in aesthetic value for its 
own sake and the behaviour that usually promotes an evaluation of aesthetic 
value is detachment. In this sense from Weber’s sociological perspective the 
participatory actions that occur in ‘Test Site’ do not provide norms for action in 
a gallery and may be categorised as abnormal, marginal or non-rational. A 
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student points out the tensions that exist between normal and ‘abnormal’ 
gallery behaviour during the ‘Renascent Scission’ pilot study when she 
mentions two newsworthy instances of inappropriate behaviour during the 
‘Sensation’ exhibition (Appendix II: Audio IX). However if Joas’ position is 
accepted then a participatory action in an artwork is not trivialised as non-
rational. By understanding action in terms of creativity rather than rationality 
its relevance becomes restored because ‘Test Site’ creates a new set of norms 
during the period of its exhibition and these new norms give participatory 
action a primary role. If this creative perspective is endorsed then I suggest that 
the value of participatory action may be fairly appraised. 
 
6.3.3 The assumptions of rational action 
 
I arrived at ‘Test Site’ with the intention of taking part and I took it for granted 
that there would be no difficulties. It turned out that I had to wait an hour 
because it was so busy but luckily I could manage this. In retrospect I realise 
that there could have been many more practical difficulties. I could have been 
on a tight schedule and unable to wait or I could have been with an older or 
younger group of people and would then have witnessed their frustration at 
the health and age restrictions.  
 
This situation is addressed by Joas when he lists three assumptions of theories 
based on rational action: “They presuppose firstly that the actor is capable of 
purposive action, secondly that he has control over his own body and thirdly 
that he is autonomous vis-à-vis his fellow human beings and environment.” 
(Joas, H. 1996: 147). The problem with all of these requirements is that they are 
rarely found in actual human action. Human actions are not always 
concentrated on clearly defined purposes and are frequently distracted by other 
objectives. Individuals do not always have the same ability to act. There are 
many forms of physical ability and you also regularly act on behalf of others or 
for reasons that are dependent on your environment.  
 
Joas also suggests that a rational approach to action ignores the way that your 
cultural background may influence your understanding of the role of the body. 
For Joas a rational theory of action assumes that human action should be 
considered in terms of an “activistic relationship to the world” (Joas, H. 1996: 165). 
Rationalism makes a cultural assumption that you face the world forcefully 
with a willingness to change the environment and does not acknowledge that 
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there are other cultural outlooks that favour circumspection or an acceptance of 
the prevailing state of affairs. Following Joas the extent to which the customs 
and traditions of the surrounding community shape interpretations of the role 
of passivity and activity in human action must be taken into account. 
Joas additionally stresses how a rational approach to action assumes that 
individuals are equally able to control the body in an efficient way. He states 
that this assumption ignores the way that the body as an organic entity may not 
necessarily comply with a rationally considered objective; the body does not 
always act in accordance with an individual’s intentions. From the rational 
perspective the body in action is understood in much the same way that a 
mechanism is understood. The body plays an instrumental role in your actions. 
Joas claims that this application of control over the body is not the only way to 
understand human action and suggests that the alleviation and absence of 
control have as an important role to play in a general explanation of human 
action. Events that happen to you like falling asleep, sneezing, sighing, 
laughing or remaining inactive are not central to accounts of human action but 
these capture a sense of how marginal action can offset reductive rationalism. 
Rational action theories tend to overlook the instability that is always ready to 
breach intentional action. It should be recalled that at certain times Aristotle 
recommends that it may be more appropriate to embrace a broad range rather 
than a narrow range of actions (§ 4.2.2). In this sense you should be prepared to 
expand your spectrum of relevant human actions. 
 
Joas highlights how a rational approach to action tends to overlook some of the 
concrete conditions in which human actions take place and shows how a 
rational approach cannot accommodate the range of potential influences on 
human action. Human action does not always have a clear purpose, does not 
always start from a uniformly able situation and is not constantly carried out in 
absolute isolation from other agents. Attitudes to activity and inactivity are 
culturally shaped and additionally there is a volatile edge to human action 
owing to the organic nature of the body. From this perspective it could be said 
that it is more appropriate to build the heterogeneity of these kinds of 
conditions into an account of participatory action rather than attempt to 
regulate participatory action in a prescriptive and rational way. In this sense 
these diverse influences form a pragmatic underpinning for the notion of 
participatory action. An explanation of participatory action then concentrates 
on the practical viability rather than the rationalisation of participation. Rather 
than regarding the erratic features of human action as a problem in an account 
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of participatory action they should instead be recognised as the basis for a more 
inclusive explanation of participation. The potential precariousness of the 
situation underscores the difficulty of producing a successful participatory 
artwork like ‘Test Site’. An individual’s decision to not participate can be 
partially accounted for if these variable concrete situations are acknowledged. 
The decision to slide down one of Höller’s chutes is subject to numerous 
contingencies involving your physical ability, responsibility to others, your 
cultural attitude to participation and the extent to which your intention to slide 
down a chute may be influenced by other more intermediary aspects of action 
like tiredness, illness, embarrassment or apathy. In Erwin Wurm’s ‘Do It’ series 
he exhibits an instruction and supplies clothing and a means to document your 
participation. In this work (Fig. 5) you are invited to stretch a sweater over your 
body, strike a particular pose and have your photograph taken. I would say 
that this work makes some assumptions about the abilities of participants. It 
requires a lot of enthusiasm from participants because you have to put a bit of 
effort into your actions and you also have to be quite physically fit to achieve 
the bodily contortions that are required. This comparison makes it clear that 
there are degrees of participation and that often works can alienate as well as 
enthuse an audience. Following Joas I suggest that if a participatory artwork is 
unable to accommodate a degree of audience diversity then it is based in an 







Having decided to take part in ‘Test Site’ I began to appreciate that 
participation was not such a straightforward act. You could not spontaneously 
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participate in ‘Test Site’ in the way that you could spontaneously dive into a 
swimming pool. You had to pass through a number of checks that ensured that 
the event ran smoothly. You were ‘processed’ to an extent. 
 
The procedures that channel the spontaneity of participatory action in ‘Test 
Site’ can be paralleled with the way that Joas captures human action as an 
expression. For Joas the most uncomplicated explanation of an expression is 
that it is a bodily demonstration of an inner feeling: a facial expression or a 
gesture. However Joas casts doubt on the idea that an expression is the 
straightforward movement of something inner to the outside. 
 
He supports his claim by considering a phenomenon you frequently undergo 
when you express yourself. You are often taken aback by what you express or 
have a need to alter what you express in order to get closer to what it is you are 
trying to communicate. When this happens it is often the first opportunity you 
may have to reflect on what you are trying to communicate. Joas suggests that 
this shows expression to be not such a simple procedure. You often are not able 
to gain access to the content of private feeling until you see or hear evidence of 
it in a more public domain. Joas highlights how this demonstrates the shared 
nature of expression. Expression emerges from a spontaneous interval that 
generates the unforeseen newness of the expression but also emerges from a 
shared system of communication that exists prior to the expression. He 
supports this model because it shows “[…] the mediated nature of the act 
expression, but also the novelty of each new found expression” (Joas, H. 1996: 
79). For Joas expression is founded on an exchange between an inner feeling 
and the outer act of expression. A thought or feeling is augmented in the act of 
expression.  
 
John Langshaw Austin covers similar ground in his study of the speech act. 
Austin looks at the way certain utterances you make are like an action or like 
doing something. He identifies a few classic examples: “’I do’ (in marriage), ‘I 
name this ship’,’ I bequeth my watch to my brother’, ‘I bet you a fiver’” (Austin, 
J.L. 1962: 5 Italics mine). These remarks stand out because when you say them 
you aren’t describing or giving an account of anything. You are acting by using 
words. Austin maintains that in each of these kinds of expressions you do not 
represent what you are doing, have done or are going to do, you do it in saying 
the words. When you say ‘I bet you a fiver…’ you are not stating anything 
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about betting, chance or the odds. You engage in the act of betting. Austin 
names this kind of expression a “performative utterance” (Austin, J.L. 1962: 6) 3. 
 
Austin suggests that a general condition of the performative utterance is that it 
should be uttered in the appropriate circumstances. All the circumstances in the 
above examples are extremely controlled and would probably only ever occur 
on the particular occasion of marriage, ship launching, will reading or betting. 
Another important circumstance is that the utterance usually accompanies 
something else such as another statement, a physical act or a mental act. Austin 
concentrates on questioning the mental act that is supposed to accompany an 
utterance. He states that there may be a sense in which a performative utterance 
is simply a description. This is when the utterance is seen as external evidence 
of an “inward performance” (Austin, J.L. 1962: 9). Here the declaration ‘I bet …’ 
is gauged on whether it truly reflects an inner declaration of a bet. However 
Austin argues that the act of doing something should be stressed in these 
utterances. Through this emphasis he questions the status of the inner 
declaration and instead highlights the value of the performative utterance. He 
questions the simple view that characterises an utterance as a mere “outward 
and audible sign” of something inner (Austin, J.L. 1962: 13). By placing the 
weight of his discussion on the performative he criticises explanations of speech 
that depict it as a report of a state of mind. 
 
Joas compares human action to expression and argues against the 
straightforward view that expression is an external sign of an inner state of 
mind. He claims that expression should be explained as a form of mediation 
between a private and a public state. Austin looks at special kinds of speech 
acts to show that communication shouldn’t be simply described as an outward 
sign of an inward state of mind. Like Joas he underlines the palpable and 
performative aspects of a speech-act and argues that these features demonstrate 
the mediated nature of communication. Therefore just as an expression is not 
simply a process of impartially broadcasting an antecedent feeling and just as a 
performative utterance is not simply an ‘audible sign of an inner declaration’, 
human action in general is not simply a demonstration of an intention that is 
fully formed prior to an action. There is a sense that your actions can surprise 
you in a similar manner to the way your speech can surprise you and there is 
also a sense that your actions can only be reflected upon and refined once they 
become observable. Human action understood in terms of expression or the 
performative utterance can therefore be described as an event that is created ‘in 
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the open’ as much as it can be described as an event that shows your inner 
purposes. For Joas “[…] it is only in our utterances and actions that we 
recognise our own potentiality.” (Joas, H. 1996: 81). ‘Test Site’ places an 
emphasis on publicly observable and participatory actions and it can be said 
that this helps to underscore the mediated and shared aspects of 
communication. Prior to and after sliding your participatory actions are 
regulated by the systems of ‘Test Site’ just as an expression is mediated by the 
conventions of communication. During the actual sliding you may undergo a 
private experience of exhilaration or panic for a few seconds but bystanders and 
attendants also witness you as you emerge from the chute (Fig. 6). In ‘Test Site’ 
there is a procedural and performative aspect when you take part in preparing 
to slide and the aftermath of the sliding that places you at a confluence of 




6.3.5 Collective action 
 
‘Test Site’ motivated large groups of people to participate without any problem. 
It had a similar ability to draw a crowd as a popular ride at a fairground. In one 
sense you could say that it used a populist form of entertainment to generate an 
interest in participation. On the other hand you could say that people were 
brought together by their unaffected enthusiasm. 
 
The possibility that a group has to be prompted or may naturally participate in 
an artwork is explored when Joas looks at an influential rational approach to 
collective action put forward by Mancur Olson, (Olson, M. 1965). Olson wants 
to know what rational reasons there are for acting collectively and suggests that 
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there is a contradiction between rational action and collective action. He states 
that collective action seems to occur when individuals are undergoing the same 
circumstances and they want to change these circumstances. The way to 
achieve this change in circumstances is to form a group. At first glance it 
appears rational, if the aims of a group coincide with the aims of all its 
participating members then it is to everyone’s benefit to participate in the 
group. Olson thinks this rationale is taken for granted by social theorists. As an 
alternative he suggests that it is more rational not to participate in a group. If 
you can avoid participation but simultaneously benefit from what is achieved 
by the group then this makes more sense. It is more rational to receive the 
rewards of the efforts of others without making any effort yourself. If it is 
accepted that you cannot presuppose the readiness of individuals with shared 
goals to participate, then this exposes the difficulties associated with 
assembling groups of individuals. The significant question then becomes: How 
can participants be mustered to take part in collective actions? Olson identifies 
a number of issues associated with ways to gather together a collective group. 
These are: 
 
Coercion: Participants are forced to contribute and penalised if they do not 
  contribute. 
Group size: The smaller the group the more noticeable is your failure to  
  participate and the larger the group the easier it is to blend in. 
Incentives: In order to generate a collective interest an appeal is made to the 
  advantages that may be of personal benefit to a participant. 
Observation: An ethical dimension is introduced into participation. If you  
  participate and this participation is observable, is this   
  participation a result of a genuine desire or need to present a good 
  impression? 
 
In Olson’s account of rational approaches to collective action it appears that it is 
more rational not to participate. On this basis a rational account of collective 
action is reduced a series of techniques designed to overcome this way of 
thinking. Appeals are made to authority, personal interest and public 
reputation in order to compel individuals to unite in action. If the participatory 
artwork is considered from this perspective it could be said that at first glance it 
appears that Olson provides a useful set of principles that could be gainfully 
employed in any participatory artwork. His methods seem to offer a way to 
overcome participant apathy. When ‘Test Site’ is considered from this 
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viewpoint I would suggest that coercion was not a factor for participants. No 
one was forced to take part. Group size was influential in reducing any pressure 
to participate because being in the Tate Modern Turbine Hall any participation 
or non-participation that took place merged with a considerable and steady 
audience presence. I would suggest that the most persuasive aspect of ‘Test 
Site’ is the incentive of an exciting physical experience offered to the individual 
participant. In Gonzales-Torres stacks pieces the incentive of a free artwork 
operates in a similar manner (Fig. 7a & Fig. 7b). It is additionally suggested that 
observation played only a small part in ‘Test Site’ because there was such a 
sizeable audience taking part and witnessing the spectacle that an individual 




Fig. 7a & Fig. 7b 
 
However it should also be recognised that these techniques are founded on the 
claim that an individual will always rationalise their attitude to collective 
action. Olson’s account does not consider the spontaneity that may play a role 
in collective action. He assumes that individuals are led to non-participation by 
shrewd calculation but does not consider that affective states such as 
enthusiasm and empathy may play an equally motivational role. These are 
often the reasons why people participate in charity work or demonstrations. It 
should also be pointed out that the techniques put forward by Olson bear a 
striking resemblance to the kinds of strategies used in marketing. It is suggested 
that Olson’s rational approach to collective action resembles a persuasive 
method of manipulation rather than a method to encourage participation. 
Accordingly although initially he appears to offer some useful tools to increase 
the rate of participation these kinds of methods may have the opposite affect. 




These issues have similarities to the discussion on participatory action that is 
based on Donald Davidson’s explanation of free action (§ 4.3.3). From this 
perspective participatory art permits a degree of freedom but also insists on a 
level of control. There may be flexibility in how you choose to participate but 
you are also required to follow the ‘right route’. From Olson’s perspective 
collective action can take place as a result of a spontaneous feeling and so is 
freely chosen but it is also suggested that participation may need to be 
manipulated to an extent. It may only arise when participation has been 
encouraged and this requires a set of techniques designed to overcome a 
participant’s lack of interest. I would say that there is a resemblance between 





This sociological view has emphasized the problems that arise when an overtly 
rational sociological approach is taken on human action. From another 
perspective the materialism of Marx, Lukács and Habermas highlights how a 
measure of objectivity can help to explain the role that human action plays in 
‘social being’. Marx considers human action as praxis, Lukács understands 
human action as labour and Habermas considers human action in terms of 
communicative action. However their objectivity does not narrowly focus on 
the cold efficiency of praxis, labour or communicative action but concentrates 
on ensuring that these descriptions of action continue to be known in human 
terms. Consequently their objective treatments of human action respectively 
present praxis as a realisation of human potential, labour as realisation of 





It could be said that ‘Test Site’ can be appreciated as an extensive sculptural 
project. Sections of it are five storeys high and it involves impressive 
engineering ingenuity. As an object on its own it has aesthetic value and Höller 
accepts this view, “[…] it would be a mistake to think that you have to use the 
slide to make sense of it.” (Honoré, V. 2006). Nonetheless it could be said that 
human activity and sociability are integral to an appreciation of the work and to 
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see the object and not the crowds is to overlook one of the work’s essential 
properties. 
 
This connection between the man-made world and human activity is explored 
when R.J. Bernstein argues that Marx’s materialism does not depend on 
“classical mechanistic materialist doctrine” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: 42). Marx may 
concede that reality has fundamental material properties but he suggests that 
these basic properties do not exist as passive objects in a passive state. For Marx 
there is not such a clear division between objective nature and the human 
subject who perceives nature. For Marx materialism has its basis not in a sterile 
objectivity but in an active human engagement with this objectivity. 
Materialism has to account for the way that human subjects actively experience 
the material world. Bernstein quotes Marx describing his brand of materialism. 
It is a state of affairs that is structured around “sensuous human activity, 
practice [Praxis]” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: 42). 4. 
 
Bernstein describes an important outcome of Marx’s approach to materialism. If 
it is accepted that natural objectivity and human activity coincide in a 
fundamental way and if a crucial term for Marx like labour is considered, then 
it may be suggested that any products that result from a human engagement 
with nature in the form of labour are not so straightforwardly separate from 
human affairs either. The artefacts that emerge from labour are not sterile 
objects. “The product produced is not something “merely” external to and 
indifferent to the nature of the producer.” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: 44). Products 
that are an outcome of human activity are a manifestation of praxis. What you 
do and make is an embodiment of human activity and this embodiment is a 
register of the reality of human life. Your products are not detached 
commodities separate from your activity; they reflect back to you what it is to 
be human. Through their labour men and women produce “crystallized forms 
of their activity” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: 59).  
 
Bernstein describes Marx’s materialism in active rather than passive terms. At 
its basis there are active individuals engaged in praxis. According to Marx, 
when labour is understood as praxis it displays the social origins of human 
activity and demonstrates the human potential of labour. It can therefore be 
said that the participatory artwork draws attention to participatory activity as 
well as the tangible and objective product of the activity. A work like ‘Test Site’ 
destabilises the settled status of art as a commodity or object and in doing so it 
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reconciles the artwork with its social and human origins. By allowing 
participants the opportunity to actively inhabit the work Höller challenges the 
status of his work as a product. He does this principally by not charging 
participants but he also does this by openly declaring that a significant part of 
the artwork can only surface when participatory actions are present alongside 
the artwork as an object. It can be said that he places praxis at the basis of his 
notion of what constitutes this artwork in the same way that Marx places praxis 
at the basis of his materialist philosophy. In this sense ‘Test Site’ serves as a 
restorative example of how human activity can be recombined with its 
products. It shows how other forms of praxis can integrate human activity more 




It could be said that participatory action demonstrates the interdependence 
between human activity and the artwork. You do not see the whole work if you 
view ‘Test Site’ without taking into account the participatory actions that it 
encourages, however it could equally be said that you miss the whole work if 
you only concentrate on the participatory actions. 
 
Bernstein has demonstrated how, according to Marx human activity intersects 
at a fundamental level with objectivity and how this can provide a way of re-
introducing human activity to the products of its labour. George Lukács 
captures the relationship between human activity and natural objectivity in a 
similar way. Initially he explores the possibility that human activity is 
absolutely distinct from natural objectivity because human activity has a 
purpose while nature does not have any purpose. Labour is considered to have 
clear aims like providing shelter or food, while nature is considered to lack 
these kinds of aims and only passively bears the imprint of human labour. 5. 
Lukács suggests that labour marks out the boundary where purpose may be 
said to exist. “Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature; 
he also realises his own purpose in these materials.” (Lukács, G. 1980: 3).  
 
However Lukács questions if this new form of objectivity is absolutely 
independent of the natural world. He suggests that although purpose is 
generated, nature itself is not intrinsically altered. Human labour may appear to 
place nature in an auxiliary position; the properties of the material world are 
exploited in order to create use-value. The material world can be re-arranged, 
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recombined and coupled in numerous ways to serve a purpose however the 
rules of nature remain. Nature may be indifferent to the efforts of human labour 
but it has a formidable authority in determining the outcome of human activity 
and continues to be the overwhelming background for the creation of use-
value. Quoting Hegel he describes the relationship between nature and labour: 
“’nature’s own activity, the elasticity of a watch spring, water, wind etc. are 
employed to do things that they would not have done if left to themselves, so 
that their blind action is made purposive, the opposite of itself.’ Man ‘allows 
nature to act on itself, simply looks on and controls it with a light touch’” 
(Lukács, G. 1980: 12). For Lukács human purposes simultaneously control and 
submit to nature. Purpose and nature are not easily differentiated and therefore 
he suggests that the apparent purposefulness of human activity and the 
seemingly passive state of nature are interdependent. Labour could be more 
accurately described as mediating between the intention of human purpose and 
the passivity and pervasiveness of natural objectivity.  
 
Lukács suggests that human action in the form of labour creates a new kind of 
objectivity. Labour produces purposes in the form of intentions in a natural 
environment that is devoid of these kinds of purposes. Nonetheless he argues 
that man’s ability to create purposefulness with his labour could not come 
about without the underlying principles of natural objectivity. Accordingly 
Lukács proposes that labour and natural objectivity are mutually supportive; 
the productive processes of human activity should be considered in the light of 
their material circumstances. Through labour individuals are commonly 
engaged in the material properties and objects of the world. If it accepted that 
there are resemblances between labour and human action and that parallels can 
be drawn between labour and participatory action it can be suggested that a 
participatory action must also be explained with reference to the materially 
embodied artwork that the action is inevitably connected to. In this way 
participatory action cannot be exclusively explained in terms of the ‘event’ of 
activity. To fully explain a participatory artwork the participatory action must 
be considered alongside the participatory object. In ‘Test Site’ the participatory 
actions are the waiting, the preparation, the sliding and its aftermath but there 
is also a participatory object that makes these actions possible. A series of 
images without any human figures are used on the Tate Modern web site to 
show in detail the construction and design of ‘Test Site’ (Fig. 8). The structures 
of the chutes form the stable material basis that embodies the artwork. This 
includes the material properties of the metals and plastics used in its 
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construction, the spatial properties of the Turbine Hall where it was sited and 
the natural forces of gravity and acceleration that play a part in causing each 
participant to slide down. Consequently there is interdependence between 
purposive participatory action and the objective material forces that are 





The issue of the relationship between the activity and products of labour has 
similarities to Ackrill’s explanation of action as doing and making (§ 6.2.1). 
Following Ackrill it is initially recognised that participatory action does not 
seem to be involved in the discernible fabrication of any kind of product. 
However if it is accepted that action should be seen as being both a transitory 
event and as having a tangible result then it is suggested that in doing a 
participatory action you are also contributing to the production of the notion of 
participation. Likewise according to Lukács if it is accepted that labour is an 
activity with a purpose that arises from the manipulation of underlying 
material forces then participatory action becomes an activity that takes place 
together with the objective properties of the artwork. I would therefore say that 
participatory action is an event that is oriented towards the creation of 






Although Marx and Lukács’ ideas usefully demonstrate the relationship 
between human action, the products of this action and the objective world that 
human action takes place within it should also be recognised that they are 
primarily explaining human action with reference to the making of artefacts. 
They see human activity in terms of productive work. When I was participating 
in ‘Test Site’ I was not working in any obvious way although I was paying 
closer attention to ‘Test Site’ that most others because I was there as part of my 
research. It is suggested that the type of participatory action encouraged by 
‘Test Site’ involves other factors and is not satisfactorily described as work. 
 
This problematic relationship between work and participatory action is evident 
when Joas looks at Marx’s notion of praxis. He notes how the term is primarily 
associated with a form of “object-related activity” (Joas, H. 1996: 91). Through 
praxis new artefacts are generated and ideally this kind of activity is linked to a 
fuller realisation of human potential. Joas wants to avoid restricting his 
explanation of creative human action to an association with production. He 
does this by detailing a number of Jurgen Habermas’ doubts about the use of 
praxis as the model for human action. One of Habermas’ main reservations is 
that when an explanation of human action is exclusively based on the way that 
artefacts are produced then the importance of production becomes exaggerated. 
Notions associated with production such as efficiency and utility become 
overbearing and explanations of many aspects of social life are generalised. 
Production models tend to create uniformity in the understanding of human 
action and notions like utility begin to be inappropriately applied to creative 
activity. 
 
Habermas proposes that actions are directed towards different aspects of the 
world. In his typology of action Habermas distinguishes four ways that you act 
in the world. These are “Teleological action […] Normatively regulated action […] 
Dramaturgical action [and] Communicative action […]” (Outhwaite, W. 1994: 71). 
In the first of these you treat the world as a series of things or objects that you 
may use efficiently. You accept that other people may also take this objective 
outlook and that they may also have a similar desire to use their surroundings 
efficiently. In the second of these you accept that you are part of a social group 
and consent to the standards and conduct of this group. In the third category 
actions become a way of conveying or suppressing personal desires in a way 
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that is similar to a performance. These objective, social and the personal 
groupings are all “success-oriented” (Baynes, K. 1998: 195).  
In contrast to these limited perspectives Habermas places more emphasis on 
communicative action. When communicative action is employed he claims that 
your orientation towards the need to influence others recedes. During 
communicative action the primary aim is to achieve a shared viewpoint, “[…] 
in the case of communicative action any further ends the agent may have are 
subordinated to the goal of achieving a mutually shared definition of the 
agent’s lifeworldly situation through a cooperative process of interpretation.” 
(Baynes, K. 1998: 195). In this sense a production model of action cannot be 
used to explain communicative activities like teaching, social work or artistic 
creation. These activities require collaboration and shared values and are not 
strictly about success or failure. 6.  
 
For Marx, Praxis embodies the creative potential of human action however Joas 
has reservations that praxis is too closely tied to a production model based 
around the fabrication of objects. To compensate for this he looks to Habermas’ 
‘success-oriented action’ and ‘communicative action’ to provide a broader 
description of action.  
 
Is it appropriate to take into account these kinds of considerations when 
participatory action is being examined? It could be said that if praxis is used in 
its restricted sense to describe participatory action then it fails to adequately 
explain this type of action. If praxis is associated with processes of fabrication 
then the participatory actions that are invited in ‘Test Site’ cannot be described 
because these kinds of action do not in any obvious way produce anything i.e. 
no object is fabricated. As a result I would say that the doubts that Joas has 
about the relevance of the production model in an explanation of human action 
are legitimate.  
 
Is it therefore appropriate to adopt Habermas’ typology of action in a 
consideration of participatory action? His approach does seem to resonate with 
the participatory artwork. He differentiates between actions that are motivated 
by a desire to alter the surrounding world and influence others and actions that 
are oriented towards an exchange of ideas and a shared interest in 
communication. Outhwaite describes Habermas’ position as follows: “Unlike 
the ‘cognitive-instrumental’ notion of rationality in teleological action, where 
ideas of the manipulation of, or adaptation to, an environment are central, a 
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model of rationality grounded in communication implies an option in favour of 
‘a wider concept of rationality’ oriented to ‘argumentative speech’” (Outhwaite, 
W. 1994: 70). Habermas not only distinguishes between actions that are directed 
at objects and actions that are directed towards other people, within actions that 
are directed towards other people he differentiates between actions that are 
simply geared towards more efficient relations with others and actions that 
help to establish more freedom in communication and play a role in the 
widening of discussion and debate. This notion of communicative action has 
been described as an “ideal speech situation” (Davey, N. 1998: 77).  
 
If ‘Test Site’ is considered from the perspective of Habermas’s typology of 
action then it could be said that there are aspects of the participatory actions 
that comprise the artwork such as the waiting, the preparation, the actual 
sliding and its aftermath that can described as teleological action. Participants 
could evaluate these actions in terms of their efficiency or use. How long do 
you have to wait? Does it seem safe? Are the chutes pleasant to use? In this 
sense ‘Test Site’ is being evaluated as an effective system and Höller encourages 
this kind of evaluation. “From an architectural and practical perspective the 
slides are one of the building’s means of transporting people […]” (Honoré, V. 
2006). There is also an aspect of these actions that can be described as 
normatively regulated because you participate on the basis of the consent 
provided by social groups such as the artist, the gallery authorities and the 
other participants. It could also be said that there is an aspect of dramaturgical 
action in ‘Test Site’ because by participating you are ‘performing’ your desire to 
take part. Nevertheless these are all ‘success oriented’ perspectives on 
participatory action.  
 
I would suggest that the participatory actions demonstrated in ‘Test Site’ are 
most effectively described with reference to communicative action. Such actions 
are dependent on the object of the artwork but they are not directed toward the 
production of objects or the modification of the environment. It is suggested 
that by inviting a participatory action Höller is placing action in the context of 
discussion and communication (Fig. 9a, 9b & 9c). He is encouraging 
participatory actions that can be explained in terms of ‘argumentative speech’ 
or ‘ideal speech situations’. From the standpoint of communicative action 
participation is not an attempt to influence others or a response to the attempts 
of others to influence you. As communicative action the participation of each 
individual contributes to a more informed experience of ‘Test Site’. Practical, 
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social, aesthetic and collective experiences become open for discussion through 
participatory action. 
 
   
Fig. 9a, 9b & 9c 
 
This comparison of participatory action with communicative action resembles 
the way that Elizabeth Anscombe describes intentional action as having the 
conventional properties of language (§ 4.3.2). Following Anscombe intention is 
not like a psychological emotion that appears ‘naturally’ or an inner force that 
triggers the physical aspects of action but something you rationally articulate 
like language. Intention is conventional in the same way that language is 
conventional because you tell others about your intentions and others ask you 
about your intentions. In this sense if participatory action is considered to be 
intentional action then participatory action can be described in terms of 
language. Participatory action follows rules and conventions and takes place in 
the context of communication and should not be considered in simple 
psychological and physical terms. Likewise according to Habermas the 
objective of communicative action is to augment the free exchange of ideas 
within the broad context of language and is not limited to explaining social 
organisation and material production. It can therefore be said that participatory 





The previous two chapters have shown how participatory action can be 
rationalised from an analytical perspective and how the bodily situation of the 
participant can be accounted for from a phenomenological perspective. 
Nevertheless it is suggested that a rational explanation tends to isolate 
participatory action from its surroundings and phenomenology tends to 
narrowly focus on the particular situation of each individual’s actions. From the 
present viewpoint participatory action is thought about in the context of 
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general social life. Its potential role in the social environment is considered. The 
main question of this chapter was therefore: What social values influence 
participatory action? When participatory action is contextualised within the 
diversity of the wider social world it becomes explicable in terms of social 
conventions. I would say that participatory action provides grounds to test 
some of the suppositions of these social conventions. 
 
When participatory action is associated with practical wisdom it can be 
described both as an event where participation is done and as an event that 
makes participation occur. However when participation is produced it does not 
involve special skills but takes place as an everyday action. Nevertheless while 
participatory action may be closer to everyday action rather than skilled action 
it does not only deal with immediate day-to-day affairs. I suggest that it can 
contribute to a climate of ethical enrichment. 
 
Participatory action may only involve a simple physical movement but when it 
is described in simple physical terms I suggest that this only partially explains 
what takes place. Given that it enriches ethical life I would say that 
participatory action is more fully explained in the context of social conventions. 
When participatory art is exhibited it is acknowledged that participatory action 
is often marginalised by the conventions of detachment that are prevalent in art 
institutions. I therefore suggest that the value of the ideas implied by 
participatory action can be properly judged if the notion of participation is 
established as a central rather a peripheral set of norms for your behaviour in 
the gallery. In this way participatory action is not treated as an eccentric 
digression from narrowly defined norms but as a critical presence within an art 
institution that is receptive enough to accommodate new norms. 
 
Besides a need to accommodate the norms of participatory action there is also a 
need to recognise the practical feasibility of participatory action. Participation 
can be idealised and assumptions are made about what properties should be 
included and what should be excluded from participatory action. I would say 
that the properties to be integrated into participatory action should be as 
heterogeneous as possible. Participatory action should not be rationalised to the 
extent that the diversity and ability of participants becomes restricted. When 
participatory action is considered as a participatory expression then it is 
recognised that it comes to light in a shared context. Participatory action 
mediates personal and public expression. I also suggest that the rational 
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assumptions made about collective action are not entirely suitable for 
participatory action. The rational strategies used to encourage collective action 
may be helpful as rough guidelines but could be described as manipulative. 
They tend to disregard the possibility that collective action may be based on 
unprompted feelings rather than a premeditated rationale. 
Participatory action is explored in terms of productive work and it is recognised 
that explanations of production as praxis and labour show how the social life of 
human activity can be integrated with its objects and how human activity arises 
from an objective natural world. Nonetheless it is recognised that these schemes 
of production offer a restricted explanation of participatory action. I suggest 
that the notion of communicative action supports the view that participatory 
action can be explained in a broader social context. Rather than being linked 
solely to productive work, participatory action can also be explained as 
contributing to the emancipatory potential of human communication. 
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7.0 Overall Conclusions 
 
Findings on aesthetic experience and action 
 
 
The main objective of this study was to realise new knowledge about 
participatory art by employing philosophical arguments about aesthetic 
experience and human action. Comparisons were made between representative 
participatory artworks and analytical, phenomenological and 
institutional/sociological perspectives on aesthetic experience and action. It is 
stressed that the outcomes of these comparisons should be judged on how they 
contribute to a fuller understanding of participatory art and their success in 
explaining the qualities of a participant’s experience in participatory art, not 
solely on their success in explaining the philosophy associated with aesthetic 
experience and action. I would say that these comparisons have demonstrated 
that participatory action changes the conditions in which aesthetic experience 
arises. 
 
At the start of this study it was proposed that aesthetic experience is just one 
experience among the many experiences that are available in participatory art. 
A description of aesthetic experience does not lead to an exhaustive description 
of the experience of art. It was recognised that cognition, interpretation and 
background knowledge come to the fore with the introduction of participatory 
action while the perceptual experience associated with modernist aesthetics 
becomes less influential. It was shown that the disinterested perceptual 
experience favoured by modernist aesthetics stands in extreme opposition to 
the social order and instrumental reality. As a result participatory art is not 
satisfactorily explained with reference to modernist aesthetics because it 
actively involves elements of the social order and instrumental reality. It was 
also proposed that participatory art leads to actions that do not resemble 
‘artistic labour’ but are ‘ordinary’ actions and that these ‘ordinary’ actions are 
‘transdisciplinary’. 
 
When the findings of the chapters on aesthetic experience are taken as a whole 
it is suggested that a central theme demonstrating the role of participatory 
action in changing the conditions for aesthetic experience emerges. From an 
analytical, phenomenological and institutional perspective it is argued that 
participatory action goes beyond the stability of modernist aesthetics to 
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embrace other orders of engagement. The ‘ordinariness’ and 
‘transdisciplinarity’ of participatory action opens up a medial space of observable 
behaviour in the encounter with participatory art. Participatory action introduces 
a measure of interconnectedness in the encounter with participatory art where 
the participant is able to recognise that inner experiences, aesthetic experiences 
and cognitive experiences coincide with outer experiences, ordinary 
experiences and bodily experiences. Participatory action intervenes to show 
how your encounter with participatory art can be cognitive rather than 
perceptual, interpretative rather than experiential, durational rather than 
immediate and diachronic rather than synchronic. 
 
From an analytical perspective the medial space introduced by participatory 
action integrates aesthetic experience with practical and social experience. 
Aesthetic experience becomes receptive rather than isolated from other 
experiences. From a phenomenological perspective the medial space introduced 
by participatory action restores some bodily directness to aesthetic experience. 
Participatory action mediates an everydayness that extends beyond the 
discipline of aesthetics. This brings to light the circumstances shared by 
ordinary experience and aesthetic experience. From an institutional viewpoint 
the medial space introduced by participatory action puts the purity of the 
artistic competence that is customarily linked to aesthetic experience to the test. 
Participatory action brings everyday social and practical conventions to the 
surface. 
 
When the findings of the chapters on human action are taken as a whole it is 
suggested that a central role for participatory action becomes clear. When the 
philosophy of action is used to explain participatory art then the division 
between psychological meaning and physical behaviour is not so clear-cut. 
From a rational, phenomenological and social perspective it is argued that it is 
inappropriate to reduce participatory action to plain physical movement. From 
a rational perspective naturalistic or physiological explanations of action 
inappropriately reduce participatory action to a sequence of physical events. 
Instead the equally significant context of reason and the conventions of 
language should be included in the account. The phenomenological perspective 
on participatory action has similar concerns. From this perspective an entirely 
objective account of human action is considered to be a misrepresentation of the 
full scope of action. Intentional states and bodily experience should be included 
in this account. Likewise from a social perspective naturalistic accounts of 
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participatory action overlook the diverse social conventions, customs and 
policies that are inexorably bound up with participatory action.  
 
Findings on action that support findings on aesthetic experience  
 
When the study is taken as a whole then a number of the findings on the role of 
aesthetic experience are supported by some of the findings on action. 
 
In the analytical account of aesthetic experience a broad range of corporeal, 
ethical, intellectual and emotional attitudes is considered to be appropriate in 
an explanation of participatory art rather than a particular aesthetic attitude (§ 
1.4.2). I would say that participatory art encourages an experience of art that 
has a degree of continuity with ordinary experience because ordinary 
experience involves a similarly broad range of attitudes. This is supported by 
the sociological account of participatory action (§ 6.2.1). In this account action is 
closer to practical wisdom and the broad context of everyday action rather than 
the specific competence required by craft skills. 
 
Participatory action displays how the directness of ‘the body’ cuts across the 
discipline of aesthetics. This is shown in the phenomenological account of 
aesthetic experience where the bodily senses used by participatory action must 
be factored in alongside the ‘higher’ visual and aural senses (§ 2.2). This claim is 
supported by the phenomenological account of participatory action where the 
association between the participant and the artwork is described as a ‘unified 
state of being’ (§ 5.3). Through participatory action the disembodied participant 
is reconnected to his or her bodily situation and the situation of the artwork. 
 
When the change to aesthetic experience is understood as a change to the rules 
of the art institution then I propose that the socially mediated effects of 
participatory art come to the fore. Just as an experience of participatory art 
becomes less exclusive and more able to include the heterogeneity of ordinary 
experience the rules of participatory art rely less on the specific rules of the art 
institution and begin to incorporate the extemporaneous qualities of the rules 
used in ordinary social life. These socially mediated effects question the role of 
agents in the artistic field, the role expression and the privacy of intention. 
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In the institutional account of aesthetic experience participatory action creates 
some ambiguity about the distinction between artist and audience and this 
provides grounds for questions about how these roles are distinguished in the 
art institution. The doubt cast on the distinct role of artist and participant 
highlights how these roles can be publicly negotiated. You no longer privately 
experience the ‘world’ of the artist as a distant viewer but publicly participate 
in a ‘world’ that you share with the artist and other participants (§ 3.4.2). 
 
The social milieu of participatory action is demonstrated when the sociological 
account of action as an expression is taken into account. From this point of view 
participatory action is not simply an event that shows your inner purposes or a 
demonstration of an intention that is fully formed prior to an action. 
Participatory actions are ‘in the open’ and this highlights the publicly mediated 
aspects of participation (§ 6.3.4). 
 
The social context of participatory action is also shown when the analytical 
account of intention is taken into account (§ 4.3.2, 4.3.4). To an extent both artist 
and participant forgo their personal intentions in participatory art because your 
participatory actions are on view and your intentions can be a subject of 




At the start of this study it could be said that human actions could be 
adequately described as simple movements of the body. On the basis of the 
main findings of this study I propose that physiological explanations of 
participatory action can be improved by attending to the influence of reason 
and language, an awareness of intentionality and receptiveness to social 
convention. I also proposed that participatory action transforms the conditions 
of aesthetic experience in participatory art. On the basis of the main findings of 
this study I suggest that participatory action opens up a medial space of observable 
behaviour. This medial space makes the experience of art more inclusive by 
allowing other kinds of more commonplace experiences to play a role. Parity is 
created between aesthetic experience and corporeal, ethical, intellectual and 
emotional experiences. The practicality of participatory action situates everyday 
experience at the heart of participatory art. The directness of participatory 
action couples ordinary experience with aesthetic experience by going beyond 
the discipline of aesthetics and embracing other orders of engagement. Finally 
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participatory action makes the experience of art discernable. In this respect it 
acts like a catalyst allowing participants to play out the rules of the art 






Renascent Scission:         Participatory art research by Chris Wallace. 
Wed. 18th April 2007 From 10am.      Sculpture Dept. Project Room. 
 
This is a flyer for ‘Renascent Scission’. This was a participatory art research 
pilot study that lasted for a day. It took place at Gray’s School of Art in the 
Sculpture Department Project Room. The phrase ‘Renascent Scission’ derives 
from Paul Ricoeur: “I am one only in a constantly repeated conquest of the 
renascent scission” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: 297). The phrase means ‘reborn cut’ and is 
used as a metaphor by Ricoeur to describe freewill. During this work a large 
sheet of yellow cotton was laid on a table. A sewing machine was set up on the 
corner of the table, a pair of scissors hung from a nail on a wall and various 
pins, needles and thread were available. When potential participants entered 
the space I was present and I would describe to them some provisional 
requirements for participation. Initially I suggested that as a participant you 
were invited to cut the fabric in two and you were then free to sew it back 
together again yourself or you could ask me to sew it back together again. 
Initially participants simply joined the pieces together but as the day 
progressed new approaches appeared.  
 
The entire day was documented using a static DV camera on five hours of tape. 
The ‘cuts’ of each participant were edited together into a chronological visual 
track and a few ‘laying out’ sequences were retained to give some continuity. 
The most relevant sequences of discussion were then edited together on a 
separate audio track and the two tracks were brought together to create a short 
movie of around fifteen minutes. There is a transcript of the movie in Appendix 
II and a DVD of the movie in a pocket at the back of this thesis. 
 
The main intention of this practical work was to generate informal discussion 
around issues associated with participatory art and to show how art students 
relate to these issues. Consequently the document of ‘Renascent Scission’ 
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should be seen as offering additional support to proposals made about 




Transcript of ‘Renascent Scission’ 
 
Chris Wallace is in italics. 
 
Audio I 
Are different skills required from an artist? 
Could be ... that’s a good point. 
Communicative skills for a start. 
It’s taking away the idea of creativity being some kind of inner psychological state, and 
more like … a more open thing where you discuss what’s going to happen, or there’s a 
possibility of discussing it or changing what’s going to happen, I mean that erm … 
So therefore the aesthetics would change would they? 
How you would judge a piece of work can’t be by the traditional methods then. 
That’s true. 
The aesthetic changes and you relate aesthetics to other kinds of experience as well. So 
you talk about social experience or practical experience … 
Oh Right …  
As well as aesthetic experience alongside … 
The way you assess a painting … 
That’s what I mean … 
You don’t assess it in terms of social experience because the tendency is to exclude social 
experience when you’re in a gallery. You want to experience the thing on its own, on 
your own and you imagine it to be in a kind of pure way without having any influences 
about … influences by … what you might know about the artist or what movement he 
may appear from. You try to experience it in a direct, pure way … and that would be 
traditionally how you define aesthetic experience or the aesthetic.  
But the artist would still be at the core of all that but here you might not be. It 
could be the viewer or the participant who becomes the centre of the piece 
rather than the artist so you’re moving away from all that as well aren’t you? 
These things begin to become separated. So the artist and the participant/viewer become 
separated but at the same time they begin to overlap … 
Well yeah … 
The viewer/participant you are inviting in to interfere if you like with your 
work … It’s not really normal in a gallery is it? 
It’s not interfere … 
Well no it’s not interfere … 
Because the basis of the work isn’t about me its about at least two people so in that sense 
it teases apart the idea of the artist or the author and the viewer but brings them 
together as well. 
It’s a different relationship then. 
And that ties into the idea of the ‘Renascent Scission’. It takes it apart, it cuts the thing 




No ,no ,no ,no ,no, no, no ,no! 
I think this is interesting. Standing here thinking is he going to finish that? 
Should I finish it for him? I find myself conversing about slowing down things. 
I was thinking ‘Is he doing this deliberately?’ and it’s really weird when you’re 
standing with nothing to do and the anticipation of waiting to do something. 
Well that’s interesting. 
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I thought it was really interesting when you were cutting the cloth (gestures to 
other participant) and every two seconds looking up to see what you are saying 
and she’s finished cutting and its … stands back and ‘What do I do next?’ It’s 
not really a free thing, she’s still waiting for you. You are still in charge. Even 
though you are trying to back off from it. And then saying you don’t have to 
finish it, you don’t have to do this sewing, I’ll do it for you. I think your quite 
quick to offer to join in but are you … when you say do a cut an do a sew are 
you ideally looking for the person to complete both parts or are you looking for 
them to do one part and for you to do the other?  
I think that’s an option I hadn’t thought of. There’s the possibility of someone cutting 
and completing the cut themselves. Bringing it back together again, or there’s the 
possibility of me doing the cut and joining the cutting or there is the default which is 
the participant doing the cut and me doing the combination. So there is those three 
options I suppose. 
 
Audio III 
The activity itself has to be really non-threatening. 
That’s the most important thing. It can’t be something that involves a special degree of 
skill. 
Yes. 
I mean this involves a certain amount of skill. 
It puts me off. 
Well it is easy. 
Well skill is maybe the wrong word it has to have some accessibility. 
Oh yes and hominess I think, something everyday, something associated 
straightaway, that they’ve seen, done … almost kitsch the activity, do you 
think? 
Kitsch works as well because kitsch is something people identify with 
straightaway don’t they? 
I think something recognisable and familiar is a good starting point. 
 
Audio IV 
That’s it, there is truth and very … and real, reality about this kind of work. Its 
kind of like reality because its real, it’s real people, it’s in the now, it’s here, it’s 
not … you know … it’s actually happening. Which I like … and recording … us 
… isn’t it? 
Yes. 
I like that very much. 
 
Audio V 
One of the papers that interviewed me said what part of the work is to see how 
people deal with it because the nature of most people who come across strange 
things is to destroy them. 
Yes. 
Or to alter them. 
Yes. 
Well there is the destruction part where you can kick a sculpture apart or you 
can add to it … the constructive part … but its still sabotage, but in a 
constructive way. 
So your fixing … 
But that’s what you are inviting people to do … kick your thing or change it. 
Yes. In a way you’d say that the work is at fault if it can’t withstand that kind of … in a 
way you’d say it has to be able to withstand these kind of potential areas like sabotage. 
It’s context … where it is actually sitting … if it’s in a white space then you do 
need to ask permission but if it’s in a forest or floating around the street or 
something like that it becomes public domain. 
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Clearly if it was in a forest and I wasn’t there it would be insane … to have a table and 
a sewing machine … the work wouldn’t happen … it would be too disparate, it would 




It is interesting finding out about your audience whether you get some overtly 
outrageous person coming in and showing off who wants to break those rules 
but its saying more about them than it does about the art. 
The likelihood is that your more likely to … if your going to talk about where you do it 
… and this is what we were talking about earlier … we don’t represent the public 
because we are all involved in art to greater or lesser degree we are all studying art or 
are artists. 
Mary had done a performance last Thursday and it’s amazing how incredulous 
how most of the people were that you encountered. 
Well I did it at the art school because there was an audience here and if I had 
left it any later … and I didn’t want to do it at Sainsburys as somebody 
suggested because I hadn’t done it at all before so I wanted to start somewhere 
were I was safe. 
 
Audio VII 
I think if someone’s filming you that gives you credence, if you’re there without 
a camera-man you could fall into the edge of madness and people start to shun 
you. 
We noticed that with your thing didn’t we? As soon as the people saw the 
camera they sort of then looked for the performance and that meant that people 
understood what was going on but the figure walking by itself was ‘witched’. 
I think it distances you though doesn’t it if there is a camera there with a piece 
like that where somebody is dressed up or whatever because that could interact 
then with it sometimes the camera stops people interacting the same because 
that is kind of why the performance is … 
 
Audio VIII 
It is interesting how each slice becomes entangled with the next slice and 
someone’s work becomes part of someone else’s work. Would there be any way 
apart from videoing it or documenting it … a participant saying this was my 
bit. 
You could draw round each time on the table. 
Because obviously I could say … 
This worked nicely. 
It just got sliced each time no one would actually know which bit they did or 
does that … that doesn’t matter to you does it? 
Not so much no. 
It’s collective behaviour which matters … the basis of this is a collective act rather than 
saying below the collective act there is an individual act … I think its best to start with 
the collective act. Although … the likes of yourself you are quite skilled, you are a 
craftsperson (to participant) …  
Well I showed off too. 
In comparison to most people. 
To allow your craft to blend into some of the inadequacies of some of my sewing … here 
you can see it. That’s another issue so as an artist or as a craftsperson you might think 
well, I’m not so comfortable with the juxtaposition of my skills with someone with lesser 
skills … 
Audio IX 
A point about the interaction thing … the little rules that get set up … I was 
thinking about the ‘Sensation’ exhibition. Two incidents: Damien Hirst had the 
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sheep in formaldehyde and somebody put black ink into it and renamed it, 
actually changed the title to ‘Black Sheep’ which at the time I thought was quiet 
funny. It was called vandalism but in a way there was a nice bit of interaction 
there … it wasn’t in the right place. And the other one was the Myra Hindley 
portrait which again had ink thrown at it. The exhibition was called ‘Sensation’, 
it was a very provocative exhibition and somebody was moved to such 
provocation … I have them in the back of my mind … the times when artists 
were very upset about interaction and now we are starting to invite people, we 
are trying to engage the audience more and get then to join in with us, but there 
have been times when the audience has had its hand smacked very hard. 
 
Audio X 
If people don’t know the rules then they might fall foul without meaning to. 




I’m not sure how much time you should spend looking at it because it’s like just a part 
of this really … 
Its important the laying out afterwards. 
It seems to be now. 
Because each person is looking … like the next person that comes to the work 
they are coming to it fresh so they are going to have to see it … its new to them, 
the next person. You know its new every time. 
So I have got a responsibility to … I’ve got to create some continuity between … if 
someone comes after you I’ve got to create some continuity or … 
Or do you? 
Do they come to it as fresh as the plain one in the morning?    
It is like when I mentioned earlier, It’s like joining in a conversation that has already 
begun. If you arrive in café or a pub after your friends are already there it takes a while 
to understand what they are discussing … or what the joke is, or whatever and this is a 
bit like that too I think. That’s what a dialogue is already ongoing and you arrive at it 
and you think well ‘what’s this?’ So I think my responsibility is to try and explain. The 
only thing that I can do is … unless you want something different to happen … I’m 

























During this study I delivered papers at three conferences: 
 
Action and The Open Work delivered at ‘Beauty’s appeal in the Transformation of 
Standards for Valuation‘. The 10th annual conference of the International 
Society of Phenomenology, Fine Arts and Aesthetics at Harvard Divinity School 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. May 27th and 28th. 2005. 
 
Action, Sensation and Intentionality in Physically Interactive Artworks delivered at 
‘Moving Forward‘. The 3rd College of Arts and Social Sciences Postgraduate 
Conference at The University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen. June 28th and 29th. 2006. 
 
Action, Sensation and Intentionality in Physically Interactive Artworks delivered at 
‘Art and the Senses‘. The 7th Student Summer Symposium at Sainsbury Centre 
for Visual Arts, University of East Anglia, Norwich. July 20th and 21st. 2006. 
 
Action and The Open Work was published in: A.T. TYMIENIECKA. Chief ed. 
2008. Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research. Volume 
XCVII. Dordrecht: Springer. pp 239 - 262. A copy can be found in a pocket at the 








1. Paul Ricoeur supports this method of validating an interpretation of an 
artwork. He proposes that the way that artworks can be interpreted is similar to 
the way that texts are interpreted. He suggests that when reading a text you 
engage in a reciprocal procedure of understanding and explanation. (Ricoeur, P. 
1998: 213) In the first procedure you may intuitively understand what a text is 
about but you have to substantiate your personal perspective in order to 
communicate it to others. In the second procedure you may explain a text as a 
system of rules and signs but in order to understand it you need to have a sense 
of what it may mean. When you interpret an artwork there is an exchange 




1. Collinson summarises the numerous supporters of the aesthetic attitude 
theory. Aristotle claimed that you adopt an attitude of stasis. In an aesthetic 
experience you have no direct appetite or desire for the object of experience. 
Arthur Schopenhauer advocated a kind of will-lessness. In ordinary experience 
you have motives and purposes. In aesthetic experience you see behind this to a 
more fundamental reality. Emmanuel Kant suggested that you inhabit a state of 
disinterestedness. In aesthetic experience you detach yourself from any bias or 
inclination that an object may offer you. You try to consider it on its own merits. 
Edward Bullough pointed to a theory of distance. In aesthetic experience you 
separate yourself from a practical concern with the object of experience. You 
insert a distance between yourself and actuality to create a new inner 
perspective. 
 
2. A phenomenological account would question attempts to isolate the aesthetic 
properties of an object from the aesthetic experience of that object. For the 
phenomenologist an aesthetic property is not an objective property of 
experience in the way that height is an objective property of a tree. You do not 
observe the aesthetic properties of artworks in the way that you may evaluate 
the height of a tree. There is no clear way to test the reliability of the experience. 
A phenomenological account emphasises the privacy of the experience. There is 
an aspect of aesthetic experience that “unlike seeing or knowing of a genuinely 
epistemic kind, is entirely accessible introspectively” (Iseminger, G. 2003: 103). 
On the other hand the epistemic perspective favours a more public and 
evidence-based conception of aesthetic experience. From this perspective it is 
the objective properties of an artwork that cause verifiable perceptions. These 
then lead to aesthetic experiences. The important epistemic point is that the 
aesthetic experience is differentiated from other experiences through its 
reference to an external object.  
 
3. In the realist account the aesthetic facts of a thing are captured by perception. 
This perception provides the experience with “aesthetic representational content” 
(Zangwill, N. 2003: 64). Therefore a realist accepts that there are actual aesthetic 
properties in the world. These are perceived and in doing this they are 
represented by you. This representation then provides you with content. It is 
this content that embodies aesthetic experience. In the non-realist account of 
aesthetic experience the suggestion is that aesthetic experience emerges from 
the adoption of a viewpoint. Such accounts tend not to accept that aesthetic 
properties really exist in the world. The question that is frequently asked is: If 
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such properties do objectively exist then why is it so difficult to clearly judge 
what is aesthetic? Consequently for the non-realist there is a sense that your 
viewpoint has to be regulated because if there are no objective aesthetic facts 
then you have to be certain that you are adopting the ‘correct’ attitude in order 
to sort out what is and what is not aesthetic. 
 
4. To clarify this it could be asked what ‘interested awareness’ might be. This 
would be a situation where a viewer does consider the relationship an artwork 
has to external associations. You may be looking at a painting of a landscape 
where you grew up. This may cause you to think about memories associated 
with the image. Another viewer who has no biographical connection with the 
landscape would tend not to have these sorts of memories and would instead 
treat the painting on its own merits. In the first case the viewer is ‘interested’ in 
the second the viewer is ‘disinterested’.   
 
5. Beardsley parallels art with the situation found in law. You are presumed 
innocent until proven guilty; the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. 
Within the context of a trial the convention of presumed innocence cannot be 
questioned. Beardsley then uses this line of reasoning to establish firmer 
grounds for the argument about the supposed intrinsic value of aesthetic 
experience. For Beardsley the intrinsic value of aesthetic experience cannot 
simply be justified ‘for its own sake’. It is more like the presumption of 
innocence. Its intrinsic value is accepted until evidence can be provided of a 
conflict with other values. Art needs no justification as long as there are no 
reasons against it existing. Until some other proof crops up that time would be 




1. Hermeneutics is a discipline that emerged from the study of religious and 
legal texts and conventionally offers guidance in the accurate reading of texts. 
 
2. On these grounds Nietzsche claims that science cannot offer any remedy to the 
metaphysical situation. If the underlying reality is in ‘becoming’ and history is 
ultimately cyclic then all scientific advances are an illusion. Scientific progress 
may offer some optimism because it rises to the challenge of the ultimate 
impermanence of reality but it is not a method of escape and it cannot ‘correct’ 
this underlying reality. For this reason the early Nietzsche rejects science in 
favour of art because if science is believed in then you close your eyes to the 
reality of the inexorable collapse of the order that has been imposed. You are 
“entirely unprepared” (Young, J. 1992: 41). According to Nietzsche art is more 
truthful because the artist accepts the underlying impermanence of reality from 
the outset. The artist does not hope to amend reality but begins with the 
recognition of inevitability of this state of affairs. The challenge that the artist 
must rise to therefore differs from the scientist. While the scientist optimistically 
hopes that scientific advances can remedy man’s metaphysical situation, the 
artist has to summon a belief in creative action knowing the distressing truth of 
things. 
 
3. Two key terms in Nietzsche’s philosophy of art are the terms ‘Apollonian’ and 
‘Dionysian’. Generally it could be said that these terms are used to describe 
different kinds of mental state. When considered in relation to art then they 
describe the mental state that an artist may experience while making an 
artwork or the mental state that a viewer may experience while considering an 
artwork. Nietzsche draws on the Greek myth of Apollo and uses some of the 
myth’s principal characteristics to describe an ‘Apollonian’ mental state of 
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orderliness. Apollo is principally seen as the ‘sun god’: “In his wisdom is seen 
the searching light from which nothing is hidden” (Jobes, G. 1961: 110). In 
ordinary experience Apollo is associated with a moderate temperament. This 
temperament is connected to numerous other characteristics such as a desire to 
clearly distinguish things, to recognise limits, to seek civil values and to be 
reasonable. In the experience of art Apollo is associated with the kind of 
transformation that may occur when sunlight is at its extreme. For example 
sunsets or evening sunlight can enhance the appearance of things in such a way 
that appearances have the quality of a dream. Apollonian art is an elevation or 
improvement on the appearance of the ordinary world and experience of such 
art leads to states of “entrancement” (Schacht, R. 1995: 495). Nietzsche refers to 
the Greek myth of Dionysus and again uses some of the myth’s aspects to 
describe a ‘Dionysian’ mental state that in many respects is the opposite of the 
‘Apollonian’ state. Dionysus is associated with the changes inherent in natural 
phenomena: “he embodies the life of nature as it comes and goes with the 
seasons” (Jobes, G. 1961: 447). Dionysus is also associated with extraordinary 
kinds of experience linked to intense excitement or intoxication. Historically 
Dionysus and the states he is associated with are related to rituals to celebrate 
the renewal of springtime. “The ritual consisted of dances and songs designed 
to magically stimulate the growth of plant life” (Jobes, G. 1961: 449). Young 
points out that in such states participants pierce the habitual illusion of 
ordinary experience to reveal themselves to be part of a, in Nietzsche’s words 
“primordial unity” (Young, J. 1992: 34). In the experience of Dionysian art it is 
claimed that a loss of the sense of self is experienced. Individuality is absorbed 
into a more fundamentally fused reality. 
 
4. Gadamer aims to associate art with a more objective kind of knowledge by 
questioning the explicit subjectivity of traditional aesthetic theories connected 
to Kant’s ‘Critique of aesthetic judgment’. He wants to show that there is a way 
of looking at knowledge that the ‘human sciences’ can claim as their own 
without having to stand in the shadows of the natural sciences. By questioning 
the subjective nature of aesthetic theory and by trying to reconnect art to a more 
objective form of knowledge Gadamer is favouring hermeneutics over 
aesthetics. Gadamer himself asserts: “Aesthetics has to be absorbed into 
hermeneutics” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 157). Gadamer describes how Kant 
developed an aesthetic theory that secured a certain amount of independence 
for aesthetics. This helped to legitimise the study of art but with this 
independence came a dislocation between art and knowledge. For Gadamer, 
Kant’s descriptions of the judgements made about art involve a “radical 
subjectivization” (Gadamer, H.G. 1975: 36). Judgements about art came to be 
associated with an introspective ‘play of the imagination and understanding’. 
Aesthetics was linked to subjective knowledge that could not be demonstrated. 
From this time onwards knowledge linked to aesthetic judgement became 
increasingly marginalised as the more verifiable knowledge of the natural 
sciences began to dominate. Gadamer explains that the diminishing influence of 
aesthetic judgement caused by this marginalisation resulted in the ‘human 
sciences’ being obliged to always define themselves in relation to the natural 
sciences. The verification of the natural sciences became the most legitimate 
source of knowledge and the ‘subjective’ knowledge of aesthetics ceased to 




1. Peter Burger describes Dada, Constructivism and Surrealism as the ‘historical 
avant-garde’; he contrasts these historical movements with art that came later 
and is influenced by this period describing it as the ‘neo-avant-garde’. Burger is 
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extremely pessimistic about the potential criticality any neo-avant-garde art 
may have. For him all post-war art is a degraded repetition of the more genuine 
innovations of the historical avant-garde. Horowitz characterises the neo-avant-
garde: “the more stylish the subversion, the more obvious its claim to enter the 
institution and, thus, the more effective it is in legitimating the institution” 
(Horowitz, G. 2003: 756). Burger dismisses this art because the original critical 
value that it may have had has come to be expected by its audience. In this way 
neo-avant-garde art aestheticises the avant-garde. He highlights how the 
institution of art confiscates the dissenting impetus of avant-garde art and uses 
it to immunize itself against the risk of criticism. For Burger the neo-avant-
garde is now the dominant force and represents the status quo in contemporary 
art.  
 
Hal Foster challenges Burger’s description of contemporary critical art as an 
inauthentic ‘neo-avant-garde’. Foster suggests that Burger idealises earlier art 
movements giving them a “pristine authenticity” (Foster, H. 1996: 11) pointing 
out that Burger adopts a straightforward causal conception of history. The 
earlier art movements caused the original disruption and all later critical art 
derives from this starting point but only as an effect. It simply follows 
afterwards. In place of this description Foster suggests “a temporal exchange 
between historical and neo-avant-gardes, a complex relation of anticipation and 
reconstruction” (Foster, H. 1996: 11). Foster does not understand the situation as 
containing an authentic before and a repetitious after; he sees a dialogue 
between the two historical points.      
 
When he suggests that there is a connection rather than a split between these 
two historical situations Foster is suggesting that though a lot of contemporary 
art terminates the avant-garde project there are some manifestations that are a 
more advanced development of the project. In its entirety contemporary art is 
not all just a chic subversion that reinforces the institutional conditions under 
which it is produced. This more advanced development of the project is 
characterised by the way in which it broadens the possibilities for critique. 
Foster proposes that the historical avant-garde while exposing the conventions 
of the artwork did not effectively tackle the problem of the art institution. He 
suggests that the problem of the art institution is not adequately addressed 
until the advent of the neo-avant-garde art. Foster therefore distinguishes 
between neo-avant-garde art that addresses its institutional status and neo-
avant-garde art that does not and proposes that the former category of artwork 
is more advanced and worthy of being compared to the original avant-garde. 
He summarises his response to Burger’s pessimism about the post-war neo-
avant-garde: “(1) The institution of art is grasped as such not with the historical 
avant-garde but with the neo-avant-garde. (2) The neo-avant-garde at its best 
addresses this institution with a creative analysis at once specific and 
deconstructive (not a nihilistic attack at once abstract and anarchistic, as often 
with the historical avant-garde); and (3) rather than cancel the historical avant-
garde, the neo-avant-garde enacts its project for the first time – a first time that 
again is theoretically endless.” (Foster, H. 1996: 20).  
 
2. Peter Burger describes the development of aestheticism in the mid nineteenth 
century as a point where advanced art no longer attempted to make direct 
connections with the wider values of ordinary life. Aestheticism protested 
against the oppressiveness of these wider values by absolutely denying them. 
In this sense the aesthetic movement indirectly commented on the values of 




3. For Burger art appears to be separate from the rest of life as a result of the 
influence of numerous social forces throughout the nineteenth century. Among 
other things art’s maintenance of the craft mode of production; the 
transformation of the artwork into a rare commodity and a new kind of 
bourgeois individualism gains legitimacy. Such factors have a determining role 
in allowing art to be independent from the utility, efficiency and 
competitiveness of day-to-day life. 
 
4. In his discussion of the artistic field, Bourdieu takes Duchamp’s galvanised 
iron bottle dryer readymade “Bottle Dryer” (1914) as an example. He asks: 
What makes this an artwork? It is an ordinary thing but it has somehow 
acquired a supernatural status. He suggests that Duchamp’s signature on the 
bottle dryer gives it a special status. But what makes this signature so endowed 
with transformative power? He claims that all the power of the autograph rests 
on its direct connection to Duchamp the master artist. It could then be asked 
what qualities mark out Duchamp as a master when all he has done is sign an 
ordinary object? One explanation may be that his status as a master rests on the 
notoriety of previous artistic risks he took. Again similar questions could be 
raised ad infinitum about these exploits. 
 
5. According to Bourriaud the historical avant-garde presented far-reaching new 
programmes for living, and imagined future modernist utopias. He claims that 
current practitioners have ambitions that are informed by these aspirations, but 
now that these experiments have passed into history, they can be seen in 
relation to the dominant cultural forces that have emerged since. He insists that 
the efforts of the historical avant-garde should not be disregarded but hints that 
their out-and-out idealism should be tempered. Instead of being placated with 
imaginary utopias the relational artwork should be directed to “learning to 
inhabit the world in a better way” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 13). In this way more 
flexible and contingent models should be used as strategies for artistic practice. 
He suggests “cultural do-it-yourself and recycling” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 14). 
 
6. An ‘interstice’ is usually understood to be a space that occurs between things, 
like gaps in paving stones. Bourriaud, however, refers to a definition of 
‘interstice’ used by Marx. Under Marx’s terminology an interstice has similar 
characteristics - it is ‘in-between’ things – but it is ‘in-between’ the main modes 
and forces of production. It is a special area where the rules of capital are 
substituted by other rules like barter, charity, self-sufficiency or even despotic 
rule. Bourriaud proposes that the space of the relational artwork has similarities 
to these kinds of communities. 
 
7. As a consequence of the influence of media such as photography, television 
and computing and as a result of experiments in recent art practice Bourriaud 
suggests that artists and audiences have a different understanding of form. The 
informed individual is now more readily able to associate groups of widely 
divergent phenomena from many different fields. In this sense he proposes that 
form should not be considered as a stable relationship between perceptible 
elements of a medium such as colour, line etc. Instead it should be considered 
as a volatile coming together of “an artistic proposition with other formations, 
artistic or otherwise” (Bourriaud, N. 2002: 21). 
 
8. The potential meaning, purpose, quality, institutional context and the methods 
used to invite participatory action should take into account the work as a 
whole. It could be said that this argument is at odds with how participatory 
action is analytically and phenomenologically explored in this project (§ 4.0, 
5.0). During these discussions action is isolated from its broad context and 
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explained rationally and with reference to bodily experience. The way that a 
rational or bodily experienced action integrates with a wider social framework 
is set aside in order to reach some analytical or phenomenological outcomes. It 
is therefore acknowledged that in light of the argument against a neutral view 
of participation that the outcomes of these discussions should bear in mind that 
participatory action takes place in a participatory artwork as a whole. While 
participatory action is a primary focus of this project it is also recognised that 





1. This means that they can be more or less explained from the viewpoint of the 
natural sciences in terms of the biology or chemistry of the brain. This neural 
activity is then able to cause an appropriate nerve firing that causes an 
appropriate muscle movement that causes an appropriate action. In these kinds 
of causal explanations of action it is suggested that the discussion is once more 
breaking away from how action is ordinarily considered. Actions are usually 
thought of as involving some kind of observable bodily movement but the 
causal explanation seems to be diverting attention to other kinds of issues. A 
‘chain’ of spatially extended movement inside the body is now being 
considered. Where is the event of action located now? At muscle movement or 
the firing of nerve ends? In a description of an arm movement George Wilson 
summarises the situation, “Some philosophers have favoured the overt arm 
movement the agent performs, some favour the extended causal process he 
initiates and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 
‘generates’ the rest.” (Wilson, G. 2002: 5). The bodily movement, the 
intermediate causal chain of nerve firings and the early brain activity of ‘trying’ 
in the action of moving an arm can be causally explained as physical events. 
However when the natural sciences are entirely relied on to explain actions it 
can be argued that the natural scientist is turning his or her back on the person 
who may be experiencing all this brain activity, firing of nerves and bodily 
movement. There is a sense in which an analysis of the physical events that 
constitute an action is being focused on too closely at the expense of the human 
subject who may be directly experiencing these actions. How does the inner self 
who is generating the reason for the action fit into this explanation? 
 
2. He compares this detached sense of action with an imaginary situation. He 
conceives of a drawing machine that you control by a series of levers. You may 
sit behind the machine and pull its levers and these cause a pencil to move 
across the paper. He asks whether this is perhaps an appropriate metaphor for 
describing your actions. Do you sit behind your actions in this way and decide 
which levers to pull in order to bring about the desired effect? Wittgenstein 
argues that the drawing machine metaphor is false and suggests that the 
conception of a will that operates separately from an action is also false. If it is 
accepted that actions do function like the drawing machine then it has to be 
accepted that behind the drawing machine choices have to be made, “there is 
such a thing as deciding which one we were going to pull before pulling it” 
(Wittgenstein, L. 1958: 153). 
 
3. If it starts raining and you start to go upstairs. Someone may ask ‘Why are 
you going upstairs?’ You may reply, ‘It’s raining’. You may be the only one 
who knows about the open skylight upstairs that will let in the rain. There are 




4. Davidson defends the usefulness of including causal relations in explanations 
of action. He focuses on the use of the word ‘because’ when it is used to explain 
a reason for an action. It is the bond between reason and action. In a similar 
way to Anscombe he describes the way you use reason to explain your actions 
as something more diffuse than the way you use causality to explain events. 
Reason offers a “pattern of justification” (Davidson, D. 1963: 9) whereas 
causality gives a harsh ‘cause and effect’. In giving the reasons for actions you 
re-describe events and include other factors like beliefs, history, social 
situations etc. However Davidson is not so willing to surrender the clarity of 
cause and effect to a vague configuration with an uncertain outline. A main 
argument against the causal explanation claims that if causality is used to 
explain action then attention has to be paid to the rule of cause and effect and 
this means that there should be a clear cut distinction between cause and effect. 
“Causation: The relationship between two events or states of affairs such as the 
first brings about the second” (Flew, A. 1984: 58). This means that if a reason is 
described as the cause of an action then the reason must be separate from the 
action. It can be argued that a re-description of an action is not a separation of 
reason from action. In explanations of action a link is usually made between 
reasons for doing an action and the action itself so the distinction is not so 
evident. In this way it can be argued that a reason is not a cause. Nevertheless if 
it is accepted that in a re-description of action, a reason becomes mixed up with 
the action in some uncertain manner and in unscrambling this relation a pattern 
is produced that is different from cause and effect then Davidson declares “that 
pattern must be identified” (Davidson, D. 1963: 10). If a reason does not cause 
an action he wants to know in what other manner are reason and action related. 
Davidson questions the use of terms like ‘pattern’ and suggests that cause and 
effect remains the most convincing explanation there is so far of the connection 
between reason and action. 
 
5. Davidson is responding here to the argument described by Mele, (Mele, A.R. 
1997: 14). Mele claims that a causal explanation of action contradicts a widely 
held view of freewill. If you describe your actions as being caused by reasons 
then there is sense in which it appears that as a free individual you seem to be 
determined by reasons. There seems to be some state of affairs that is simply 
part of you or some state of affairs outside of you that causes you to act. So it 




1. John Searle stresses that not all mental states exhibit intentionality. He points 
out that states of anxiety, depression or elation can be experienced without 
these being directed at anything in particular. These states can be experienced 
in a general and undirected way. Additionally when you say that you 
experience anxiety it is different from when you say you have a memory of a 
person. In the first instance the experience and the anxiety are 
indistinguishable, in the second instance the memory and the person are 
different.  On this basis he suggests that although it appears that intentionality 
and consciousness are the same thing they are not. If you are generally anxious 
without being able to put your finger on what it is that your anxiety is directed 
towards you do not have intentionality but you are conscious. Therefore you 
can be conscious without having intentionality, “the class of conscious states 
and the class of intentional mental states overlap but they are not identical […]” 
(Searle, J. 1983: 3) 
 
2. If it is accepted that mental states have intentional properties when they are 
directed towards the world then it is also important to point out that from a 
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phenomenological viewpoint, phenomena in the world can also lead you to 
have intentionality. An important aspect of phenomenology is the way that it 
helps in the recognition of how different phenomena in the world exist in 
different ways. In the example a bowl was perceived and remembered but in 
the other example a person was also admired and disliked. Bowls and people 
exist in different ways and these different ways of existing lead to different 
ways of orienting the self in relation to them. Perceptions and memories of a 
bowl are different to perceptions and memories of a person, just as admiration 
and dislike of a bowl is different to admiration and dislike for a person: “Things 
do not just exist; they also manifest themselves as what they are. Animals have 
a way of appearing that is different from that of plants, because animals are 
different from plants in their being.” (Sokolowski, R. 2000: 14)  
 
3. Husserl uses perception as a model on which to base an understanding of 
intentionality. He uses an example like the utterance of a word. This may first 
be experienced as a physical phenomenon. Sound without meaning. Equivalent 
to the way that voices in a crowd are experienced as an undifferentiated 
hubbub without focus. But as soon as you experience this sound as meaning, as 
soon as a word emerges from this background, an alteration in consciousness 
occurs. The sound is no longer merely a physical object but is “modified” (De 
Boer, T. 1978: 131). For Husserl this adjustment to consciousness, as you move 
from experiencing an abstract sound to experiencing a meaningful word, 
provides the basics for understanding intentionality. This adjustment in 
perception is identified as an intentional act. The actual event in space and time 
and the meaning occur together, there is no physical change in the sound but 
the perception adopts a new complexion. The word that emerges from the 
hubbub becomes attached to meaning via “[…] a new, sense giving act” (De 
Boer, T. 1978: 131). Husserl pushes his enquiry further by demanding to know 
“What in general is the surplus element distinguishing the understanding of a 
symbolically functioning expression from the uncomprehending verbal 
sound?” (Husserl, E. 1970: 567). He is trying to determine how the differences 
may be shown between hearing noise and hearing meaning from the same 
source and is also seeking to establish what is exemplary about the hearing of 
meaning. This ‘surplus’ is further evidence of the intentional act that provides 
something more than ‘data’. It is that “[…] which is found in experience itself, 
in its descriptive content as opposed to the raw existence of sense: it is the act-
character which, as it were, ensouls sense […]” (Husserl, E. 1970: 567) 
 
4. In summary Cartesian doubt states that much of what you perceive can be 
doubted. Everyone may be being misled in some way or another. Therefore you 
should doubt what is perceived as existing in order to get to something that you 
can be certain about. The world is perceived through the bodily faculties so this 
means that the world and the body must be doubted. However when the point 
is reached where everything that exists is doubted then the only thing that 
remains is the ability to doubt. In this sense Cartesianism suggests that 
although the existence of an exterior world that the body is part of can be 
denied the existence of a thinking self cannot be denied. If the existence of the 
body can be denied and at the same time the existence of a thinking self who 
doubts cannot be denied then there must be two kinds of thing: A mind and a 
body. This doctrine leads to two main problems: How can knowledge of 
anything be achieved if everything must be doubted and how do mind and 
body affect one another. One seems to be present in space and the other appears 
not be in space. 
 
5. His translator describes the general gist of this title as “nature makes freedom 
actual, freedom makes nature meaningful” (Ricoeur, P. 1966: xv). 
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6. This ambivalence emerges from the way that the body as an object is often 
called up to serve as a means of psychological explanation. Lived experiences 
become reduced to hard data “[…] by contamination from the object body 
which alone has the privilege of being exposed among objects” (Ricoeur, P. 
1966: 9). This can frequently seem inappropriate if the self is associated with 
intentionality. For Ricoeur it is important to emphasise the exchanges between 
the detached facts of an objectified world and life that “overflows” (Ricoeur, P. 




1. R.J. Bernstein’s initial description of praxis is based on the way that Aristotle 
categorises the term. Aristotle makes a general distinction between theoria and 
praxis that could very roughly be translated in today’s terms as theory and 
practice. The former term could be described as knowledge ‘for its own sake’, a 
kind of contemplative approach to knowledge. The latter term could be 
described as knowledge as it is lived in the ethical affairs of the individual. 
Bernstein describes praxis as “free activity (and the disciplines concerned with 
this activity) in the “polis”” (Bernstein, R.J. 1971: x). Bernstein emphasises that 
care should be taken not to make a sharp distinction between these two terms. 
Theoria should not be seen as an expression of remote and passive thought and 
praxis should not be seen as an expression of a kind of ‘nuts and bolts’ 
practicality. These are not isolated states of mind. They should be viewed as 
two aspects of the same thing. They are two ways of explaining how you live 
and use knowledge. Both expressions should be considered together while 
recognising that there is a “”high” and “low”” way of looking at praxis, 
(Bernstein, R.J. 1971: x). Bernstein differentiates between the ‘high’ of Aristotle’s 
ethically minded approach to a ‘good’ life and the ‘low’ of the contemporary 
understanding of the term that is related to practical mindedness. 
 
2. Bernstein cautions that when analytical approaches to action theory are 
considered there should be an awareness of two considerations that have the 
potential to radically alter any position that may be taken. Changes in scientific 
knowledge and changes in the social order can both change your understanding of 
human action. You have to be receptive to new developments in scientific 
knowledge because these may change your understanding of the psychology and 
physiology of human action. Experimental science may well present a credible 
case that demonstrates how human action can be reduced to a complex physical 
mechanism. You have to be sensitive to changes in the social order because if it is 
accepted that human action can be explained by reasons then the context in 
which these reasons take shape should be considered. It could be said that these 
reasons take shape in a neutral arena that has a timeless logic to it or it could be 
said that they take shape in a social order that is made of institutions and 
practices. If this is accepted then it must be accepted that these institutions and 
practices are subject to change and that these changes will affect the reasons 
used to explain human action. 
 
3. Later on Austin refines his thoughts on the nature of the speech-act. He 
identifies three areas that draw attention to the main features of the speech act. 
He calls these the “Locution, Illocution and Perlocution” (Austin J.L. 1962: 102). 
Locution is what we actually say, the actual words and their basic meaning. 
These words take place at the same time as the illocution. This is what we do 
“in saying something” (Austin J.L. 1962: 99). It is how our words are to be 
taken. Is what you say a question, a warning, a joke? Finally we have the 
perlocution. This is what the words are intended to bring about in the recipient: 
“[…] certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the 
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audience […]”(Austin J.L. 1962: 101). A locution might be: ‘I’ll meet you at 
lunch’. The illocution of this may be: an assurance. The perlocution of this 
might be: That settles what I am doing later.   
 
4. A materialist philosophy classically describes the world in terms of scientific 
laws. Accordingly human society rests on the natural laws of physics, chemistry 
and biology. Bernstein argues that this form of materialism can no longer be 
strictly applied to Marx’s philosophy if praxis plays a key role in his thought. 
He proposes that Marx’s materialism can be captured in a clearer light through 
an explanation of praxis.   
 
5. Lukács describes the creation of utility from natural materials as a primitive 
form of labour that emerged when early man made the transition from a 
natural relationship to his surroundings to the social organisation of his 
surroundings. Labour established a metabolism between natural existence and 
social organisation and consequently it is linked to the essence of social being. 
He suggests that the metabolism established by labour generates a qualitatively 
different form of objectivity from that of natural objectivity. Natural materials 
are worked on and put to use, but the results of labour do not form a 
continuation with the previous objectivity of nature. For Lukács human activity 
in the form of labour has its basis in reasoned intentions while natural 
objectivity lacks these reasons. This differentiates human activity not only from 
less active organic life like plants but also from the biological impulse that 
compels animals to their instinctive behaviour.  
 
6. While broadly accepting Habermas’s typology Joas continues to insist that 
Habermas should not absolutely rule out the production model of action. He 
proposes that the role of the production model of human action should not be 
understood negatively. Its role is not to conceal the differences between 
different types of human action but to explain what is shared among the 
diverse of kinds of human action, “the production model of action should be 
regarded not as an alternative to communicative action, but rather as a - 
problematical attempt - to grasp in metaphorical terms the central determining 
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